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THE WEAPON OF CHOICE

If the other fellow sells cheaper than you, it is called "dumping"!
Course, if you sell cheaper than him, that's "mass production." 1

Tariffs no longer matter in international trade law. Between
1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
entered into force, 2 and 1994, the eve of the entry into force of the
Uruguay Round agreements, 3 average tariffs in industrial countries
plunged from 40% to 6.3%. 4 As a result of the Uruguay Round,
that average will fall to just 3.9% and the percentage of industrial
products (by value) that receive duty-free treatment will rise from
20% to 43%. 5 Nontariff barriers are what matter in late twentieth
and early twenty-first century international trade law, leaving protectionists with few remaining weapons to achieve their goals.
In the 1980s the United States began to utilize antidumping law
as its weapon of choice. 6 Only eighty-four U.S. antidumping
orders, applicable to exporters from twenty-three countries, were
I. Will Rogers, quoted in JAMES BovARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAuD 107 (1991) [hereinafter BovARD].
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened far sif;nature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
3. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, Hein's No. KAY 3778.
4. POWELL, GoLDSTEIN, FRAZER & MURPHY, BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON GATT
ANTIDUMPING IssuES, tab A, at 17 (June 1994) (on file with The George Washington journal of
International Law and Economics).
5. /d. For analyses of the economic effects of the Uruguay Round agreements, see
U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: URuGuAY
RouND FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OvERALL U.S. EcoNOMIC GAINS 2-5 (1994); OFFICE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY RouND: Joss FOR THE UNITED STATES. GRowrH
FOR THE WORLD 6-15 (n.d.);JEFFREYj. ScHoTT, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L EcoNOMICS, THE URuGUAY ROUND: AN AsSESSMENT (1994).
6. See Bryan T.Johnson, A Guide to Antidumping Laws: America's Unfair Trade Practice,
BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Foundation), July 21, 1992, at 1, 4-5 (stating that "successive
GATT rounds have eliminated many forms of direct trade protectionism [and] U.S.
antidumping laws thus have proved to be a more convenient tool to limit competition by
denying foreigners access to the U.S. market") (on file with The George Washington journal of
International Law and Economics); Nancy Dunne, US Companies Use Protectionist Tactics, Says
Budget Office, FIN. TIMEs, June 16, 1994, at 5 (noting biases in U.S. antidumping law against
foreign exporters and U.S. consumers of foreign goods); Frances Williams, Dumping Complaints Rising &zpidly, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at 5 (discussing the "growing use of antidumping rules to keep out unwanted imports").
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in effect in 1980. 7 These orders affected just 131 categories of merchandise in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), or 3.43% of
U.S. imports. 8 By 1990 there were 197 orders applicable to exporters from forty-two countries. 9 These orders affected 219 categories
of merchandise in the HTS, or 9.59% of U.S. imports. 10 In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) found dumping in
over 90% of all antidumping petitions filed during this period.U
Between 1985 and 1992 the DOC terminated only 2% of all U.S.
antidumping cases because of a lack of dumping. 12 Similarly, the
U.S. International Trade Commission (lTC) found that injury
existed in just under 60% of all cases. 13
Antidumping law also became a potent weapon for protectionists
in other countries in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990 the United
States, Australia, Canada, and the European Union were responsible for bringing 95% of all antidumping cases worldwide. 14 That
figure dropped to 80% between 1985 and 1992, 15 suggesting an
increase in other countries' use of antidumping law as a weapon. 16
Unsurprisingly, the Economist printed in 1988 that "[a]nti-dumping suits are emerging as the chemical weapons of the world's trade
wars." 17
7.

Keith B. Anderson, Antidumping Laws in the United States: Use and Welfare Conse-

quences,]. WoRLD TRADE, Apr. 1993, at 99, 102. Unless otherwise noted, the term "exporter"
as used herein includes both the foreign company producing merchandise and the foreign
company exporting that merchandise.
8. /d. at 105.
9. /d. at 102.
10. /d. at 105.
11. PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A. at 13. See PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE
GATT AND U.S. TRADE PouCY 81 ( 1993). The 90% figure may reflect the high cost (both in
terms of time and money) of bringing a petition. As a result of the high cost, marginal
petitions (those with little chance of success) are not filed.
It should be clear that not all affirmative dumping determinations yield equal results. As
a rule of thumb, unless a petitioner successfully proves the existence of a dumping margin
of at least 10% or more and obtains a double-digit antidumping duty order, it is unlikely to
view the competitive playing field as leveled. See Greg Rushford, Americas "MIT/ Without
Brains", WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995, at A12 (for an acerbic critique of the DOC's lmpon
Administration Department, the agency responsible for dumping margin determinations).
12. ScHOTT, supra note 5, at 78 n.l.
13. Low, supra note 11, at 81. As a result of settlements and other dispositions, "(w]ell
under half of all [antidumping] cases [brought in the United States actually] result[ ed] in
the imposition of duties." Gary N. Horlick, The United States Antidumping System, in
ANTIDUMPING LAw AND PRACTICE: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY 99, 165 n.254 (John H. Jackson &
Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
14. Johnson, supra note 6, at 5.
15. ScHoTT, supra note 5, at 78.
16. See id. at 79.
17. The Anti-Dumping Dodge, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1988, at 77.
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Surely, the Uruguay Round was supposed to destroy the
antidumping law weapon. Due to its wide-ranging agreements on
nontariff matters, the Uruguay Round is hailed as the most ambitious and trade-liberalizing multilateral trade negotiation in GATT
history. 18 Fortunately for protectionists seeking undeserved protection from competitive imports, the antidumping law weapon survived. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Agreement),I9
ensures that antidumping law will remain a weapon of choice, at
least until the conclusion of the next round of multilateral trade
negotiations. 20 The Agreement deserves the "C+" grade assigned to
it by one economist21 because it
will add new layers to the arbitrary rules governing the use of
antidumping measures, but will do little to assuage the concerns of
exporters and import-competing industries alike about the abuse of trading rules. Indeed, as these changes promote the adoption of
antidumping laws in more and more countries, the number of
antidumping actions is likely to expand rapidly. This will
undoubtedly lead to more trade disputes among [World Trade
18. As the legislative history to the U.S. legislation implementing the Uruguay Round
agreements indicates:
In addition to updating and further developing the codes on non-tariff measures
negotiated in the previous two rounds of multilateral trade negotiations-making
most of them multilateral agreements instead of limited membership agreements
as negotiated in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds-the Uruguay Round tackled
new areas, such as services, intellectual property rights, and investment, reflecting
the growing complexity of the world trading system .... Furthermore, the Uruguay Round overhauled the mechanism for settling disputes among signatory
countries and established the World Trade Organization (WTO), which will provide a permanent arena for member governments to address issues affecting their
multilateral trade relations as well as to oversee the implementation of the trade
agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
SENATE COMM. ON FIN., SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, AND SENATE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, S. REP. No. 412,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also HousE CoMM. oN WAYS
AND MEANs, URUGUAY RouND AGREEMENTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 826, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3773 [hereinafter HousE REPORT] ("The Uruguay
Round Agreements are the broadest, most comprehensive trade agreements in history ....
They are vital to our national interest and to economic growth, job creation, and an
improved standard of living for all Americans."); Results of the Uruguay Round Negotiations:
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 103d Con g., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1994) (statement of
Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, discussing the merits of the "largest, broadest trade agreement in history" that is "shaped to the strengths of our economy").
19. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, Dec. 15, 1993, Hein's No. KAV 3778,
annex 1A, no. 8, at 1-26 [hereinafter Agreement].
20. See Gary N. Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea, The World Trade Organization Antidumping
Agreement,]. WoRLD TRADE, Feb. 1995, at 5, 6-23 (for a discussion of the negotiating history
of the Agreement).
21. ScHOTT, supra note 5, at 8, 12.

6

Geo. Wash. ]. Int'l L. & Econ.

[Vol. 29

Organization] trading partners. In short, the agreement provides a bandage to a festering sore of trade policy . . . .22
Title II, subtitle A of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Act) ,23
which implements the Agreement by amending the Tariff Act of
1930 (1930 Act), 24 also merits a C+. The Agreement and the Act
fail to resolve the central crisis facing antidumping law: abuse of
the law by protectionists who use it as a nontariff barrier to trade.
The new law invites protectionist abuse because it is replete with
ambiguous language and neglects to consider the relationship
between pricing strategy and costs of production. It should be
replaced with a straightforward "traffic-light" system. In this system
only "red-light" dumping, which entails predatory behavior, would
be unlawful. No liability would be ascribed to "yellow-light" or
"green-light" dumping.
Part II of this Article presents an economic analysis of antidumping law and explains why the clear consensus of scholarly opinion
finds no economic justification for antidumping law. More importantly, it emphasizes that this consensus is of little practical value.
Antidumping law is here to stay, thus making the more appropriate
inquiry whether its use for protectionist purposes may be circum22. /d. at 85 (emphasis added).
23. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4842-4901
(1994) [hereinafter Act] (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
For discussions of U.S. implementation of the Agreement, see generally Alan F. Holmer
et al., Enacted and Rejected Amendments to the Antidumping Law: In Implementation or Contravention of the Antidumping Agreement~, 29 INT'L LAw. 483 (1995) (discussing the debate between
those in favor and those opposed to antidumping law); David Palmeter, United States Implementation of the Uruguay Round Antidumping Code,]. WoRLD TRADE, June 1995, at 39 (discussing changes in U.S. antidumping law because of the Uruguay Round).
In January 1995, the DOC published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking soliciting suggestions for regulatory changes to implement the Act and improvements in
antidumping law generally. 60 Fed. Reg. 80 ( 1995) (proposed Jan. 3, 1995). This Article
does not address the notice or the many comments made by practitioners. For an example
of propetitioner comments, see Letter from Michael H. Stein & John A. Ragosta of Dewey
Ballantine to Susan G. Esserman, assistant secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce (Feb.
3, 1995) (with attached materials) (on file with The George Washington University journal of
International Law and Economics). For an example of prorespondent comments, see Letter
from Eugene J. Milosh, president, Association of Exporters and Importers to Susan G.
Esserman, assistant secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce (Feb. 3, 1995) (with attached
materials) (on file with The George Washington University journal of International Law and
Economics).
24. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 19 U.S.C.). Major amendments to the antidumping provisions of the 1930 Act were
made by the following acts: Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144;
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2984; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
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scribed. In answering this question, Part II defines protectionist
abuse.
Part III reviews pre-Uruguay Round U.S. antidumping law. This
review is worthwhile for four reasons. First, the reader must understand the status quo ante to recognize the significance of the
Agreement and the Act because the protectionist abuse problem,
left unresolved by the Agreement and the Act, is rooted in prior
law. Second, the pre-Uruguay Round regime is applicable to cases
arising before January 1, 1995, when the Act took effect. 25 The new
regime only applies to cases where an antidumping petition or a
request for an annual review of an existing antidumping order is
filed on or after January 1, 1995. 26 As a result, the United States will
have two parallel antidumping regimes for several years to come.
Third, much of prior law remains good law for cases arising after
January 1, 1995. Although the Agreement and the Act significantly
modify certain aspects of prior law, they leave other mcoyor areassuch as procedural aspects of preliminary and final determinations-relatively untouched. Finally, most economic analyses of
antidumping law proceed immediately to the level of impractical
grand theory and neglect to consider how antidumping law actually works. An understanding of pre-Uruguay Round antidumping
law assists in bridging the gap between theory and operation.
Part IV argues that post-Uruguay Round antidumping law is textually ambiguous and ignores the cost structure of petitioners and
respondents. 27 Part IV advances five key points. First, the Agreement and the Act expand the universe of potential petitioners and
cases. Second, they provide a petitioner with numerous opportunities to manipulate a dumping margin calculation to achieve the
maximum margin. Third, their injury provisions enhance the ability of a petitioner to claim successfully that it is injured by reason of
dumped imports. Fourth, they permit the scope of an antidumping
order to be expanded easily to include component parts and new
25. Act, supra note 23, § 291, 108 Stat. at 4931.
26. Id.
27. The petitioner, in most antidumping actions, is a U.S. producer of a domestic like
product-merchandise identical or akin to the merchandise subject to investigation-or a
union. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1994).
The respondent in an antidumping action is usually the exporter of subject merchandise-the allegedly dumped product under investigation. The U.S. importer of the merchandise is also likely to be a respondent, particularly where the importer is legally related
to the exporter. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B) (1994). When an importer is unrelated to a
respondent-exporter, its role typically is limited to monitoring a case, even though the
importer is liable for any antidumping duties imposed.
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shippers. Fifth, they make revocation of an antidumping order
difficult.
Part IV also emphasizes the distinctions between the Agreement
and the Act. It asks whether the United States faithfully implemented the Agreement and suggests that in at least three areasprice averaging, captive production, and anticircumvention-the
Act is inconsistent with the Agreement. These areas may give rise to
challenges by other countries against the United States in a future
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution proceeding.
Part V considers how the Uruguay Round negotiators should
have addressed the problem of protectionist abuse. It proposes a
traffic-light system, based on the microeconomic theory of the cost
structure of a firm, that eliminates some of the ambiguities in the
Agreement and the Act. The traffic-light system focuses on predatory behavior. Dumping is considered predatory and occurs when
an exporter sells merchandise in the United States at a price below
its average total and variable costs of production. Under this system
such behavior is categorized as unlawful red-light dumping. Yellowlight dumping occurs when an exporter sells at a price below its
average total cost but above its average variable costs of production, and it leads to the issuance of a caution. Green-light dumping
is defined as pricing above average total cost of production and is
lawful.
Part VI provides concluding remarks.
II.

THE EcoNoMIC CRITIQUE

In a substantial number of [antidumping] cases the root of the
problem is a loss of comparative advantage. 28
A.

Antidumping Law as Protectionism

Broadly defined, dumping is international price discrimination.29 It occurs when an exporter sells merchandise in the import28. Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Antidumping and Market Disruption: The
Incentive Effects of Antidumping Laws, in THE MuLTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND
OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 155, 164 (Robert M. Stem ed., 1993) (citation omitted).
29. jACOB VINER, DuMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (Augustus M. Kelley
1991) (1923). Ever since Viner published his classic economic study in 1923, economists
have characterized dumping as cross-border price discrimination. See, e.g., MELVYN B.
KRAuss, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: THE WELFARE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 68-70
(1978) (wAccording to Article VII of GATT, dumping is defined as the sale of a product
abroad at a lower price than charged domestically."); KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT 168
(1970) (analyzing Viner's work and discussing dumping as international price discrimination); Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in THE MULTILATERAL
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ing country at a price significantly below that at which it sells like
merchandise in its home country. 30 If the home market is not viable for this comparison, the exporter's prices in a third country or
a constructed value (CV) is used to determine whether it is dumping.31 A stricter definition of dumping is that it occurs when the
exporter sells merchandise in the importing country at a price
below its cost of production. 32 In either case, dumping is actionable if: (1) it causes or threatens to cause material i~ury to an established industry in the importing country; or (2) it materially
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 28, at 135, 136-42; John J. Barcelo III, Antidumping Laws as
Barriers to Trade-The United States and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CoRNELL L.
REv. 491, 500-16 (1972) (for an analysis of Viner's Work).
The economic literature on dumping is voluminous. See RANIER M. BIERWAGEN, GATT
ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN ANTI-DUMPING LAws 171 ( 1990) (for an excellent bibliography as of 1990); Richard D. Boltuck, An Economic Analysis of Dumping, J.
WoRLD TRADE L., 1987, at 45 [hereinafter An Economic Analysis of Dumping]: Richard D.
Boltuck, Reply to Professor Lazar's Comment on "An Economic Analysis of Dumping", J. WoRLD
TRADE L., 1988, at 129 [hereinafter Reply to Lazar]; Fred Lazar, Structural/Strategic Dumping:
A Comment on Richard Boltuck 's "An Economic Analysis of Dumping", J. WoRLD TRADE L., 1988,
at 91; Michael Leidy, Antidumping: Unfair Trade or Unfair Remedy, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1995, at
27.
Much of the recent scholarship emphasizes econometric models of dumping. See generally Dan Bernhardt, Dumping, Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty, 8 J. EcoN. DYNAMICS & CoNTROL 349 (1984); James Brander & Paul Krugman, A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of
International Trade, 15J. INT'L EcoN. 313 (1983); Satya P. Das & Adwait K Mohanty, Dumjr
ing in International Markets and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 17 J. INT'L EcoN. 149
( 1984); Stephen W. Davies & Anthony J. McGuiness, Dumping at Less than Marginal Cost, 12
J. INT'L EcoN. 169 (1982); Wilfred]. Ethier, Dumping, 90J. PoL. EcoN. 487 (1982); Brian
Pinto, Repeated Games and the "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of Trade, 20 J. INT'L EcoN. 357
(1986); Daniel Trefler, Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An
Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy, 101 J. PoL. EcoN. 138 (1993). At least one observer
finds these studies "not very helpful~ because "[t]hey depend on a number of assumptions
which render them useless for day to day use as well as for a more general hypothesis.~
BIERWAGEN, supra, at 10. My own review of the econometric analyses leads to the same
conclusion.
30. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 103D CoNe., 1ST SEss., OvERviEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 62 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter OvERVIEW).
Article VI of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) defines dumping as the sale of merchandise in an export market at a price below normal value (NV).
GATT, supra note 2, 61 Stat. at A23-25, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212; see KENNETH R. SIMMONDS &
BRIAN H.W. HILL, LAw AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT 12 (1988). The NV is the price
charged by the exporter for like merchandise in its home market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(3) (d)
(1994). If there are no sales in the exporter's home market (or the volume of such sales is
small), the NV is estimated by calculating either the price the exporter charges in a third
market or a constructed value (CV). 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(3)(e) (1994). The CV is the sum of
the cost of: (1) materials and fabrication; (2) selling, general, and administrative (SG&A)
expenses; (3) profits; and (4) containers, coverings, and items incidental to placing the
merchandise in a condition ready for shipment to the importing country. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(3)(e)(l) (1994).
31. See discussion infra part III.C.3.
32. BIERWAGEN, supra note 29, at 8.
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retards the establishment of an industry in that country. 33 The
importing country may react . to dumping by imposing an
antidumping duty on the dumped merchandise in the amount of
the dumping margin. The dumping margin is the difference
between the prices for the merchandise in the exporter's home
market and the importing country.s4
An exporter may successfully engage in a bifurcated cross-border
price strategy upon the existence of three necessary and sufficient
conditions. 35 First, the exporter's home market and the importing
country's market must be segregated so that merchandise does not
flow between them. Tariff and nontariff barriers in the exporter's
home market must support a higher home market price and consumers must face significant costs in traveling to the importer's
market. Once this condition is met, the cross-border price differential may persist because of the impracticality of arbitrage (buying
the product in the cheaper market and selling it in the more
expensive market).36
Second, the exporter must not face perfect competition in both
markets. It must have sufficient market power to influence the
price of merchandise in at least one of the markets. 37 Without such
power, any price differential for merchandise in the different markets would not be within its control. 38 In an extreme case, the
exporter is a monopolist in its home market and a perfect competitor in the importing country's market.
Third, the exporter must face a relatively more elastic demand
curve for merchandise in the importing country's market, and a
relatively less elastic demand curve for like merchandise in its
home market. This differential may result from trade barriers that
shield the exporter from competition in its home market. 39 Absent
this elasticity differential, the price charged by the exporter in the
importing country would equal or exceed the price charged in its
home market and there would be no dumping. 40
33. 19 u.s.c. § 1673(2) (1994).
34. GAIT, supra note 2, art. VI, 61 Stat. at A23, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212; SIMMONDS & HILL,
supra note 30, at 13.
35. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 158-59.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 159.
38. Id.
39. ld.
40. For example, in a world of uncertainty, unintentional dumping may occur
because of changes in exchange rates. In this world only the first condition is requiredmarket power and elasticities are irrelevant. ld.
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Economists generally agree that, except for predation, dumping
is "basically harmless for the importing country." 41 Consumers in
the importing country benefit from the lower price of imported
goods:
If one takes the importing country's viewpoint only, all consumers are being favored. That is, the importing country as a whole
benefits unambiguously from dumping to the extent that it
acquires access to imported goods at a lower price than it would
if dumping were not taking place. This lower price must be a
benefit to the importing country as a whole, despite distributional effects that will hurt some residents who compete with
imports, precisely because the importing country is a net
demander of the dumped good. 4 2

Empirical evidence strongly suggests that this gain outweighs the
cost to producers in the importing country, measured by reduced
profits, and to their employees, in terms of reduced employment.
One economist's 1989 to 1990 welfare analysis of eight U.S.
antidumping proceedings found that
such duties are an extremely costly way to improve the profitability of U.S. producers or employment in U.S. industries. In
these eight cases, the consumer cost per dollar of increased
profits ranged from 2.40 to 25.10 dollars, with an average cost of
8.00 dollars. The cost to the U.S. economy per dollar of profit
range[d] from 0.20 to 10.80 dollars, with an average value of
3.60 dollars. The minimum consumer cost per job created was
113,800 dollars, while the minimum cost to the economy to create an additional job was 14,300 dollars. 43

The ITC recently considered what the economywide welfare
effects would have been if all outstanding U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty orders in 1991 had been removed. 44 These
orders affected $9 billion out of $491 billion, or approximately
1.8% of all U.S. merchandise imports in 1991. 45 The ITC estimated
that these orders imposed a net welfare cost on the U.S. economy
of $1.59 billion, or 0.03% of the U.S. gross domestic product in
1991 ($5.725 trillion). 46 The loss to consumers in the form of
41. Deardorff, supra note 29, at 135.
42. /d. at 139.
43. Anderson, supra note 7, at 115 (foomote omitted). In theory, the gain to consumers from lower prices could be taxed and redistributed to companies and workers injured
by competition from lower-price imports. In the context of current trade remedy laws,
petitioners could bring safeguard actions and receive adjustment assistance. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251 (1994).
44. The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-344, at ix Uune 1995).
45. /d. at ix.
46. /d.
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higher prices far outweighed the benefit to petitioning industries
in the form of increased output and employment. 47
Taking both the exporting and the importing countries into consideration, it is impossible to prove a priori that the welfare effects
of cross-border price discrimination are negative. Although consumers in the exporter's home market are harmed by a higher
price, the source of the higher price is the exporter's monopoly
power, not dumping. Such power enables the exporter to gamer
monopoly rents by charging a price above its marginal cost of production. These extra profits do not offset the welfare loss to consumers in the exporting country.
The same logic applies to the less extreme situation where the
exporter charges a high (but not monopoly) price in the home
market and a low (but not perfectly competitive) price in the
importing country. Whether the aforementioned benefits from
cheaper prices in the importing country offset the net loss from
monopoly prices in the exporter's country is uncertain. As Kenneth Dam concludes:
The fact that governments act against dumping only when the
low price is charged in their own territory reveals that governments are concerned with the welfare of their own enterprises
rather than with the protection of their citizens from extremely
high prices charged by monopoly sellers. If the problem were
really the discrimination itself, then presumably governments
would be more concerned to attack high prices than low prices.
Where an exporter sold at home at higher prices than he sold
abroad, it would be the exporter's government, not the
importer's government, that would take coercive action. The
General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade], like the governments themselves, views the impact in the low-price country as
the harmful aspect of dumping ....
The concern with dumping is therefore a concern with the
protection of domestic industry from international
competition. 48

Two hypothetical inqmnes illustrate the fallacy of assuming
dumping is evil. First, suppose that antidumping laws are repealed
and the conditions that make dumping possible are eliminated.
Theoretically, prices in the home and importing countries would
converge because of cross-border arbitrage. 49 Consumers in the
47. This static result, however, does not consider the cumulative effect of outstanding
antidumping orders over time.
48. DAM, supra note 29, at 168.
49. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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home country would benefit from lower prices, consumers in the
importing country would be harmed by higher prices, and the
exporter's profits would decline. Whether the benefits to the consumers in the home country outweigh the losses to the consumers
in the importing country is uncertain. The net welfare effect of the
repeal can only be forecast as positive if the exporter's monopoly
position in the home country is completely undermined, and it
behaves like a perfect competitor in the importing country.
Second, suppose an antidumping duty is imposed on the
exporter's merchandise in an effort to level the competitive playing
field between that merchandise and like merchandise produced by
companies in the importing country. In this situation, consumers
in the importing country are the clear losers. They must pay a
higher price for the imported product because of the duty. In addition, they may have to pay a higher price for like merchandise
because other companies may competitively raise prices to match
the price of the imported merchandise. 50
One observer points out that between 1980 and 1989, "almost all
foreign companies investigated for alleged dumping [in the
United States] were found guilty." 51 That observer concludes:
While many people consider dumping an arcane subject, dumping penalties have forced Americans to pay more for photo
albums, pears, mirrors, ethanol, cement, shock absorbers, roof
shingles, codfish, televisions, paint brushes, cookware, motorcycle batteries, bicycles, martial art uniforms, computers and computer disks, telephone systems, forklifts, radios, flowers, aspirin,
staplers and staples, paving equipment, and fireplace mesh
panels. Dumping laws increasingly prevent American businesses
from getting vital foreign supplies and machinery. Commerce
Department officials now effectively have direct veto power over
the pricing policies of over 3,000 foreign companies. Dumping
law constitutes potential political price controls over almost
$500 billion in imports a year. 52
50.

William J. Davey, Antidumping Laws in the GAIT and the EC, in ANTIDUMPING LAw
supra note 13, at 298; see also Laura Fraedrich, The japanese Minivan
Antidumping Case: How American Manufacturm Lost the Legal Battles But Won the War, 2 Gw.
MAsoN U. L. REv. 107, 120-24 (1994) (for a discussion of harm to consumer interests
resulting from an antidumping case brought and lost by General Motors, Chrysler, and
Ford againstJapanese minivan manufacturers).
51. BovARD, supra note 1, at 108.
52. Id.; see also N. David Palmeter, The Capture of the Antidumping Law, 14 YALEJ. INT'L
L. 182, 190 n.44 (1989) (citing Department of the Treasury, Antidumping Duties, in UNITED
STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 395, 406 (1971)
(pointing out that a DOC determination of dumping has a chilling effect on a U.S.
importer)).
AND PRAcncE,
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In effect, when the interests of consumers of dumped merchandise
are considered, application of antidumping law makes the playing
field less competitive.
.
What about the predation case where an exporter attempts to
drive its competitors in the importing country out of business and
then raise its prices? In this situation the exporter's conduct is
unfair and antidumping law affords protection to its competitors in
the importing country. The law, however, is clumsy. It confuses
predatory and nonpredatory behavior because it fails to consider
the exporter's cost structure. As long as the exporter's marginal
revenue from sales in the importing country exceeds its marginal
cost of production, the exporter is behaving in an economically
rational fashion. 53 Moreover, an exporter that sells merchandise in
the importing country at a price above its average variable cost of
production is not engaging in predatory behavior. 54 The law protects the exporter's competitors from rational, nonpredatory
behavior. Competitors are not challenged to reduce their cost
structures to remain competitive with the exporter. The development of a perfectly competitive market in the importing country is
throttled and consumers are denied the benefit of lower prices:
In using the predation rationale for AD [antidumping], purportedly the interests of consumers are being advanced, not
those of import-competing firms. Yet in the absence of successful predation, the imposition of AD duties can only harm
domestic consumers. As AD actions cause exporters to recoil
from the foreign market, competitive pressures are diminished
and domestic prices move upward. It is rather paradoxical that
vigilant and enthusiastic application of AD by policy officials
tends to promote the result that it is supposed to combat under
the predation justification: monopoly pricing. 5 5
Skepticism about the economic effects of antidumping law motivates some scholars to argue for repeal of the law. 5 6 These scholars
53. Davey, supra note 50, at 296 (defining and describing the role of marginal cost
and marginal utility in a microeconomic sense). See generaUy PAuL A. SAMUELSON, EcoNOMICS 431-32, 439-43 (lith ed. 1980) (discussing marginal cost and utility, cost curves, and
shutdown and breakeven points).
54. See infra notes 342-350 and accompanying text.
55. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 162.
56. See generaUy BIERWAGEN, supra note 29, at 168-69 (concluding that the final step in
reforming antidumping legislation is to phase it out in favor of domestic antitrust and
competition law); BovARD, supra note I, at 160 ("The U.S. should take the lead in the
dismantling of antidumping laws."); Davey, supra note 50, at 296-97 (antidumping laws are
not "justified economically"); GABRIELLE MARCEAU, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-TRUST ISSUES
IN FREE-TRADE AREAs 310-18 (1994) (discussing measures to phase out antidumping provisions on a regional basis in order to integrate economies); RicHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 309-ll (4th ed. 1992) (describing antidumping policies as protectionist
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present four lines of attack. First, they argue antidumping law is
redundant to domestic antitrust laws. 57 The Robinson-Patman
Act58 proscribes price discrimination, 5 9 while section two of the
Sherman Act60 outlaws predatory pricing.6 1 This redundancy vioand thus not justified); Wesley K Caine, A Casefrn Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 13 LAw & Pot.'Y INT't. Bus. 681, 681-83, 724-26 (1981) (arguing
antidumping provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 are unpredictable, unfair, and should be
repealed); Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Case far Reconciliation, 22
TEx. INT't. LJ. 265, 288 (1987) (concluding both the United States and the second GATT
antidumping duty code provisions should be reconsidered). But see Richard Boltuck &
Robert E. Litan, America's "Unfair" Trade Laws, in DoWN IN THE DuMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF
THE UNFAIR TRADE LAws 1, 10-11 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (summarizing new economic rationales in favor of antidumping laws and rebuttals).
57. See generatry BIERWAGEN, supra note 29, at 162-64 (discussing the substitution of
antidumping law with competition law); PosNER, supra note 56, at 309-11 (explaining
dumping and the free-trade question) ;Jacques HJ. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy: A
Peaceful Coexistence? European Community Perspective-[, INT't. Bus. LAw., Feb. 1989, at 58-67
(discussing antidumping actions in context of competition law in the European Community) ;Jacques HJ. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy: A Peaceful Coexistence? European Community Perspective-//, INT't. Bus. LAw., Mar. 1989, at 115-22 (reviewing European
Community trade policy); Terry Calvani & Randolph W. Tritell, Invocation of United States
Import Relief Laws as an Antitrust Violation, 31 ANTITRuST But.L. 527 (1986) (explaining why
the U.S. import relief laws are antitrust violations);Jeffrey L. Kessler, The Antidumping Act of
1916: Antitrust Analogue ar Anathema?, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 485 (1987) (discussing provisions
and the legislative history of the rarely used Antidumping Act of 1916 which aimed at
"prevention of predatory international price discrimination") (emphasis omitted); Thomas
J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need far a Synthesis
with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT't. L. & CoM. REG. 393, 398-402 (1993) (arguing that "the
antidumping laws have numerous shortcomings"); A Paul Victor, Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies by Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT't. L. & Pot.. 339 (1983) (reviewing
the relationship between U.S. antidumping and antitrust laws); George Yarrow, Economic
Aspects of Anti-dumping Policies, 3 OxFORD REv. EcoN. Pot.'Y 66 (1987) (assessing the current
policies of antidumping); Note, The Antidumping Act-Tariff ar Antitrust Law?, 74 YALE LJ.
707 ( 1965) (explaining how the Antidumping Act is a hybrid of tariff ideas and theories of
antitrust law). But see Ronald A Cass, Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust
and International Trade: A Comment, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 877 (1993) (arguing that antidumping law assesses price discrimination and predation in a markedly different manner from
international law). One scholar suggests a new way of viewing the injury requirement in
antidumping law that is based on antitrust law principles, but stops short of calling for the
repeal of antidumping law. Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-Based
Approach, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1153, 1174-93 (1989); see also Richard D. Boltuck & Seth Kaplan,
Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation Be Reconciled?, 61 U. CIN. L.
REv. 903, 912-13 (1993) (critically appraising Wood's position).
58. Robinson-Patrnan Antidiscrimination Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1994) ).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(b), 21(a) (1994); seealsoChritopherM. Barbuto, Note, Toward
a Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An .International Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman,
62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2047, 2085-94 (1994) (discussing the convergence of antitrust and
antidumping law).
60. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
u.s.c. §§ 1-7 (1994)).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Some economists suggest that antitrust laws are the appropriate means for combating predatory pricing. See, e.g., Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at
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lates the natio~al treatment clause of Article III of the 1947 GATT,
which suggests that conduct permitted domestically should be
treated similarly if engaged in intemationally. 62 Antidumping law
does not apply to the domestic context. A domestic company
engaged in price discrimination or predatory pricing only in its
home country may run afoul of antitrust law but not of antidumping law. One could argue, however, that antidumping law is not
redundant to domestic laws because
161 ("In the unlikely event that an anticompetitive outcome develops from a strategy of
predatory dumping, this could be challenged under existing antitrust or competition laws,
assuming that problems related to extraterritorial enforcement can be overcome." (footnote omitted)); Barbuto, supra note 59, at 2089-94 (suggesting a convergence of antitrust
and trade law).
The antitrust literature on predatory pricing is extensive and a review of it is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally Harvey M. Applebaum, Foreign Predation & Price Discrimination against U.S. Firms-Antidumping Under Title VII, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE PoLICIES IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-11 (Barry Hawk ed., 1985) (examining the issue of predatory
intent in antidumping law); RoBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITsELF (1978) (reviewing antitrust policies); George A. Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide
to the Predatory Pricing Literature, in EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAw 209 (Terry
Calvani &John Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988) (discussing the wave of economic litigation on
predatory pricing); HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLICY: THE LAw OF CoMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 298-328 (1994) (reviewing predatory pricing); Phillip Areeda &
Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARv. L. REv. 697, 700-32 (1975) (discussing tests for distinguishing between predatory
and competitive pricing);Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing
Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 738, 765-92 ( 1981)
(outlining the rules on predatory pricing and their relationship to current economic theories); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263,
318-33 (1981) (discussing potential remedies for predation); James D. Hurwitz & William
E. Kovacic, judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63, 94-99
(1982) (discussing the effect of debate on judicial decisions); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.]. 213, 242-58 (1979)
(examining alternative policies for predatory pricing); Charles W. McCall, Predatory Pricing:
An Economic and Legal Analysis, 32 ANTITRUST BuLL. 1, 9-19 (1987) (critically reviewing the
legislative guidelines used in predatory pricing litigation); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing
and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869, 869-83 (1976) (examining the shortcomings of the Areeda-Turner analysis of predatory pricing); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE LJ. 284 (1977) (discussing the
consensus in favor of cost-based rules dealing with predatory pricing).
For a discussion ofnonprice predatory behavior such as exclusive dealing arrangements,
see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 230-49 (1986) (demonstrating how antitrust enforcers can develop a set of objective guidelines to carry out a new two-step
analysis).
62. MARcEAu, supra note 56, at 101-29; Davey, supra note 50, at 297; Horlick, supra
note 13, at 10 l n.1. Of course, one could argue that there is no violation because Article VI
of the GATT authorizes antidumping law and, therefore, is an exception to the national
treatment clause. This rebuttal may explain why no argument about inconsistency has
been made in a GATT proceeding.
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[o]ver time, antidumping policy and antitrust policy have
diverged strikingly. Antidumping law and policy have evolved
along a path of ever-increasing protection for U.S. firms from
imports and decreasing concern for consumers and the econ9my as a whole. Antitrust law relating to predatory pricing, at
least in recent decades, has taken a path of increasing concern
for consumers and the economy as a whole and decreasing concern for firms suffering intense competition.
Antidumping law no longer acts primarily against predatory
pricing. It acts against international price discrimination (sales
at a lower price in the United States than in the home country
of the exporter) and sales below cost, regardless of whether the
sales are predatory. Yet, the relevant provisions of the antitrust
laws prohibit only predatory pricing; they do not prohibit selling
below cost or price discrimination analogous to that prohibited
by the antidumping laws except in cases where it is predatory.
This difference is important. Predatory pricing is detrimental
to economic welfare because it leads to monopolies, which
cause economic inefficiency and raise concerns about social
equity. It seldom occurs, however, because it is rarely a profitable strategy and is usually not possible. By contrast, nonpredatory price discrimination and sales below cost generally provide
net benefits to the country receiving the lower price, and both
are relatively common. Moreover, seldom do cases of price discrimination or selling below cost have anything to do with predatory pricing. 63
Antidumping law is not redundant to antitrust law because it is a
practical and political necessity in a world in which cross-border
price discrimination is possible because of protection in home
markets.
Second, scholars argue antidumping law is unnecessary because
injury to an industry caused by imports can be addressed by safeguard or escape clause actions under section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974. 64 Section 201 provides assistance to companies and workers who suffer from fair foreign competition. Applying it in the
context of dumping is legitimate because dumping is not necessar-

63. CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A REVIEW OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTER·
VAIUNG-Durr LAw AND Poucv 2-3 (May 1994) (memorandum) [hereinafter CBO
MEMORANDUM].
64. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-14 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1994)); see also Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 171-72,
174-75, 178-79 (stating that antidumping injury requirement is less stringent than safeguard injury requirement); CBO MEMORANDUM, supra note 63, at 3-7 (describing section
201 escape clause).
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ily unfair. 65 Adjustment assistance, however, is difficult to obtain
and meager in amount.66
Third, they argue antidumping law cannot address the source of
the problem of the alleged unfair pricing-the closed foreign market. 67 Although antidumping law may serve as a bargaining chip in
dealing with a closed foreign market, the law does not aim to dismantle the tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in an exporter's
home market that ensure market segmentation. If these barriers
were removed, one of the three conditions necessary for dumping
would not exist and dumping would be impossible. Scholars argue
that section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and not antidumping
law, is the unilateral tool for prying open a foreign market. 68 The
use of section 301, however, is constrained by the Uruguay Round
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 69 This is illustrated by the recent U.S.:Japan dispute aboutJapanese barriers to U.S. automobiles and auto parts. 70
Fourth, they argue antidumping law creates one of two perverse
incentives for an exporter. 71 First, antidumping law may distort an
exporter's marketing decisions. An exporter might reduce its
exports and increase its home-market sales to minimize the risk of
being named as a respondent in an antidumping action. In turn,
65. A section 201 claim in the United States requires: (1) an increase in the volume of
imported merchandise that is a (2) substantial cause of (3) serious injury to ( 4) a domestic
industry that makes like merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1994). The price at which
imported merchandise is sold is irrelevant. Antidumping law does not require a change in
import volume, "substantial" cause, or "serious" injury. However, it is beyond the scope of
this Article to consider whether the escape clause affords adequate relief or whether it
would be desirable to harmonize the elements of an escape clause and antidumping claim.
66. See Comment, Worker Adjustment Assistance: The Failure & the Future, 5 Nw.]. INT'L
L. & Bus. 394, 415-17 (1983).
67. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 163.
68. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)); Alan F. Holmer &Judith Hippler Bello, U.S. Trade
Law & Policy Series No. 14: The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the International Trading
System?, 23 INT'L LAw. 523, 527 (1989).
69. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE URU·
GUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1008 (1994) [hereinafter MESSAGE].
70. See, e.g., Bob Davis, U.S. and japan Agree to One Meeting on Auto Trade as Squabble
Continues, WALL ST.j.,June 5, 1995, atA5 (United States threatened sanctions if auto and
auto-parts issues are not resolved); Nancy Dunne, US Steps Up Pressure on japan, FIN. TIMES,
May 19, 1995, at 18 (citing one model on the sanctions list, the Infiniti Q45, selling at
$59,350 in the United States and at $75,069 in Japan).
71. See, e.g., Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 170 (listing inducements of rentseeking behavior for import-competing firms and the incentive to locate productive facilities for exporting firms).
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the price of its merchandise in the importing country rises, reducing competitive pressure on producers in that country, while the
price of its merchandise in its home country falls. Alternatively,
antidumping law may distort an exporter's decisions about foreign
direct investment. If the importing country represents a significant
market, the exporter may relocate its production facilities there.
These skeptics teach that antidumping law is inherently protectionist.72 As Bovard states, "[e]conomic xenophobia is the foundation of U.S. antidumping law." 73 Unfortunately, this insight is on a
par with advice that "rain is wet" when what is sorely needed is
direction to the nearest umbrella vendor. The call for repeal of
antidumping law is quixotic. For approximately the last century,
long before the GATT entered into force, the international trading
community has condemned dumping.7 4 The GATT contracting
parties have had four opportunities to ban antidumping law: (1) in
1947 when the GATT was drafted; (2) between 1964 and 1967
when the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code was produced; (3)
between 1974 and 1979 when the Tokyo Round Antidumping
Code was produced; and (4) between 1986 and 1994 when the
Uruguay Round Antidumping Code was produced. 75 Each time,
however, the negotiators affirmed the law.
72.

The first U.S. legislation designed to afford relieffrom dumping, enacted in 1916,

was designed principally to protect the U.S. chemical industry from German competition,
particularly in the dyestuff sector. JosEPH E. PA1TISON, ANTIDUMPING AND CouNTERVAILING
DtnY LAws § 15.02 (May 1995). For a review of this Act, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAw: CAsEs AND MATERtALS ch. 7 (Michie 1996). For an entertaining account of the

history of U.S. antidumping law, see BovARD, supra note 1, at 109-14.
73. BovARD, supra note 1, at 107.
74. SeeJoHN H. JACKSON, THE WoRLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAw AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 221 (1989).
75. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT 1969 (discussing the
drafting of the 1947 GATT).
For discussions of the 1967 Kennedy Round Antidumping Code, see BHALA, supra note
72, ch. 6; THoMAS B. CuRTIS &JoHN RoBERT VASTINE, JR., THE KENNEDY RouND AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRADE 202-215 (l971);JOHN W. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE PoLICY: THE TWILIGHT OF THE GATT? 260-62, 270 (1971). This Code took
effect on July 1, 1968. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32. The United States was one of
the original signers of the Code. However, for political reasons relating to congressionalexecutive relations, Congress limited the effect of the Code by statute. See Renegotiation
Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201, 82 Stat. 1345, 1347. Some scholars
incorrectly suggest that the United States never joined the Code. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra
note 74, at 226 ("The Code, as an international treaty, had been signed by authority of the
President, but there was no participation of the U.S. Congress .... The Congress enacted
legislation that prohibited the executive and the ... [lTC] from following the rules of the
GATT [Antidumping] Code in certain circumstances.").
For a review of the 1979 Tokyo Round Antidumping Code and U.S. implementing legislation-the Trade Agreements Act of 1979-see William H. Barringer & Christopher A
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One observer commented that the Tokyo Round actually
resulted in greater opportunities for bringing antidumping claims:
Since antidumping laws are a protectionist device, the GATT
should attempt to eliminate them or restrict their use. Unfortunately, the fact that article VI of the General Agreement explicitly allows their use, has meant that GATT control of dumping
has been largely limited to regulation of procedures only. What
is needed is a change in emphasis in the GAIT [Tokyo Rnund]
Antidumping Code, so that it restricts more tightly than now the permissible scope of antidumping laws. A similar change in attitude is

needed in GATT member states. The antidumping laws have
been treated by many legislators as inherent rights of their constituents, rights that should be regularly "improved" by making
relief more readily available. 7 6
The harsh reality is that antidumping law remains a strategic
weapon in the protectionist arsenal. 77 A cynical view of this reality
is that the law benefits a powerful lobby in Washington, D.C.-the
international trade bar. Eliminating antidumping law would dramatically reduce the business of international trade lawyers.
Whether antidumping law is economically justified is irrelevant.
The practical and more ambitious inquiry is whether the law can
be circumscribed to minimize the risk of protectionist abuse. Like
Dunn, Antidumping and Counteroailing Duties Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 14]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1, 2-3 (1979); Peter D. Ehrenhaft, lWiat the Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act {Can][WUL]{Should] Mean for U.S.
Trade Policy, 11 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361, 1361-65 (1979);Johnj. Barcelo III, Subsidies,
Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round, 13 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 257, 259
(1980); Terrence Roche Murphy, Antidumping and Counteroailing Duties under the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979: A Preliminary Analysis, 14 INT'L LAw. 203, 221 (1980); Alan H.
Silverman, An Examination of the Antidumping Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
United States Implementation of the Antidumping Code Formulated in the Tokyo Round, 7 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & CoM., 239, 240 (1979); Diana Jean Carloni, Note, An Analysis of "Material
Injury" Under the 1979 Trade Agreement Act, 4 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CaMP. LJ. 87, 88-89 (1981);
Thomas Early, Note, judicial Review of Antidumping Cases and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979:
Towards a Unified System of Review, 14]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 101, 101 n.5 (1979); Shelley A
Lorenzen, Technical Analysis of the Antidumping Agreement and the Trade Agreements Act, 11
LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1405, 1416-19 (1979); Nancy L. Nowak, Note, The Trade Agreements
Act of 1979: Counteroailing and Antidumping Procedures, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 63, 84-85
( 1979); Timothy J. Paten ode, Comment, The New Anti-Dumping Procedures of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Does it Create a New Non-Tariff Trade Barrier?, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 200,
221 (1980); Robert L. Reifenberg, Comment, Antidumping Investigations: Procedural Reform
and Substantive Change Through the Trade Agreements Act, 1 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 261, 263, 281-82
(1981). The United States and 25 other GATT contracting parties signed this Code, which
replaced the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code. The Tokyo Round Code and Trade
Agreements Act entered into force on Jan. 1, 1980. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 32.
Both the Agreement and the Act supersede them.
76. Davey, supra note 50, at 296 (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 156 (suggesting that antidumping law
is the most common method of "contingent protection").
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their predecessors, the Uruguay Round negotiators dodged this
question and wound up expanding opportunities for a petitioner
to deploy antidumping law as a nontariff barrier to trade.

B.

Focusing on Protectionist Abuse

The profile of a protectionist abuser is a petitioner that has lost
its comparative advantage in manufacturing merchandise to a
respondent that makes the same or similar merchandise. The petitioner is unwilling or unable to reduce its cost structure to meet
global competitive pressures, fails to incorporate technological
innovations in its manufacturing process and product design, or is
insensitive to changes in consumer tastes. Its strategy for restoring
its advantage is to raise the cost of imported merchandise by imposing an antidumping duty on the imports.
To some extent, the very filing of the petition serves this goal. It
harasses the competitive respondent, generates uncertainty about
the respondent's future prices and liabilities, and raises the respondent's legal fees. 7 s Litigation in federal courts may drag on for over
a decade, thus enabling a petitioner to delay final liquidation of
entries of merchandise. 79 As Judge Posner writes:
Of course, the concerns that actually animate anti-dumping,
countervailing-duty, and other measures directed against allegedly "unfair" trade practices of foreign producers go far beyond
a concern with predatory pricing. The dominant concern is to protect U.S. industry from foreign producers that have genuinely lower costs,
whether because they pay lower wages, incur fewer pollution-control and
other regulatary costs, are better managed, have better workers, or have
more modern plants and equipment. Policies so motivated are called
"protectionist" . . . .80
78. See, e.g., Low, supra note 11, at 86 (stating that antidumping law "can in effect be
easily used to create uncertainty and Inhibit trade" and that "[m]ere initiation of a case can
have trade harassment effects."); ScHOTT, supra note 5, at 78 ("[T]he very initiation of an
antidumping case casts a cloud over trade, both because the liability for penalty duties that
accused exporters face is uncertain and potentially large, and because there is concern that
national authorities will interpret the rules so as to favor the domestic constituents seeking
import relief."); PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 13 (discussing the chilling effect of
antidumping litigation and stating that the cost of defending against a petition typically
exceeds $1 million per year); Tim W. Ferguson, Trade Policy's "Chokepoint", WALL ST.J., Apr.
11, 1995, at A21 (explaining that "[s]ome manufacturers ... cannot bear the overhead
expense and risk of a dumping case [and] withhold shipments to be safe .... By disrupting
dependable supply channels, dumping law is the most injurious .form of trade barrier
0

0

0

0 ") 0

'

79. See, e.g., Daniel Michaels, Legal Charges KeepEkctric Golf Cart Going-To Court, WALL
ST. J., May 24, 1995, at A1 (discussing antidumping litigation involving golf carts from
Poland that has run for 21 years).
80. PoSNER, supra note 56, at 310·11 (emphasis added).
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After initiating an antidumping case, the protectionist abuser
eagerly manipulates the calculation of a dumping margin to maximize the potential duty. It exploits permissive injury and causation
standards to support its dubious claim. In effect, the petitioner
seeks governmental assistance to negate the economic law of comparative advantage with respect to specific merchandise. 81 Whenever the government obliges, it gives greater priority to the
interests of the inefficient petitioner than to those of the importing
country (not to mention the global economy) as a whole:
Local firms suffer "injury" (in the sense that they make less, or
lose more, money than they otherwise would) whenever the
import price is the same or lower than the price they charge.
That injury is no greater when dumping is present than when the import
price merely reflects the comparative advantage of the exporter. But it is

only when consumers in another country are charged a higher
price that this injury triggers government action under
antidumping laws. And this government action normally occurs,
unless the "injury" criterion is unusually stringently construed,
whatever the level of efficiency of local firms. Indeed, the less efficient the
local firms, or the greater their local monopoly, the more easily the requisite injury can be shown (even though the local consumer's need for the
low-priced goods is comparatively greater. J3 2

In contrast to the protectionist petitioner, one bringing a meritorious antidumping action can show predatory dumping. It can
demonstrate that the exporter sells merchandise in the importing
market at a price below the exporter's average variable cost of production.83 Further, it can prove that the exporter seeks to drive it
out of business and, perhaps, to ultimately gain a monopoly position in the importing country. Such a petition has merit because
absent predqtory dumping· the petitioner would be a financially
robust and competitive company. The antidumping order places
both the petitioner and consumers of its product at risk. 84
To differentiate the protectionist abuser from the meritorious
petitioner, antidumping law must avoid two pitfalls. First, it must
81. This law, articulated by Adam Smith in 1776 and David Ricardo in 1819, remains
the standard economic rationale for why nations trade. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES
oF POLITICAL EcoNOMY AND TAXATION 141-42 (Piero Sraffa ed., 1951); ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 474, 474-95 (Edwin
Cannan ed., 1976). For modem treatments of the principle, see generally BHALA, supra
note 72, ch. l. To the extent international trade law reflects this principle, nations gain
from trade. See id.; Ronald A. Brand, GAIT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 105, 116 (1992) (discussing the extent to which the principle is
manifest in U.S. trade law).
82. DAM, supra note 29, at 168-69 (emphasis added).
83. See infra notes 59!H>01 and accompanying text.
84. See discussion infra part IV.E.
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be clear and unequivocal. A protectionist abuser is sure to exploit
ambiguities. The broad comment of one observer about pre-Uruguay Round law remains true:
[E]ven if there is some underlying validity to the notion of the
international and national antidumping rules when properly
managed, as actually managed currently it is fair to express considerable doubt about the policy soundness of the implementation of some of these rules. There seems to be a considerable "tilt"
against imports, and any close observer of the processes of governments, whether of the United States, European Community,
Canada, or Australia (the four principal users of antidumping
law), can observe the considerable pressures brought by competing domestic producer groups so as to influence the governmental implementation of the antidumping laws in order to
limit import competition.
United States law, in particular, is especially vulnerable to
these type[s] of criticisms.s5
Second, antidumping law must be grounded in microeconomic
theory. It must examine the cost structure of a firm to isolate and
sanction predation cases. The Agreement and the Act also fail to
satisfy this criterion. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit accurately observed over a decade ago in Smith-CtYrona
Group v. United States:
Antidumping duties are imposed on the basis of differences in
value, not differences in cost. The importation of foreign merchandise can occur at a price greater than cost, yet still generate
liability for an antidumping duty. The language of the statute
would impose a duty on a foreign producer who "eats" either
costs or profits in the American market relative to .the home
market. Thus, cost criteria alone will not r~dress ¢-e fpll margin
of dumping to which Congress sought to attach an antidumping
duty. Value must be considered under the statute.
:
Congress sought to afford the domestic manufacturer strong
protection against dumping, seeming to indicate that the Secretary [of Commerce] should err in Javor of protectionism. 86
The traffic-light system proposed in Part V attempts to differentiate
the protectionist abuser from the meritorious petitioner by avoiding both pitfalls.
85. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 242 (emphasis added).
86. 713 F.2d 1568, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1022 (1984). The court's subsequent discussion of cost concerned only circumstances of
sale adjustments to foreign market value, not a complete accounting for comparative
advantage. Id. at 1577-82. This adjustment is discussed later. See infra notes 194-196 and
accompanying text.
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This is not a protectionist administration .... This is an administration that believes in opening markets. 87
The principal U.S. antidumping statute is the 1930 Act, 88 which
mandates the assessment and collection of antidumping duties if
findings are affirmative in two separate and final administrative
determinations. 89 These determinations are complex as well as
contentious. 90 The following flow chart lays out the course of an
antidumping case:9I
87. Paul Ingrassia & Asra Q. Nomani, Some Fear a Backlash As Detroit Prepares Charges
Against japan, WALL ST.j., Feb. 8, 1993, at AI (quoting Commerce Secretary Ron Brown).
88. Title VII of the 1930 Act contains the antidumping sections. See Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 150 (adding title VII, entitled Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, to the Tariff Act of 1930) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). After the Uruguay Round a number of terms used in the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act were changed to conform with the Agreement. For
example:
the term "export price" replaces the term "purchase price," the term constructed
export price" replaces the term "exporter's sales price," and the term "normal
value" replaces the term "foreign market value." In addition, because the Agreement[ ] use[s] the term "like product" to refer to both foreign and domestic
merchandise, the [Act] distinguishes between "foreign like product," which
replaces the term "such or similar merchandise" (referring to merchandise produced in the foreign country whose exports to the United States are subject to
investigation), and "domestic like product," which replaces the term "like product" (which, under U.S. law, refers to U.S. production). And, for ease of reference, in ... the antidumping ... provisions, what was formerly referred to as the
"class or kind" or merchandise subject to investigation ot covered by an order is
now referred to as "subject merchandise."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33. These changes may be easily referenced in the table
of Pre- and Post-Uruguay Round Terminology and Abbreviations. See infra app. A.
This Article us.es the pre-Uruguay Round terminology in its discussion of pre-Uruguay
Round law, and the post-Uruguay Round terminology in its discussion of post-Uruguay
Round law.
For in-depth discussions of the 1930 Act, see BRuCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES FoREIGN
TRADE LAw§§ 21.1-.33 (1991); Horlick, supra note 13; PATTISON, supra note 72, § 1.04;
DAVID SERKO, IMPORT PRACTICE CuSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 465-95 (2d ed.
1991); THOMAS V. VAKERICS ET AL., ANTIDUMPING, COUNTERVAJUNG DUTY, AND OTHER
TRADE ACTIONS 23-192 (1987); EDWIN A VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAw AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 31-193, 338-415, 504-626 ( 1987).
89. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. at 162 (adding
§ 731 of title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673
(1994)).
90. See, e.g., Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1571 (accurately pointing out that the
dumping margin determination is "complicated by the difficulty in quantification of these
factors [Foreign Market Value and United States Price] and the foreign policy repercussions of a dumping determination," thus making it "a difficult and supremely delicate
endeavor").
91. See discussion infra parts III.A-E (discussing the flow chart in greater detail).
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1.

THE PROCESS OF AN ANrmUMPING CAsE

1. Petition is filed with the DOC and the ITC.
2. The lTC preliminary determination: "reasonable indication" of
injury
a) If the ITC's preliminary dumpb) H the ITC's preliminary dumping injury determination is affirming injury is negative, the petition
ative, the DOC renders a
is dismissed.
preliminary determination as to
whether there is a "reasonable
basis" for concluding there are
less than fair value (LTFV) sales.
3. The DOC preliminary dumping determination: "reasonable basis"
that there are LTFV sales
a) If the DOC's preliminary LTFV
b) If the DOC's preliminary
dumping determination is affirmdumping injury determination is
ative: (1) it suspends liquidation
negative, the DOC proceeds to a
of entries; and (2) requires that
final dumping determination.
estimated antidumping duties are
deposited. The DOC proceeds to
a final dumping determination.
4. The DOC final dumping injury determination.
a) If the DOC's final dumping
b) If the DOC's final dumping
injury determination is affirmainjury determination is negative,
tive, the lTC renders a final injury
thepetition is dismissed. Any susdetermination.
pension of entries is lifted and any
estimated duty deposits are
refunded.
5. The ITC final injury determination
a) If the ITC's final injury deter~
b) 'If the ITC's final injury determination is affirmative, the DOG
mination is negative, the petition
issues an antidumping order.
is dismissed. Any suspension of
liquidation of entries is lifted and
any estimated duty deposits are
refunded.
First, the DOC must determine whether the respondent sells the
class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation at less than
fair value (LTFV) in the United States. 92 It does so by calculating
the dumping margin or the extent of cross-border price discrimination. Second, the lTC must determine that the merchandise
92.

For a discussion of this determination, see Alan F. Holmer &Judith Hippler Bello,

U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #9: The Scope of "Class or Kind of Merchandise" in Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Cases, 20 INT'L LAw. 1015, 1015-24 (1986).
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materially injures or threatens to injure a U.S. industry or materially retards the establishment of a U.S. industry. 9 3
If both determinations are affirmative, the DOC issues an
antidumping order calling for the collection of a duty equal to the
dumping margin. 94 The duty is collected by the U.S. Customs Service on a company-specific basis for an indefinite period. 95 It
applies to current and future imports of the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation. 96
The amount of the duty depends on the estimated duty deposit,
calculated as part of the DOC's initial investigation. The respondent makes the deposit with the U.S. Customs Service at the time
merchandise is imported. 97 If neither the petitioner nor the
respondent requests an annual administrative review, the estimated
duty amount remains effective and the deposit is converted to an
assessed duty. Each year, in the anniversary month of the
antidumping order, either party may request the DOC to review
whether the estimated amount is accurate or should be adjusted to
yield a new amount applicable to the prior twelve months of
imports. 98 If the DOC determines that a higher amount is appropriate, the respondent is liable for the difference between the estimated and final amount plus any interest. If a lower amount is
appropriate, the respondent receives a refund for the difference
plus interest. In either case, the new final amount remains the
deposit rate until completion of the next administrative review. 99

A.

Filing a Petition

Although the DOC may initiate an antidumping action, in
almost every case an interested party files a petition. An "interested
party" is one that acts on behalf of the allegedly affected U.S. industry and may be defined as follows: (1) "a manufacturer, producer,
or wholesaler in the United States of a domestic like product"; (2)
a "certified ... or recognized union or group of workers which is
representative of an [affected] industry"; (3) "a trade or business
association [with] a majority of ... members" producing a domestic like product; ( 4) a coalition of firms, unions, or trade associasupra note 30, at 64.
19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(1) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.21 (1995).
See PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5-6.
96~
See Monique Ross & Pete Zarocostas, An Overview of Antidumping, GLOBAL TRADE
TALK, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 8, 8-9 (for a brief discussion of the role of the Customs Service).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
98. 19 u.s.c. § 1675 (1994).
99. PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5-6.
93.
94.
95.

OvERVIEw,
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tions in which a majority of the individual members have standing;
(5) a coalition or trade association representative of processors, or
processors and producers, or processors and growers in cases
involving processed agricultural products. 100 A petitioner files with
the DOC and the lTC simultaneously. 1o1
The DOC does not ask whether any other producers support the
petition. Instead, it assumes that standing to file a petition exists
unless a majority of the industry contests the petitioner's standing.102 Therefore, as Gary N. Horlick states, "when Commerce
finds standing, it actually has no idea what proportion of the
domestic industry supports the petition." 103 The DOC does not
place an emphasis on standing requirements because an antidumping order cannot be issued until the DOC makes a final affirmative
determination of injury to a U.S. industry. The DOC "has gone to
great lengths to try to define the industry in such a way as to be
able to find support from more than a mathematical majority." 104
100. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C)-(G) (1994); see also OVERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66;
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (upholding the DOC's interpretation that so long as a petition is filed by an "interested party," it is considered filed "on behalf of" the domestic industry).
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(2) (1994). A petitioner, in its filing, must set forth the following information: (1) its identity; (2) the identity of all known domestic producers of the
domestic like product; (3) the volume and value of the domestic like product that is produced by the petitioner and each domestic producer; (4) a description of the allegedly
dumped product; (5) the name of each country in which the allegedly dumped product
originates or from which it is exported; (6) the identity of each known exporter, foreign
producer, and importer of the allegedly dumped product; (7) the nature of its injury allegedly caused by the allegedly dumped product; (8) the export price or constructed export
price of the allegedly dumped product; and (9) the NV of the allegedly dumped product.
19 C.F.R. § 353.12(b) (1995).
102. Horlick, supra note 13, at 154.
103. !d.
104. ld. at 155. U.S. companies may file claims when they are injured by dumping
outside the United States. Such petitions may arise in the case of third-country dumping.
For example, if U.S. and Japanese companies each sell merchandise in Thailand, the U.S.
exporter may claim injury from dumping by the Japanese company. In this situation, the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is authorized to ask the third country-here, Thailand-to take action against dumping in its market that injures U.S. exporters. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677k(c)(1) (1994). In contrast, neither the DOC nor the International Trade Commission (lTC) is authorized to take action in response to requests from other countries.
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 106.
Downstream or diversionary input dumping is another example of dumping outside the
United States that adversely affects U.S. exporters. Downstream dumping occurs when an
exporter ships finished merchandise to the United States that is comprised of raw and
intermediate goods that have been dumped in the exporter's country by some third country. For example, a Japanese company may sell merchandise in the United States comprised of Thai components dumped in Japan by a Thai exporter. As a result, the price of
the imports sold in the United States is below that of comparable U.S.-made goods. In such
a case a U.S. company may file a petition with the USTR for relief from alleged injury. 19
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Although the DOC's aim is to identify and dismiss those petitions
supported by producers accounting for only a small volume of the
subject merchandise, the DOC makes little effort to ascertain the
relevant facts and rarely dismisses a petition for lack of support. 105
B.

Preliminary and Final Determinations

Mter an antidumping petition is filed, the DOC and the ITC
render preliminary and final administrative determinations. 106 The
process is designed to allow the U.S. Customs Service to begin collecting security for antidumping duties as soon as the ITC and the
DOC have preliminarily determined that imports are causing or
threatening to cause injury to a U.S. industry and are being sold at
less than fair value.1o1
The DOC sets the duty rate by calculating the rate of dumping in
three stages: ( 1) a preliminary determination (the basis for collecting the security); (2) a final determination (the basis for collecting
cash deposits of the estimated duties); and (3) an annual review of
the dumping order (the basis for collecting the actual duties and
liquidating the entries of the class or kind of merchandise subject
to investigation) .108 Absent a request for an annual review, the liability of the importer of the merchandise is fixed at the cash
deposit rate.
The ITC makes an initial preliminary determination as to
whether there is a "reasonable indication" of material injury within
forty-five days after a petition is filed. 109 If this determination is
negative, the investigation is concluded. If the ITC's preliminary
injury determination is affirmative, the DOC makes a second preliminary determination as to whether there is a "reasonable basis to
believe or suspect" that the class or kind of merchandise subject to
U.S.C. § 1677k(b) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 71. If the USTR finds a reasonable
basis for the allegation of downstream dumping, it requests the government of the third
country-here, Thailand-to investigate and, if necessary, take action against the dumping on behalf of the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1677k(c)(1) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note
30, at 71. If the foreign government refuses to take such action, the USTR consults with the
petitioner to determine whether relief under U.S. law is appropriate. 19 U.S.C. § 1677k(e)
(1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 71.
105. Horlick, supra note 13, at 155.
106. For discussions of procedural aspects of these determinations, see OVERVIEW, supra
note 30, at 66-69; VAKERICS, supra note 88, at 23-56.
107. See OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 69.
108. !d. at 66-69.
109. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66-67. This and other
time limits for preliminary and final determinations are subject to extension under certain
circumstances. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(5)(B) (1994).
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investigation is or is likely to be sold at less than fair value. 11 o The
DOC must make this determination within 160 days after a petition
is filed, but the DOC may not do so before the lTC has made a
preliminary affirmative determination of injury.111
An affirmative preliminary dumping margin determination by
the DOC has three effects. First, the DOC directs the U.S. Customs
Service to suspend liquidation of all entries of merchandise subject
to the affirmative preliminary determination. 11 2 Liquidation is "the
final computation of the duties and fees due on an entry." 113 The
suspension requires the U.S. Customs Service to "defer[] calculation of the amount and rate of duty applicable to each individual
entry until a later time." 114Second, the respondent posts with the
U.S. Customs Service a cash deposit, bond, or other appropriate
security equal to the estimated dumping margin calculated by the
DOC in its preliminary determination for each entry of the class or
kind of merchandise subject to investigation. 115 This security
deposit is required to ensure payment of antidumping duties in the
event that final affirmative dumping and injury determinations are
rendered and an antidumping order is issued.
Third, the lTC begins a final injury determination. If the DOC's
preliminary determination is negative, the lTC will not begin a
final injury determination unless the DOC renders a final affirmative dumping determination. 116 The lTC renders its final determination of injury by the later of 120 days after the DOC's
preliminary affirmative determination, or forty-five days after the
DOC's final affirmative determination.II7
The DOC renders a final determination regardless of whether its
preliminary dumping margin determination is affirmative or negative. It makes its final determination within seventy-five days of its
preliminary determination. 118 If its final determination is negative,
the DOC terminates the investigation, 119 revokes the suspension of
llO. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67.
Ill. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A) (1994) (stating 140 days after initiation of investigation); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67 (stating 160 days after filing of petition).
ll2. 19 u.s.c. § 1673b(d)(2) (1994).
ll3. RicHARD M. BELANGER, IMPORT AND CuSTOMS CoMPLIANCE GumE, glossary, at 7
(1995); see also 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (1995) (defining liquidation as "the final computation or
ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an entry").
114. BELANGER, supra note ll3, 'I 1512.21.
ll5. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1)(B) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67.
ll6. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 67.
ll7. 19 u.s.c. § 1673d(b)(2) (1994).
liS. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1) (1994); BELANGER, supra note ll3, '11512.22.
ll9. BELANGER, supra note ll3, 'I 1512.22.
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liquidation, and refunds any estimated antidumping duty deposits.120 If the DOC's final determination is affirmative, the lTC
makes a final injury determination.I2I
If the ITC's final determination is negative, it terminates the case
and refunds any estimated duty deposits. 122 If it is affirmative, the
DOC issues an antidumping order within seven days of the ITC's
determination. 123 The order requires the U.S. Customs Service to
collect an antidumping duty equal to the dumping margin. 124 The
company that imports the dumped product ultimately is responsible for payment of this duty as well as estimated duty deposits. 125
The antidumping order applies on a countrywide basis. It
includes all exporters, whether or not investigated, unless the DOC
determines that a specific exporter is selling its product at a
nondumped price. 126 The DOC generally attempts to include
exporters accounting for 60% of U.S. imports of the class or kind
of merchandise subject to investigation in its LTFV investigation.
Nonetheless, the 40% of exporters not investigated are subject to
the order. 127

C.
1.

The Dumping Margin Calculation

The Basic Formula

To calculate the dumping margin, the DOC makes a "fair" value
comparison between: (1) the United States Price (USP), the price
of the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation in the
United States; and (2) the foreign market value (FMV), the price
of "such or similar merchandise" in the exporter's home market. 128
The formula for the dumping margin calculation is:
120. See id.
121. 19 u.s.c. § 1673d(b) (2) (1994).
122. See BEI.ANGER, supra note 113, 'I 1512.23; 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1994).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 69.
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 69.
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994) (citing "importer of record" is responsible).
126. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.14(a), 353.21(c) (1995).
127. See David A Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in
the United States, 12 Aluz.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 70. The order also covers merchandise from
a new shipper. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(d)(2) (1994). A new shipper is an exporter that did not
ship merchandise at the time the order was issued but began exportation thereafter. /d.
128. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994). Section 233(a) (4) of the Act substituted "foreign like
product" for "such or similar merchandise." See Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat. at 4899.
Under pre-Uruguay Round law the term "such or similar merchandise" was defined as
merchandise identical or comparable to the merchandise subject to investigation. See 19
u.s.c. § 1677(16) (1994).
Several cases have addressed the relationship between the DOC's determination of the
class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation (for purposes of the dumping margin
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Dumping Margin= FMV- USP.
The DOC faces three threshold questions in the dumping margin calculation. First, can nondumped sales offset dumped sales?
An exporter may make some, but not all of its home-market sales at
a price above the USP. The DOC does not offset sales made at
LTFV in the United States-those where the FMV exceeds the
USP-against those not made at LTFV-those where the FMV is
less than the USP.I29
Second, is there an amount of dumping that is nonactionable?
Nonactionable dumping is defined in terms of a de minimis dumping margin or volume of imports. 130 Although there is no brightline rule to determine whether the volume of the class or kind of
merchandise subject to investigation is de minimis,I3 1 a weighted
average dumping margin of 0.5% or less is typically considered de
m1mmis. If such a margin exists, the DOC terminates its
investigation. 132
Third, should average or individual transaction prices be used to
compare the FMV with the USP? It is critical to compare "apples
with apples." If an average-to-average methodology is used, the
DOC compares the average FMV to the average USP. The averages
investigation) and the ITC's identification of a like domestic product (for purposes of the
injury investigation). See Hosiden Corp. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 1088, 1094-99
(1992) (holding that the ITC must make a separate injury determination for each class or
kind of merchandise designated by the DOC, but that the ITC's like product determination could include products with minor differences in physical characteristics or uses from
the imported article); Torrington Co. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1278, 1280 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (upholding the ITC's determination that there were six separate like products and
domestic industries involving antifriction bearings); see also Luciano Pisoni Fabbrica Accessori Instrument Musicali v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 424, 429 (1986) (holding that
the DOC improperly compared Italian woodwind instrument pads without allowing for
differences in physical characteristics and pad sizes).
129. See Davey, supra note 50, at 298-99; Horlick, supra note 13, at 146.
130. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(4) (1994);jACKSON, supra note 74, at 232.
131. The issue of whether a dumping margin is de minimis is distinct from the issue of
whether the volume of imports is negligible. While the first issue is determined by the
DOC, the second issue is a matter for the ITC. In making a material injury determination,
the ITC declines to cumulate imports that are negligible and that have no discernible
impact on the domestic injury. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (1994). "Negligible" is defined in terms
of qualitative factors, and the ITC examines the U.S. market share held by each country's
imports. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24) (1994).
132. 19 C.F.R. § 353.6 (1995); see also Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 10
Ct. Int'l Trade 301, 306 (1986) (Carlisle II) (holding that a 0.45% margin might be de
minimis if the DOC can adequately explain the basis for such a finding). The de minimis
exception was not set forth in the statute. Rather, it was created by the DOC over the
objections of petitioners. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade
352, 353-54 (1981) (Carlisle 1). The exception was promulgated as a regulation after Carlisle
II
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are based on data from the same time period and the respondent
may be able to use nondumped sales to offset dumped sales. Conversely, if the DOC uses the individual-to-individual methodology,
it compares the FMV of a specific sale in the exporter's home market to the USP associated with a specific and contemporaneous sale
in the United States. Although the DOC is authorized to use either
methodology, 133 its practice is to calculate an average of prices in
the exporter's home market-generally based on a six-month
period-and then to compare that average to an individual U.S.
sales price. 134 This practice protects firms and consumers against
"targeted" dumping, where an exporter charges a dumped price to
particular customers or regions while selling at higher prices to
other customers or regions at the same time. 135
2.

Identifying the USP

The USP is based on either the Purchaser's Price (PP) or the
Exporter's Sales Price (ESP) of the class or kind of merchandise
subject to investigation. 136 Both measures attempt to establish an
arms-length price; namely, an unbiased, undistorted figure. 137 The
PP is the price at which the class or kind of merchandise subject to
investigation is purchased or agreed to be purchased from the
manufacturer for export to the United States prior to the date of
importation into the United States. 138 The DOC uses the PP if the
exporter sells the merchandise before importation by an unrelated
U.S. purchaser. 139 The ESP is the price at which the exporter sells
133. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(a)-(c) (1994).
134. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; Boltuck & Litan, supra note 56, at 14. In
contrast to the calculation period for a Less Than Fair Value (LTFV) investigation, the
DOC uses a monthly average when reviewing an antidumping order.
135. Boltuck & Litan, supra note 56, at 14 (discussing individual-to-average comparisons and "spot" or "rifleshot" dumping); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 98; MESSAGE,
supra note 69, at 842; see also Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (observing that "[a]veraging U.S. prices defeats [the purpose of the antidumping
statute] by allowing foreign manufacturers to offset sales made at Jess-than-fair value with
higher priced sales. Commerce refers to this practice as 'masked dumping' ").
136. OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 65. Some scholars do not always differentiate carefully
between the Purchaser's Price (PP) and the Export Sales Price (ESP). See, e.g., JACKSON,
supra note 74, at 232 (stating that either ESP or PP shall be used, "whichever is
appropriate").
137. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04(1].
138. 19 C.F.R § 353.41(b) (1995).
139. See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04[2]. The PP is also used where an intermediary,
whether unrelated or related to the exporter, exists between the exporter and the U.S.
buyer. Suppose the buyer has an overseas purchasing agent that purchases merchandise
from an unrelated foreign manufacturer. The price paid by the agent to that manufacturer
is the PP. Conversely, suppose a foreign manufacturer has a U.S. marketing subsidiary that
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or agrees to sell the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation.140 It is most frequently used "when the merchandise has
not as yet been sold at the time of importation and, therefore,
since the exporter or a party related to the exporter still has title
over the goods, is imported for the benefit of the exporter." 141

3.

Identifying the FMV

The DOC begins the FMV determination with one threshold
inquiry: What merchandise sold by the exporter in its home market
is the same as the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation in the United States? Ideally, the DOC will be able to identify
identical merchandise the exporter sells in the home market in a
quantity sufficient to allow for meaningful comparison. The DOC
modifies its FMV determination, however, if the exporter does not
sell identical merchandise in the home market or if the exporter
sells a significant amount of merchandise at a price below the cost
of production. 142 In these situations, the DOC may look to a CV or
to intermediate country sales in determining the FMV. 1 43
Although the DOC prefers to use identical merchandise, 144 such
merchandise may not exist because of differences in style, design,
or features that accommodate variations in consumer preferences
in the home and U.S. markets. The DOC may be _forced to use the
exporter's sales of merchandise similar to or of the same general
class as the merchandise subject to investigation. 145 If the exporter
does not sell identical or comparable merchandise in its home
sells merchandise to an unrelated U.S. buyer. The price charged by that subsidiary to the
buyer is the PP. Note, however, that under certain circumstances, if the merchandise is
placed in inventory at the expense of the subsidiary before it is sold to the buyer, the price
is the ESP. In both cases the DOC relies on the PP because the exporter knows the merchandise is destined for the United States.
140. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R § 353.41(c) (1995); see OvERVIEW, supra
note 30, at 65. Section 223 of the Act generally amended 19 U.S.C. § 1677a, substituting
the term "export sales price" with "constructed export price." Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat.
at 4876-78.
141. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04[3]. In practice, despite the statutory language
regarding the ESP, the DOC sometimes focuses more on which party has title to the merchandise and whether the merchandise is held in inventory in the United States, than on
the time the sale actually occurs.
142. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (1994).
143. Id. § 1677b(a)(4).
144. See id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (using the term "foreign like product").
145. These alternative preferences are set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1994). The
DOC seeks to treat merchandise with distinct features as if it were identical, unless there
are significant differences in cost associated with the features. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1994).
The market value of the particular features may also be relevant. PATIISON, supra note 72,
§ 5.06[5].
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country, the DOC investigates whether the exporter sells identical
or comparable merchandise in a third country. 146 In some cases,
the DOC may have to look to sales in a third country as a basis for
the FMV even though sales exist in the home market of identical or
comparable merchandise. This situation arises when: (1) the
exporter sells merchandise only or largely for export, eliminating
home-market sales or rendering them so few as to provide an inadequate basis for comparison; and (2) more than 90% of sales are
disregarded by the DOC as below the exporter's cost of
production. 147
To determine whether an exporter's home market provides an
adequate basis for comparison, the DOC applies a 5% "home-market viability test." If the volume of home-market sales is less than
5% of the volume the exporter sells to third countries, it is deemed
insufficient. 148 The market viability formula is:

(<bi/(b) X 100
where MV is market viability, <bi is the quantity of sales by an
exporter of such or similar merchandise in its home market, and
(b is the quantity of sales by an exporter of such or similar merchandise to countries other than the United States. 149 If the home
market is not viable, the DOC bases the FMV on the price at which
the exporter sells such or similar merchandise to a third
country. 150
MV

=

146. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[3).
147. !d. § 5.05[2]. Alternatively, unique circumstances may exist in the home market
that render sales therein incomparable. !d.§ 5.05[3].
148. 19 C.F.R. § 353.48 (1995). The test has a long history. SeeH.R. REP. No. 1261, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1957); S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-95 (1979), reprinted in
1979 U.S.C.CAN. 381, 478-81.
The DOC, in some instances, may choose to examine U.S., not third-country, sales. See
PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[2].
149. 19 C.F.R. § 353.46 (1995).
150. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.49(a) (1995); see also NMB
Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 590, 593-95 (1991) (holding that the
DOC erred in including ball bearing parts in the calculation of the viability of the Singapore home market for ball bearings).
A variation of the third-country sales scenario occurs when a foreign company with inadequate home-country sales has production facilities in several countries. The DOC may use
data from the markets in which a multinational company's facilities are located as a basis
for calculating the foreign market value (FMV). See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d) (1994); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.53 (1995).
If sales in two or more third countries may provide a basis for calculating the FMV, an
interesting question arises as to selection of an appropriate third country. Criteria for making this selection are set forth at 19 C.F.R. § 353.49 (b) (1995). See also Southwest Fla. Winter Vegetable Growers Ass'n v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 99, 103 (1984) (rejecting a
claim that use of third-country sales was inappropriate because of price volatility and sales
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The DOC disregards sales made at prices below the cost of production in the home- or third-country market and calculates the
FMV on the basis of the remaining above-cost sales. 1 5 1 The exclusion of below-cost sales causes the FMV to rise because below-cost
sales are the exporter's lowest-price sales. In turn, the probability
of an affirmative dumping margin determination increases.
Before disregarding certain sales, the DOC must have "reasonable grounds to believe or suspect" that the exporter sells such or
similar merchandise in the home- or third-country market at prices
below the cost of production. 152 If reasonable grounds exist, the
DOC determines whether such sales exist "in fact." The DOC must
then exclude these sales if they are made: ( 1) "in substantial quantities;" (2) "over an extended period of time;" and (3) not "at
prices which permit recovery of all costs within a reasonable period
of time in the normal course of trade." 153
As to the first criterion, the DOC considers sales to be made in
substantial quantities when they cross a 10% threshold. If 10% or
less of the sales of a particular product are below cost, they are
included in the calculation of the FMV. 154 If between 10% and
90% of the sales are below cost, the DOC only uses those sales that
are above cost. 155 If more than 90% of the sales are below cost, the
DOC disregards all sales. 1 56
With respect to the second criterion, an extended period of time
normally means a period greater than six months. 157A recent case,
however, suggests a three-month period will be typical in the
future. 158
below cost of production in the third country). In certain circumstances the DOC may
combine sales to several third countries.
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(a) (1995). The cost of production of such or similar merchandise sold in the home market is the sum of the costs of
manufacturing the merchandise (and includes factors such as materials and labor costs,
factory overhead, financing expenses), plus an amount for general expenses, such as
expenses incurred to sell the product. It does not include an amount for profit. 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.51(c) (1995). For a discussion of the Cost of Production Questionnaire used by the
DOC, see PATIISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[7].
152. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1994); 19 C.F.R § 353.51(a) (1995).
153. 19 C.F.R. § 353.51(a)(1)-(2) (1995).
154. Horlick, supra note 13, at 137.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(2)(B) (1994).
158. Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products from the United
Kingdom, 60 Fed. Reg. 10061, 10063 (Dep't Comm. 1995) (preliminary results of
antidumping review).
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The third criterion is defined in a case-specific context. 159 As a
practical matter, it is usually ignored by the DOC and therefore is
not a source of controversy.
If neither home- nor third-country sales are an adequate basis
for the FMV, either because of insufficient sales or because more
than 90% of the sales are disregarded as below the cost of production, the DOC identifies the FMV by calculating the CV of such or
similar merchandise. 160 A statutory formula for the CV emphasizes
the average total costs of manufacture plus a minimum amount for
profit and overhead. 161 The CV functions as a substitute for the
sales price and thus incorporates the same items as an actual sales
price. It equals the sum of: (1) the costs of materials, fabrication,
and other processing; (2) an amount for general expenses based
on actual financial performance, but at least 10% of material and
fabrication costs; (3) an amount for profits based on actual financial performance but at least 8% of materials, fabrication costs, and
general expenses; and (4) the cost of all containers, coverings, and
packing.I62
Sometimes the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation is exported to the United States from an intermediate country,
rather than directly from the country of origin. In such cases, the
DOC bases the FMV of such or similar merchandise on sales in the
intermediate country if: ( 1) the producer of the merchandise does
159. See PATIISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[6] (stating that the DOC treats many belowcost sale issues "on a case-by-case basis" and has "no available set of guidelines ... which are
of general applicability in below cost sale situations.").
160. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (2), (b), (e) (1994). The DOC expressly prefers to examine
third-country sales as a basis for determining the FMV before resorting to the CV. 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.48(b) (1995); see also Floral Trade Council v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 497,
500-01 (1991) (upholding the DOC's rejection of home-market and third-country sales in
favor of CV because: (1) U.S. and third-country prices were not positively correlated; (2)
third-country sales occurred only in peak months; and (3) the perishability of the product-fresh-cut flowers-led to price differentials unrelated to dumping). However, as a
practical matter, when there are no acceptable home-market sales to serve as a basis for
determining the FMV, the DOC often uses the CV without bothering to seek data on thirdcountry prices.
161. 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a) (1995). The concept of the cost of manufacturing-which is
associated with the CV and adjustments for differences in merchandise, see infra notes 186187 and accompanying text-is distinct from the concept of the cost of production, which
is associated with below-cost sales. The cost of manufacturing includes only variable costs of
production.
162. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.50(a) (1995). General expenses
include interest, and the DOC's approach to interest has created controversy. See generally
Mark David Davis &Jeffrey Allen May, Recent Stitches in the Department of Commerce's Cost of
Production Analysis: The MMF Sweaters Antidumping Case and Commerce's Treatment of Interest
Expense, 25 Gw. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. ll5, 123-30 (1991) (discussing the DOC's
approach to interest).
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not know its merchandise is destined for export; and (2) the class
or kind of merchandise subject to investigation is transshipped
through, not substantially transformed in, the intermediate country.163 When either of these conditions is not satisfied, or the intermediate-country market is not viable (i.e., sales are too small in
volume to serve as a basis for the FMV), the DOC bases the FMV on
sales in the country of origin.
Regardless of whether home-country sales, third-country sales,
the CV, or sales in an intermediate country are used to identify the
FMV, the sale prices typically will be denominated in a foreign currency. The DOC converts these prices into U.S. dollars at an official quarterly foreign exchange rate published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. 164 Because exchange rates are notoriously volatile, changing dramatically in a short period, 165 the DOC
disregards temporary fluctuations. Temporary fluctuations are
those where the exchange rate on a day during the investigation
period varies by 5% or more from the applicable quarterly rate
during that period.I66
4.

Adjusting the USP

The DOC and lawyers for the petitioner and respondent spend
an enormous amount of time and energy adjusting the FMV and
163. 19 U.S.C. § l677b(a) (3) (1994).
164. See 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1988) (ordering the secretary of the Treasury to estimate
and publish the values of foreign coins quarterly). Under certain circumstances the DOC
may use a hedged, or forward, rate.
165. See generally Raj Bhala, Risk Trade-Offs in the Foreign Exchange Spot, Forward and Derivative Markets, THE FINANCIER: ANALYSES OF CAPITAL AND MoNEY MARKET TRANSACTIONS, Aug.
1994, at 34, 34-50 (discussing the management of currency risks). For a recent discussion
of key issues, see Thyssen Stahl AG v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 23, 25-29 (Ct. Im'l Trade
1995) (discussing an adjustment to the U.S. price requested by Thyssen under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(c)(2)(A)).
166. See 19 C.F.R § 353.60(b) (1995); PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.01(3]. For discussions of pre-Uruguay Round rules on currency conversion, see William Dickey, Antidumping: Currency Fluctuations as a Cause of Dumping Margins, 7 INT'L TRADE LJ. 67 (1982)
(discussing the potential for widespread antidumping activity during 1982); William
Mange, Recent Development, 20 TEx. INT'L LJ. 425 (1985) (discussing one court's method of
calculating the foreign currency exchange rate); N. David Palmeter, Exchange Rates and
Antidumping Determinations,]. WoRLD TRADE, 1988, at 73, 73-80 (discussing the selection of
an appropriate exchange rate under Article VI of the GATT). Of course, the DOC cannot
ignore long-term appreciation or depreciation, such as the appreciation of the Japanese
yen relative to the U.S. dollar from approximately 1992 to the present. See THE BANK
CREDIT ANALYST RESEARCH GROUP, THE OUTLOOK 1995, at 57 (1995) (on file with The George
Washington journal of International Law and Economics). Exporters are expected to respond
to such trends within a reasonable period known as the "lag time." See 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.60(b) (1995); PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.01(3].
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the USP to ensure that the methodologies used to arrive at those
prices are comparable:
Were products produced overseas and in U.S. markets virtually
identical in physical and sales characteristics, the complex
adjustments established by the Tariff Act would be unnecessary.
In reality, however, such identical characteristics are never present. Even if domestic and export products are identical physically, they are inevitably packed and transported differently, and
often sold through different commercial procedures. The
adjustment framework is designed to effectively reduce domestic
and U.S. sales to common denominators so that they may be
fairly compared.l67
Adjustments are supposed to ensure that the FMV and the USP are
ex-factory prices, or prices prevailing when the merchandise leaves
the factory in which it is made.
Determining the appropriate adjustments is very complicated
and largely within the discretion of the DOC. The stakes are high
because whether the DOC finds a dumping margin invariably
depends on adjustments made to the sales prices. 168 Arguments
about adjustments are common, time-consuming, and costly. One
practitioner writes that "fighting over adjustments to [the FMV and
the USP] historically has been the main forum for lawyers'
efforts." 169 Another writes that "[m]any attorney hours are spent
on numerous potential adjustments to each of the prices to be
compared." 170 A petitioner's incentive is to maximize the dumping
margin by maximizing the FMV and minimizing the USP. It seeks
to minimize deductions from the FMV and maximize deductions
from the USP. Conversely, a respondent wants to minimize or eliminate the dumping margin by minimizing the FMV (without lowering prices below cost) and maximizing the USP. It aims to
167. PA"ITISON, supra note 72, § 5.01[1]. Similarly, one observer points out that the
dumping margin
determination process can be extremely complex, partly because of the large
number of potential "adjustments" that can be made either to the export price
figures or to the comparable home-market price in order to arrive at what is
deemed a fair comparison.
jACKSON, supra note 74, at 231-32; see generaUy Charlene Barshefsky & Richard 0. Cunningham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C.].
INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 307, 343-50 (1981) (for discussions of adjustments under pre-Uruguay Round law); U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, STUDY OF ANTIDUMPING ADJUSTMENTS METHODOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY CHANGE (1985) (regarding the need and
the means for simplifying and modifying adjustment practices).
168. See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.06[1] ("[T]he results of most antidumping investigations hinge upon the application of such adjustments.").
169. Horlick, supra note 13, at 144.
170. jACKSON, supra note 74, at 233.
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maximize deductions from the FMV and minimize deductions
from the USP.
The DOC makes adjustments for differences in the quantity and
quality of merchandise sold in the exporter's home market and the
United States, as well as for differences in the circumstances of sale
in these two markets. 171 It may make several adjustments to the
USP, whether the PP or the ESP. These adjustments are divided
into two categories: additions to and subtractions from a starting
figure for the USP.
The DOC makes three additions to the USP, assuming these
additions are not already included in the USP and are directly
related to the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation:
(1) the cost of containers and coverings used to pack the merchandise for shipment to the United States; 172 (2) the amount of any
import duties imposed by the exporting country that are rebated
or uncollected because the merchandise is exported to the United
States; 173 and (3) the amount of any taxes imposed by the exporting country that are rebated or uncollected because the merchandise is exported to the United States. 174 The logic behind making
these additions to the USP is that the FMV includes these items.
171. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1994). Some obseiVers fail to differentiate carefully among the adjusonents made to the FMV versus the United States Price (USP). See,
e.g., jACKSON, supra note 74, at 232-33 (explaining that for the ESP a single price is matched
to determine whether dumping or LTFV exists, but because the FMV is an average of all
expon sales, about half of the expon sales are below the average (the FMV), and thus
dumping or LTFV is established).
172. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (1) (A) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41 (d) (1) (i) (1995). This addition, which concerns preshipment expenses, is distinct from the deduction for costs associated with the shipment of the merchandise to the United States. See infra note 175 and
accompanying text. In effect, the DOC attempts to arrive at net prices for merchandise
packed ready for shipment to the United States. Accordingly, it deducts packing costs from
both the USP and the FMV but includes the cost of U.S. packing. See infra note 182 and
accompanying text.
173. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(B) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(l)(ii) (1995). An example of this addition would be drawback of customs duties.
174. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(l)(B) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(l)(iii) (1995). An
example of this addition would be an indirect tax such as a sales or value added tax. See,
e.g., Daewoo Elec. Co. v. International Union ofEiec. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1513-19 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (upholding the DOC's accounting methodology whereby all Korean commodity
taxes assessed on home-market sales but forgiven upon expon were added to the USP, and
finding that the DOC was not required to make an econometric analysis of the tax incidence on Korean consumers); Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1580-82
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the DOC improperly applied a circumstances-of-sale adjustment to the FMV to account for a multiplier effect of home-country taxes associated with
an adjustment to the USP). As the Daewoo and Zenith cases suggest, how to adjust for
rebated or uncollected taxes has been litigated extensively.
Technically, the 1930 Act, as codified in the U.S. Code, calls for a fourth addition-the
amount of any countervailing duty imposed by the United States on merchandise to offset
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The exporter incorporates packing costs, import duties, and taxes
into the price of such or similar merchandise and passes these
items onto home-country consumers. Without these additions, the
FMV and the USP are incomparable because the USP is artificially
low and any dumping margin is correspondingly high.
The DOC also makes two deductions from the USP, assuming
they are not already excluded: (1) costs associated with shipping
the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation from the
original place of shipment in the exporting country to the United
States; 175 and (2) the amount of any export taxes imposed by the
exporting country on the merchandise. 176 The rationale for making these deductions is that the FMV excludes these items. The
exporter does not incorporate these items in the price of such or
similar merchandise and does not pass them on to home-country
consumers. Without these deductions, the FMV and the USP are
incomparable because the USP is artificially high and any dumping
margin is correspondingly low.
If the ESP is the basis for the USP, the DOC makes three further
deductions, assuming the ESP also includes these deductions: (1)
any direct or indirect selling expenses incurred by the exportersuch as a commission paid, guarantee, warranty, or credit
expense-to sell subject merchandise in the United States; 177 (2)
any direct or indirect expenses incurred by the exporter to sell
merchandise in the United States that is the same or similar to subject merchandise; 178 and (3) the amount of any value added to the
merchandise as a result of manufacture or assembly after its import
into the United States, but before its sale to an unrelated buyer. 179
The second deduction is related to the ESP offset to the FMV. 180
These deductions are necessary because of the costs associated with
using the ESP.
an export (but not domestic) subsidy provided by the exporter's government. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(c)(1)(C) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(l)(iv) (1995).
175. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(2)(i) (1995). These
include, for example, international and U.S. freight charges, insurance premiums, handling, port and customs brokerage fees, U.S. import duties, and warehousing expenses.
PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.04(4).
176. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(B) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d)(2)(ii) (1995). This
deduction is rarely applied because so few countries tax their exports.
177. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(l)(A)-(C) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(1)-(2) (1995).
178. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(l)(D) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(2) (1995). An example
might be advertising expenses.
179. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(2) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(e)(3) (1995).
180. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.

1995]

Rethinking Antidumping Law

41

When the ESP is used, the exporter sells and ships merchandise
to a related party in the United States before a final sale to an unrelated buyer is arranged. Typically, the exporter pays the related
party a commission and incurs selling expenses in connection with
the final sale. Before this sale, the related party may process the
merchandise further by adding material or labor. Neither the commission nor the expenses are included in the FMV of such or similar merchandise the exporter sells directly to consumers in its
home market.
The DOC also excludes from the FMV material, labor, and other
expenses associated with processing in the United States because
merchandise sold in the home market is not further processed. If
commissions, sales expenses, and value added are not deducted,
the ESP is artificially inflated and the dumping margin is correspondingly small. In practice, a case involving further processing
may be extraordinarily complicated, particularly where there are
multiple related parties and the value added in the United States is
high.
5.

Adjusting the FMV

Like adjustments to the USP, adjustments to the FMV are
divided into additions to and subtractions from a starting figure for
the FMV. 181 Some of these adjustments are the same as those made
to the USP. If, for example, the cost of containers and coverings
used to pack such or similar merchandise sold in the exporter's
home market is not already included, it is added to the FMV. 182
Four types of adjustments to the FMV that are particularly noteworthy include those made to account for differences in: (1) the quantity of merchandise sold in the home market and the United States;
(2) the physical characteristics of merchandise sold in the home
market and United States; (3) the levels of trade of such sales; and
(4) the circumstances of such sales. Iss
181. The DOC has a de minimis rule regarding FMV adjustments. Any individual
adjustment with an ad valorem effect of less than 0.33%, or any group of adjustments with
an ad valorem effect of less than 1%, is de minimis and may be disregarded. 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.59(a) (1995). In practice, this rule is rarely invoked because the DOC has to make
the adjustment in order to determine whether it has a de minimis effect. There is no
reason to disregard the adjustment once it is made.
182. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.46(a) (1), 353.49(a) (1) (1995). But see Ad Hoc Comm. of AZ-NMTX-FL Producers of Gray Portland Cement v. United States, 13 F.3d 398, 402 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that home-market transportation costs in the country of origin are not to
be deducted from the FMV).
183. 19 C.F.R §§ 353.54-.58 (1995); see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(6)-(7) (1994)
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With respect to quantity adjustments, the DOC ensures that sales
used to establish the FMV are comparable in volume to those used
to establish the USP. 184 Where an exporter grants a quantity discount in its home market but not in the United States, there is an
issue as to whether the DOC should compare the USP to the discounted price alone. It may do so on two conditions. First, the
exporter must give the discount to 20% or more of the home market. Second, the exporter must show that its discount is warranted
on the basis of cost savings. This requires a showing that the
exporter has achieved an economy of scale in production. 1 s5
With respect to adjustments for physical characteristics, commonly known as difference in merchandise (DIFMER) adjustments, the DOC ensures that the merchandise sold in the home
and U.S. markets are comparable. Merchandise that is similar but
not identical requires a DIFMER adjustment unless both the homemarket and the U .S.-market merchandise incur the same cost of
production. To determine whether merchandise is identical or
merely similar, the DOC focuses on the physical comparability of
merchandise, not their uses. 186 A respondent asserting that its
home-market merchandise is of a lower quality than the merchandise it sells in the United States will not receive a DIFMER adjustment unless it demonstrates that the quality differential results in a
cost difference between the home-market and U .S.-market merchandise. The DOC has broad discretion in this regard and, as suggested above, it almost always analyzes cost of production data. 187 If
there is a direct relationship between the cost of production and
the difference in merchandise sold in the home and U.S. markets,
a DIFMER adjustment is appropriate. No adjustment is made, however, where identical merchandise is manufactured in different
facilities with different production costs.
Differences between the actual functions performed by the sellers in the foreign and U.S. markets, or differences in the level of
184. 19 C.F.R § 353.55(a) (1995).
185. Jd. § 353.55(b), (d).
186. ld. § 353.57(a) (stating that the DOC must make "reasonable allowance for differences in the physical characteristics of merchandise") (emphasis added).
187. But see Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984). There, the DOC made a difference in merchandise
(DIFMER) adjustment based on value, instead of cost of production. The court upheld the
DOC's decision to adjust for accessories and printed manuals associated with merchandise
sold in the home market but not the U.S. market, even though the merchandise itself was
not changed by these features. The dispositive fact was that the DIFMER adjustment was
based on a difference in value, and product accessories and manuals can enhance value.
/d. at 1582.
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trade, may necessitate a level of trade (LOT) adjustment that
increases or reduces the FMV. 188 The 1930 Act does not expressly
allow for this adjustment, though DOC regulations provide for
comparisons "at the same commercial level of trade" or "appropriate adjustments for differences· affecting price comparability." 189
The purpose of the adjustment is to ensure that retail sales in the
home market are not compared with wholesale sales in the United
States (or vice versa). The FMV and the USP must result from functions performed by those sellers in the foreign market and the
United States that operate at the same level of trade (usually the
ex-factory level) .190 The burden is on the respondent to prove the
validity of any LOT adjustment that lowers the dumping margin.
Sometimes an exporter does not sell to end-user customers in its
home market but to wholesale distributors in the United States. In
such cases, the DOC makes a LOT adjustment to compare wholesale-to-wholesale or retail-to-retail sales. 191 The DOC looks past formalisms like the name of a purchaser or the characterization of the
purchaser by a petitioner or respondent. Instead, the DOC focuses
on substantive issues such as the purchaser's marketing and distribution functions and the quantity of merchandise that it buys. If
the volume of sales in either or both the home- or U.S.-markets at
the same level of trade is inadequate, the DOC compares sales at
the nearest commercial level of sales. In general, the DOC prefers
to avoid making a LOT adjustment because it is unnecessary and
susceptible to abuse:
The effect of difference in trade levels can often be adjusted
through other types of adjustments, based on the particular
facts of a case. Indeed, the level of trade adjustment in many
respects could be characterized as a redundant provision of
Department regulations; in some ways it invites parties to place
labels on transactions (wholesale, retail, etc.) that the Department will
not accept on their face in any event, being inclined to analyze transactions in its own framework. It is not surprising that level of
trade adjustments are frequently rejected.I92

188. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1995).
189. Id.
190. In practice, the meaning of the phrase "ex-factory level" and its relation to the
purpose of the statute are unclear.
191. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1995).
192. PA1TISON, supra note 72, § 5.06[3] (emphasis added) (foomote omitted).
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Practitioners sometimes find it futile to request a LOT adjustment
because the DOC rarely grants the request. In lieu of a LOT adjustment, the DOC simply seeks to match prices at the same level.l 93
In contrast to LOT adjustments, circumstances of sale (COS)
adjustments are common. Differences in home-market and U.S.
prices may arise because of differences in sales commissions, warranties, technical services, interest on accounts receivable, guarantees, credit terms, advertising, warehousing, general discounts and
rebates, free samples of merchandise, and sampling and testing
expenses. 194 If such differences relate directly to the sales under
consideration and arise simultaneously with or after such sales, the
DOC makes appropriate adjustments to the FMV. These criteria
amount to a "but for" test. An expense is deducted from the FMV
as a circumstance of sale if it would not have been incurred but for
the particular sales at issue. 195 Research and development expenses
and salaries of technical service personnel are usually not deducted
from the FMV because these costs are incurred regardless of
whether the sales were made. 196
The DOC traditionally takes a strict view of what constitutes a
"direct" sales expense because it fears that a respondent can easily
manipulate the level of such expenses incurred in its home market
in order to minimize any dumping margin. Accordingly, a salesperson's salary is considered an indirect sales expense. 197 It is not
deducted from the FMV in a case where a PP is used as the basis for
the USP. Indirect sales expenses related to circumstances of sale,
however, may be deducted from the FMV in a case where the ESP
is used. 198
The DOC limits the amount of indirect sales expenses that a
respondent can deduct from the FMV. The most controversial COS
adjustment is the ESP cap-offset scheme. 199 As stated above, if the
basis for the USP is the ESP, the DOC deducts from the ESP both
direct and indirect expenses incurred in connection with U.S.
193. Courts have upheld the DOC's requirement that a respondent bears the burden
of supporting its claim for a level of trade adjustment. See, e.g., Fundicao Tupy SA v.
United States, 12 Ct. lnt'l Trade 6, 7 ( 1988) (agreeing that "it is reasonable to place a
burden on the party seeking the benefit of those assertedly lower selling costs"), aff'd, 859
F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming lower court's discretion in denying an adjustment
based on respondent's insufficiency of proof).
194. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.06[4}.
195. Id.
196. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a) (1995).
197. Horlick, supra note 13, at 145.
198. Id.
199. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.06; 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b)(2) (1995).
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sales. 200 At the same time that the DOC deducts indirect sales
expenses from the ESP, it deducts indirect expenses associated
with home-market sales from the FMV. The deduction from the
FMV for indirect sales expenses is the "ESP offset." The amount
deducted from the ESP establishes the "ESP cap." The ESP offset
cannot exceed the ESP cap. The deduction for indirect sales
expenses from the FMV may be, at most, equal to the amount of
indirect sales expenses deducted from the ESP. The rationale for
this policy, as one practitioner puts it, is that "the cap represents an
irrebuttable presumption that all indirect selling expenses claimed
for home market sales are false to the extent they are in excess of
indirect selling expenses deducted from the U.S. price." 201
In spite of this limitation, the ESP offset is extremely valuable. In
1987 Senator Ernest Hollings sponsored legislation that would
have eliminated the offset. 202 The bill, which was not enacted,
would have inflated dumping margins by continuing the deduction
for indirect sales expenses from the ESP but barring an offset to
the FMV. 203 Had it been passed, deleterious economic effects
might have ensued: U.S. living standards might have fallen by $38.7
billion-about $640 per four-person family-in part because foreign companies would have had to raise their prices by 20% or
more to avoid accusations of dumping. In addition, higher import
prices might have caused the loss of 880,000 jobs among U.S.
wholesalers and retailers, as well as reduced the competitiveness of
U.S. exporters that rely on imported components. 204

D.

The Injury Determination

The ITC's injury determination previously entailed a two-pronged inquiry: injury and causation.2°5 First, the lTC decided
whether there was material injury to a U.S. industry, threat of material injury to a U.S. industry, or material retardation of the establishment of a U.S. industry. 206 Second, if there was actual injury,
200.
201.
202.

See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 498 n.57.
Donald B. Cameron & Susan M. Crawford, An Overview of the Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Amendments: A New Protectionism?, 20 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 471, 497
(1989).
203. ld.
204. Robert Z. Lawrence, The Dangers of the ESP Amendment, 1, 6-8 (on file with The
George Washington journal of International Law and Economics).
205. OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66. Interestingly, in countervailing duty cases the lTC
undertakes the same inquiries using the same standards.
206. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (1) (1994). As with DOC dumping margin investigations, the
lTC makes its injury determinations, in pan, on the basis of a questionnaire sent to rele-
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threat of injury, or retardation, the ITC had to determine whether
dumped merchandise was the cause. 207 Recent ITC practice suggests that it increasingly uses a unitary approach to injury determinations, essentially combining the two inquiries. Nonetheless, for
present purposes it is useful to retain the conceptual distinction
between injury and causation analysis.
A critical threshold requirement underlies both the injury and
causation inquiries. The injury must be to an industry as a whole;
not merely to one or a few firms in the industry that do not comprise all or a sizeable portion of that industry. 208 As John H. Jackson states, "[i] f the industry is generally thriving, even though
several firms are going out of business, arguably, there is not material injury." 209 The outcome of an ITC inquiry hinges critically on
its identification of the U.S. industry allegedly injured by dumping.
As amended and codified in the U.S. Code, the 1930 Act defines
"industry" as the "producers as a whole of a domestic like product,
or those producers whose collective output of a domestic like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of the product." 210 Identifying the industry, therefore,
depends on defining "like product."
vant parties; namely, importers and U.S. producers of the merchandise in question. See
PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.03. The lTC relies on the same factors to make preliminary
and final injury determinations. See, e.g., Certain Carbon Steel Products from Belgium, the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,814, 31,815 (Dep't Comm. 1980) {stating that "the same
factors with respect to material injury are to be considered in making both preliminary and
final determinations"). For discussions of pre-Uruguay Round injury rules, see Paul W.
Jameson, Recent International Trade Commission Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard:
A Critique, 18 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 517, 517-77 (1986); N. David Palmeter, Material Retardation in the Establishment of an Industry Standard in Antidumping Cases,]. WoRLD TRADE L.,
June 1987, at 113, 113-15; N. David Pal meter, Injury Determinations in Antidumping and Counteroailing Duty Cases-A Commentary on U.S. Practice,]. WoRLD TRADE L.,Jan. 1987, at 23-26
[hereinafter Injury Determinations]; Bruce A. Ortwine, Note, Injury Determinations Under
United States Antidumping Laws Before and After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RuTGERS L.
REv. 1076, 1076-1107 (1981 ); John Slayton, Note, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Material
Injury Standard, 14]. hn'L L. & EcoN. 87, 87-100 {1979); Peter D. Staple, Note, Implementing "Tokyo Round" Commitments: The New Injury Standard in Antidumping and Counteroailing
Duty Law, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1183-87 (1980).
207. For discussions of causation in the context of injury determinations, see William
D. DeGrandis, Proving Causation in Antidumping Cases, 20 INT'L LAw. 563, 563-90 (1986);
Edward R. Easton & William E. Perry, The Causation of Material Injury: Changes in the
Antidumping and Counteroailing Duty Investigations of the International Trade Commission, 2
U.C.L.A PAC. BASIN LJ. 35, 35-37 (1983).
208. jACKSON, supra note 74, at 236.
209. !d.
210. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1994). The lTC has discretion to exclude from the definition of "industry" a U.S. producer that is related to the exporter or importer of dumped
merchandise, or which itself is the importer of dumped merchandise. !d. § 1677(4)(B)
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The 1930 Act states that a "like product" is a product that is like,
or the most similar in characteristics to, the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation.2 11 This definition leaves the lTC
with considerable discretion. Usually, it will not conclude that
products are different because of minor variations. 212 Several of
the factors used by the lTC to determine if an item is a "like product" include: (1) the characteristics and uses of the product; (2)
whether the product is interchangeable with another product; (3)
channels of distribution for the product; (4) customer and producer perceptions of the product; (5) whether the product is made
at the same manufacturing facility as another product; and sometimes (6) the price of the product. 213 If the lTC cannot obtain this
product data, it considers economic data that might permit the
separate identification of production-profits, production
processes, productivity, employment, cash flow and capacity utilization.214 The lTC is not required to define a "like product" in the
same way the DOC defines a "class or kind of merchandise" and
neither grouping must resemble a classification in the Harmonized
Tariff System. 215

1.

I~ury

Standards

"Material injury" is defined by statute as harm that "is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 216 As with the like product determination, the lTC possesses considerable discretion in
determining whether an injury is material. 217 The lTC analyzes
three variables: (1) the volume of imports of the class or kind of
(1994). See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. lnt'l Trade 220 (1992) (holding
that the lTC did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude parties that import or are
related to exporters of ball bearings from a preliminary injury determination because
"appropriate circumstances did not exist for exclusion").
211. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10). Section 233(a) (3) (A) (iii) of the Act substituted "domestic
like product" for "like product." Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat. at 4898.
212. See SENATE COMM. ON FIN., TRADE AGREEMENTS Acr OF 1979, S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.AN. 381,476-77 [hereinafter TRADE
AGREEMENTS Acr SENATE REPORT].
213. High Information Content Flat Panel Displays and Display Glass Therefore from
Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,376, 32,381 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (final determination).
214. TRADE AGREEMENTS Acr SENATE REPORT, supra note 212, at 83-84.
215. Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories from Japan, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,599,
11,601 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (final scope rule); see Robert Mordhorst, Comment, International Trade Administration vs. International Trade Commission: The Scape of Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Investigations Issue, 9 Gw. MAsoN U. L. REv. 147, 153-54 (1986) (for a
discussion of the relationship between the DOC and lTC definitions).
216. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (A) (1994).
217. For an analysis of voting patterns of Commissioners on the lTC, see Jameson,
supra note 206, at 521 n.26, 530 n.53.
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merchandise subject to investigation; (2) the effect of such merchandise on U.S. prices of like merchandise; and (3) the effect of
such merchandise on U.S. producers of like products.2 1 8
With respect to the first variable, the less significant the volume
of imports, the less likely it is the lTC will find that material injury
exists. The difficulty lies in identifying a "significant" volume. The
lTC may consider volume either in absolute terms or relative to
U.S. production or consumption.2 19 Market share data alone are
not important:
It is clear from the cases that the simple existence of a large
importers' [sic] market share is somewhat meaningless as an
injury index. Rather, the Commission will be concerned with
the dynamics of that share; it would be difficult to show current
injury on the sole grounds of a foreign market share of, for
example, 30 percent, if that percentage had not been subject to
significant change for the past 15 years. A much smaller share,
for example, 5 percent, however, could be highly significant as
an injury gauge if that share had risen from .5 percent in one
year. Such a significant rise in market penetration has been a
much more vital concern to the Commission than market share
size alone. 220
Similarly, lost sales and revenue attributable to an increased volume of imports cannot be the sole basis for an affirmative injury
determination. 221
Analyzing the second variable entails a seemingly straightforward
inquiry-have the imports forced or kept down U.S. prices? 222
There are different ways, however, to measure the price sensitivity
of U.S.-made products to imports. Lost sales or revenue, for example, may indicate price depression or suppression. The most prominent type of evidence may be the elasticity of substitution between
the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation and such
or similar merchandise. This type of evidence "reflects the degree
218. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B)(i) (1994); see, e.g., SCM Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. lnt'l
Trade 7, 12-16 ( 1982) (discussing market penetration by dumped imports, price suppression, and lost sales).
Plainly, these variables are also important to the causation determination. This duality of
function may help explain the ITC's recent unitary approach referred to above. See supra
note 208 and accompanying text.
219. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(7)(C)(i) (1994).
220. PATriSON, supra note 72, § 4.04[2] (foomote omitted); see also SCM Corp. v.
United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 7, 12-16 (1982) (discussing market penetration by dumped
imports, price suppression, and lost sales).
221. USX Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. lnt'l Trade 82, 86 (1987).
222. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (ii) (II) (1994).
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to which competition is based on price." 223 Other elasticities, such
as the elasticity of substitution between subject and nonsubject
imports of aggregate U.S. demand and of domestic producers' supply, also influence lTC determinations.22 4
Underselling may be evidence of price depression or suppression; however, it is not a per se basis for an affirmative material
injury determination. 225 The lTC must examine the degree and
duration of the underselling and consider whether price is a significant factor in a purchaser's decision. Underselling need not be
predatory for the lTC to consider it evidence of price depression
or suppression. 226 The safest generalization with respect to underselling is that "[i]f demand for the product is not price sensitive,
but, rather, is the function of other product characteristics, it is
likely that price undercutting will not be a central consideration in
any injury finding. "227
Gauging the third variable calls for an assessment of "all relevant
economic factors which have a bearing on the state of the [U.S.]
industry." 228 Such factors include:
(I) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share,
profits, productivity, return on investments, and utilization of
capacity, (II) factors affecting domestic prices, (III) actual and
potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment,
[and] (IV) actual and potential negative effects on the development and production efforts of the domestic industry, including
efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the
allegedly dumped merchandise.229

223.

Daniel W. Klett & Todd T. Schneider, Price Sensitivity and fTC Injury Determinations,
1994, at 96 (foomote omitted). This elasticity measures the upercentage change in quantity demanded of domestic product given a percentage change in the
price of subject imports." /d. at 96 n.9.
224. /d. at 96-99, 109-10.
225. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C)(ii) (1994).
226. /d. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 changed the statutory
term uprice undercutting" to "price underselling," which some observers suggest is more
ambiguous and confusing. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.04[4] n.30.1.
227. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.04[ 4].
228. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (iii) (1994); see, e.g., American Spring Wire Corp. v. United
States, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 20, 24-26 (1984) (discussing market demand, production, capacity
utilization, net sales, inventory levels, capital funding and expenditures, and profitability),
aff'd suh nom. Armco Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
229. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (1994); OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66.

J. WoRLD TRADE, Apr.
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The lTC must evaluate these factors in the context of the business cycle of the affected U.S. industry. 230 No one factor is dispositive, and it is not necessary that each factor be negative to make an
injury finding. 231 The lTC cannot substitute its own set of factors
for determining injury, 232 nor can it "rely on isolated tidbits of data
which suggest a result contrary to the clear weight of the evidence."233 Interestingly, however, the amount of the dumping margin is not expressly mentioned in the statute as a factor in the
material injury determination.234
The lTC may base an injury determination on a threat of material injury, rather than present material injury. 235 The likelihood
of material injury must be "real and imminent" and not simply a
matter of "supposition, speculation or conjecture." 236 Although
predicting future events is more difficult and controversial than
analyzing current data, 237 the lTC must consider certain factors
when making a material threat of injury determination: ( 1) an
increase in the exporting country's production capacity likely to
result in a significant increase in imports into the United States;
(2) a rapid increase in U.S. market penetration that will be injurious; (3) the probability that imports will depress or suppress U.S.
prices; (4) a substantial increase in inventories; (5) the presence of
230. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (iii) (1994). Presumably, the ITC takes measures to ensure
that lingering effects of past injury do not form the basis for a present injury
determination.
231. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (E) (ii) (1994); see also Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 2
Ct. Int'l Trade 18, 22 (1981) (indicating that no single factor is decisive with respect to a
material injury determination), rev'd on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Iwatsu Elec. Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 44, 49 (1991) (stating that the ITC can
weigh each factor in light of the circumstances of the case and need not find that all
factors point to material injury to render an affirmative injury determination).
232. Trent Tube Div. v. Avesta Sandvik Tube, 975 F.2d 807, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(rejecting a five-factor test devised and applied by a commissioner).
233. USX Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 82, 84 (1987).
234. PArriSON, supra note 72, § 4.04[7]; see also Hyundai Pipe Co. Ltd. v. United States,
11 Ct. Int'l Trade 117, 123 (1987) (rejecting an argument that the ITC must engage in a
dumping margin analysis in injury determinations). For discussion of dumping margin
analysis under pre-Uruguay Round law, see jACKSON, supra note 74, 241-42; N. David
Palmeter, Note, Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC is Free to Choose, J. WoRLD
TRADE L., Apr. 1987, at 173, 173-175.
235. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.06.
236. !d.; see also American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001-04 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (holding that the statutory requirement that the ITC base a preliminary determination on a "reasonable indication" of threat of material injury does not mean the same as a
"mere possibility" of threat of injury).
237. H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Gong., 2d Sess. 174 ( 1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4910, 5291; Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, CA v. United States, 17
Ct. Int'l Trade 146, 164 (1993).

1995]

Rethinking Antidumping Law

51

underutilized capacity in the exporting country; (6) the actual and
potential negative effects on development and production efforts
in the United States, including attempts to develop derivative or
more advanced products; and (7) the existence of dumping of the
subject merchandise in a third country. 23B
The lTC rarely uses material retardation of the establishment of
a domestic industry as the basis for a material injury determination;239 the evidentiary requirements are severe. 240 There must be a
substantial commitment to commence production, demonstrated
by information about business plans, market surveys, product
designs, and financial commitments. 241 In addition, "a representative of an 'inchoate' or 'nonexistent' industry is not likely to be
financially and commercially postured to complain of imports."242
Nonetheless, the lTC has found material retardation in a few cases.
In one instance the lTC held that where a petitioner had made a
substantial investment in a product that competed with the class or
kind of merchandise subject to investigation, such merchandise
would impede the petitioner's market entry. 243 In another instance
the lTC considered the commercial viability of a petitioner's startup operations. 244

2.

Causation

The 1930 Act requires only that injury to a U.S. industry be
caused "by reason of" dumped merchandise. 245 A petitioner need
not show that the class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation is the direct, immediate or proximate, or even substantial
cause of the injury. In contrast, "substantial" causation is a necessary element of an escape clause claim under section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974. 246 In addition, a petitioner need not show that
238. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i), (iii) (1994).
239. See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.07.
240. See id.
241. Id.; see, e.g., Motorcycle Batteries from Taiwan, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,609 (Dep't Comm.
1982) (finding no material injury); Memorandum from the General Counsel to the Trade
Commission Regarding Legal Issues in Certain Dried Salted Codfish from Canada, Inv. No.
731-TA-199 (preliminary) (Aug. 22, 1984) (recommending that a material injury analysis,
rather than material retardation, is appropriate).
242. PATIISON, supra note 72, § 4.07.
243. Salmon Gill Fish Netting of Manmade Fibers from Japan, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,979,
14,981 (Dep't Comm. 1982) (finding material retardation in the fish-netting industry).
244. BMT Commodity Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 524, 526-27 (1987)
(criticizing the ITC's approach for failing to focus on the effect on the petitioner's ability
to produce the merchandise subject to investigation).
245. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1994) (codification of Tariff Act of 1930 as amended).
246. Id. § 2251(a) (codification of Trade Act of 1974 as amended).
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dumping is the sole or even primary cause of injury. 247 It may show
injury through other factors, including: (1) the volume and price
of merchandise that is not dumped; (2) a contraction in demand
or changes in consumption patterns; (3) competition between foreign and domestic producers; (4) technological developments; and
(5) "[t]he export performance and productivity of the domestic
industry." 248 These factors are irrelevant, however, because "[i]t
has been unequivocally established that extraneous factors are not
to be weighed or balanced against the injury caused by dumping."249 Therefore,
in reaching an injury determination, the [International Trade]
Commission does not ask whether the subject imports are the
principal or fundamental cause of injury to the concerned
industry. In the words of the House of Representatives in reviewing the injury standard, any such construction of the injury standard would have the "undesirable result of making relief more
difficult to obtain for those industries facing difficulties from a
variety of sources, precisely those industries that are most vulnerable to ... dumped imports." In this light, the Commission
has explained, the "causative link required in unfair trade circumstances . . . is weaker than when fair trade conditions
exist."250
The ITC may consider evidence introduced by a respondent that
injury is caused by extraneous factors; however, the petitioner does
not bear the burden of proving that injury is not caused by such
factors. 251
With respect to actual injury and threat determinations, the ITC
may cumulatively assess the volume and effect of imports of like
merchandise from multiple countries, as opposed to imports of
merchandise from a single country, under certain conditions.
Those imports must: (1) be subject to investigation; (2) compete
with each other and a U.S. product; and (3) be marketed in the
247. See POWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5.
248. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.05; see 19 U.S. C. § 1677(7) (B) (ii) (1994).
249. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.05 (foomote omitted); see also USX Corp. v. United
States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 205, 214 (1988) (rejecting the ITC's use of a five-factor causation
test and a causation analysis based on an elasticity estimate); Horlick, supra note 13, at 163
(stating that "weighing of causes ... is specifically forbidden under U.S. law" (footnote
omitted)); PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 5 (stating that the lTC "lacks authority to
weigh other countervailing interests against evidence of injury, such as consumer interests
or those of other U.S. industries such as those that rely on 'dumped' components for their
own production (which could suffer from dumping duties), or the 'national' interest (e.g.,
national security, bilateral relations, market access [and] trade strategy)").
250. PATTISON, supra note 72, § 4.05 (foomotes omitted).
251. !d.
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United States in a reasonably contemporaneous period.2s2 The
traditional rationale for a cumulative analysis is that a U.S. industry
can be injured by imports whether those imports come from one
or many sources. 253 The second requirement for cumulative assessment is met if the imports: (1) are sold in the same U.S. markets as
a U.S. product; (2) are distributed through the same channels as a
U.S. product; (3) are fungible with a U.S. product; (4) fall within
the same price range as a U.S. product; or (5) are present in the
U.S. market at the same time as a U.S. product. 254 The first requirement is met if the imports are identified by one or more petitions
filed simultaneously. 255 Curiously, the third requirement is not set
forth in the 1930 Act, either because it is redundant or because it
requires that the imports compete with one another and U.S. products.256 The lTC may also cumulate imports subject to an
antidumping investigation with those subject to a countervailing
duty investigation; 257 however, the lTC may not cumulate those
imports subject to a voluntary restraint agreement that addresses a
dumping dispute.2ss
252. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i) (1994); H.R CONF. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 173 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 4910, 5290; OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 66.
While the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 only applied to material injury determinations,
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 612(a)(2) (A), 98 StaL at 3033, the Court oflnternational
Trade subsequently held that the ITC may cumulate imports in appropriate cases. Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'I Trade 634, 642
- (1988).
For a discussion of pre-Uruguay Round cumulation practice, seeM. Roy Goldberg, lWien
Unimportant Is Interesting: The Negligible Import Exception to Cumulation in Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 25 Gw. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 721, 721-36 (1992);
William B.T. Mock, Jr., Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations &fare the International Trade Commission, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 433, 439-77 (1986); Jonathan T. Suder,
Note, Cumulation of Imports in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, 17 GEo.
WASH.]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 463, 470-85 (1983).
As a result of an amendment to the 1930 Act made by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the ITC need not cumulatively assess the volume and effects of
imports from two or more countries if imports from one country are negligible and have
no discernible adverse impact on a U.S. industry. The ITC may deem imports as negligible
and having no discernible impact if they are the product of a country with which the U.S.
entered into a free trade agreement before january 1, 1987. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1330(b), 98 Stat. 2948, 3033 (amending
section 771(7) of the 1930 Act). Israel satisfies this requirement as a result of the 1985
United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement. No other country satisfies this requiremenL
253. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 847.
254. PAITISON, supra note 72, § 4.12.
255. /d.
256. See id. § 4.12 n.6.
257. Bingham & Taylor Div. v. United States, 815 F.2d 1482, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
258. Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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Anticircumvention

A respondent may attempt to circumvent an antidumping order
by: (1) assembling merchandise subject to the order in the United
States or a third country; (2) altering the merchandise in a minor
way; or (3) developing different merchandise, so-called "laterdeveloped" merchandise. 259 In these situations the problem of circumvention can raise difficult questions of policy and
enforcement:
How different should a product be to be reasonably excluded
from the scope of an order? Should the import relief laws reasonably be extended to provide protection for consecutive generations of products? Are the rights of third countries infringed
when imports from them are subjected to an order which had
originally been targeted against another country? 2 6°
In response to these issues, the DOC has been empowered to
expand the scope of an antidumping order to include: (1) components imported into the United States and assembled in the United
States to make finished merchandise; (2) imported merchandise
assembled from components in a third country; (3) altered merchandise; or (4) later-developed merchandise. 261
Before expanding the scope of an antidumping order to include
imported components subsequently assembled in the United
States, the DOC must determine that:
(1) merchandise is sold in the United States that is the same as
merchandise that is subject to an antidumping ... order; (2)
merchandise is completed or assembled in the United States
from parts or components produced in the foreign country to
which the antidumping order applies; and (3) the difference
between the value of the merchandise sold in the United States
and the value of the imported parts and components is small. 262
The third condition is particularly telling because if a small
amount of value is added in the United States, the exporter is probably dumping finished merchandise in an unfinished form.
The DOC has similar power v.rith respect to imported merchandise assembled from components in a third country. Before
expanding the scope of an order, the DOC must determine that:
259. OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 70; see Cameron & Crawford, supra note 202, at 4 73-80
(discussing changes to the circumvention rules made by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988).
260. PATriSON, supra note 72, § 10.09.
261. 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)-(d) (1994); 19 C.F.R § 353.29(e)-(h) (1995); OvERVIEW,
supra note 30, at 70.
262. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 81; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)-(b) (1994).
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(1) merchandise imported into the United States is the same
class or kind as merchandise subject to an order; (2) before
importation, that merchandise was completed or assembled in
another foreign country from merchandise subject to an order
or was produced in the foreign country to which the order
applies; (3) the difference between the value of the imported
merchandise and the value of the merchandise completed or
assembled in a third country is small; and (4) . . . action is
appropriate to prevent evasion of an order.263
Again, the value added condition is crucial. It may indicate that the
exporter is dumping merchandise assembled in a third country.
The DOC is virtually unfettered in expanding the scope of an
antidumping order to include altered or slightly modified merchandise. Examples include merchandise of the same class or kind
as that subject to an order, merchandise assembled or completed
from components from the country subject to the order, and merchandise to which a small value is added in a third country. The
DOC need not make an additional determination with respect to
altered merchandise because it is presumed to include such merchandise in its underlying order. 264
The DOC may also expand an order to include later-developed
merchandise if it finds-on the basis of consumer expectations,
physical characteristics, use, advertising, and channels of tradethat later-developed merchandise is the same as that subject to the
underlying order.265
IV.

AssESSING PosT-URUGUAY RouND A.NrmuMPING

LAw

A word here, a phrase there, inserted in the implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round, means that foreign steel exporters and other industries selling in the US market could still find
themselves subject to "unfair trade" complaints and years of
expensive litigation before winning market access for their
products. 266
The Agreement and the Act fail to resolve the problem of protectionist abuse of antidumping law by a petitioner that has lost its
comparative advantage relative to an exporter. This failure is evi263. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 81; see 19 U.S.C. § I677j(b) (1994).
264. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(c) (1994). For a discussion of the treatment under pre-Uruguay Round law of circumvention through minor alterations, see George Kleinfeld &
Diane Gaylor, Circumvention of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders through Minor
Alterations in Merchandise: Where to Draw the Line?, J. WoRLD TRADE, Feb. 1994, at 77, 79-88
(1994).
265. 19 u.s.c. § 1677j(d) (1994).
266. Nancy Dunne, US Takes Hard Line on "Dumping": Hapes Ro.ised By Uruguay Round
May Be Dashed, FIN. TIMES, Aug. I, 1994, at 4.

56

Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.

[Vol. 29

dent in five contexts. First, the Agreement and the Act expand
opportunities for filing a petition. Second, a petitioner can manipulate a dumping margin calculation to maximize that margin.
Third, a petitioner can exploit standards for demonstrating injury
and claim that imports are the cause of its woes. Fourth, by invoking anticircumvention or new shipper rules, a petitioner that has
obtained an antidumping order can extend the protection
afforded by the order. Fifth, despite mandatory "sunset" reviews of
outstanding antidumping orders, revocation of an order is
unlikely. In each context the root of the failure is ambiguity in the
text of the Agreement or the Act, inconsistency with fundamental
microeconomic concepts, or both.
A.

l.

Filing a Petition

Conceptual and Practical Flaws

A protectionist abuser benefits from an overly broad standing
requirement in antidumping law. At the same time, the meritorious petitioner is harmed by a standing requirement that is too
strict.
Article 5.1 of the Agreement explains that a petition must be
filed "by or on behalf of" an industry. 267 Article 5.4 defines this
phrase in terms of a 50% and 25% of production threshold tests. 268
These tests are calculated to ensure the support of a critical mass of
domestic producers in the importing country. The Agreement
requires that both tests be satisfied. 269 The 50% test focuses on the
size of domestic producers supporting the petition relative to those
opposing it. Producers who support the petition must account for
more than 50% of the total output of the product. 270 This requires
that "of [all] those producers expressing a view [on the petition],
267. Agreement, supra note 19, at 7.
268. Id. at 8. Section 212(a)(2) of the Act implements the 50% and 25% tests. Act,
supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 4846. It also appears to add a third threshold test
not found in the Agreement. Compare Act, supra note 23, § 212(a) (2), 108 Stat. at 4846
(disregarding position of domestic producers related to foreign producers and producers
who are importers) with Agreement, supra note 19, at 8 (imposing no qualification of producers polled).
Suppose a petition does not establish prima facie that it is supported by domestic producers or workers accounting for more than 50% of the total production of the domestic like
product. The DOC must poll the industry to see whether the 50% and 25% threshold tests
are met. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) ( 4) (D) (1994); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 36;
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3820.
269. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8.
270. /d.
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more producers support than oppose the petition."27 1 The 25%
test focuses on the absolute size, measured in terms of output, of
domestic producers supporting the petition. 272 Producers expressing support for the petition must account for at least 25% of the
total domestic production of the like domestic product. 273
These tests, in one respect, are a welcome development given
the vacuum existing under prior law. 274 The tests create bright
lines that should provide certainty and predictability. The tests,
however, are conceptually and operationally flawed. They rely on
an antediluvian distinction between foreign and domestic production, and it is unclear whether they will reduce protectionist abuse.
A petitioner remains able to "point the Commerce Department
like a guided missile against its foreign competition and let the
U.S. government do the rest."275
Articles 4 and 5 of the Agreement, entitled "Definition of
Domestic Industry" and "Initiation and Subsequent Investigation,"
do not require a domestic industry, on behalf of which a petition is
filed, to be owned or controlled by a party in the importing country.276 These articles are conceptually flawed, however, because
they rely on an underlying assumption that manufacturing operations are neatly divided along territorial lines between a petitioner
in the importing country and a respondent in a foreign country. In
reality, the situation is more complex because such operations are
often global. 277 For example, a finished good may be the end product of raw materials from South Africa, processed into an intermediate good in Zimbabwe, shipped to the United States, and
processed into a final product through the addition of Malaysian
components. Suppose the U.S. producer is owned by a Japanese
holding company and wants to file a dumping petition against: (1)
a Japanese exporter of the same finished merchandise; and (2) a
Malaysian exporter of the components used in the finished merchandise. The petitioner has standing to bring the first case but
not the second because it is a U.S. producer of the finished merchandise and not the component. Whether this result is just is
271. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35.
272. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8.
273. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35.
274. Under prior laws petitioner was assumed to have standing to file an antidumping
petition on behalf of an industry unless its standing was challanged by another member of
the relevant industry. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
275. BovARD, supra note 1, at 139.
276. Agreement, supra note 19, at 6-7.
277. See Horlick, supra note 13, at 156.
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arguable, but it is artificial because the finished merchandise is a
global product. Any distinction between "domestic" and "foreign"
manufacturing is drawn on the basis of geopolitical boundaries,
not substantive economic reality.
The 50% and 25% tests may enhance opportunities for protectionist abuse. They make filing an antidumping petition easier
than under prior law for two reasons.2 7 S First, Article 5.4 of the
Agreement broadens the universe of potential petitioners.2 79 Second, Article 4.1 (i) conditionally disenfranchises producers related
to the respondent.2so
Article 5.4 expands the universe of potential petitioners beyond
firms in a domestic industry to include other parties purporting to
act on behalf of the industry. Footnote 14 to Article 5.4 states that
"[m]embers are aware that in the territory of certain Members,
employees of domestic producers of the like product or representatives
of those employees, may make or support an application for an
investigation." 281 Read literally, this language means that, in addition to labor unions or other worker associations, individual
employees and ad hoc groups of workers may file petitions. 282
In the United States the effect of footnote 14 is to place management and workers on equal footing with respect to supporting or
opposing a petition. 283 As a result, "if workers and management of
the same firm express opposing views with respect to a petition, the
firm and the production it represents would not be counted as
expressing either support for or opposition to the petition." 284 The
repercussions of footnote 14 may be more dramatic in WTO members other than the United States. Under the pre-Uruguay Round
law of some members, unions did not have standing to file petitions and individual employees were certainly prohibited from
doing so. There is likely to be an increase in dumping actions filed
278. One practitioner suggests that the bright-line tests could make it more difficult for
U.S. producers to gain relief from dumping. Michael H. Stein, The Uruguay Round and the
Trade Laws: Antidumping, Countervailing Duties, Common Provisions, in THE CoMMERCE
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND lNVESrMENT 877, 892 (PU 1994).
279. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8.
280. Id. at 6.
281. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
282. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3820.
283. The Act clearly intends "labor [to] have [an] equal voice with management in
supporting or opposing" a petition. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35; HousE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 48, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3820; MEssAGE, supra note 69, at 862.
284. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35; see HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3820.
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by foreign unions and workers in such members and successful
U.S. exporters could be vulnerable to attack.
With respect to the conditional disenfranchisement of producers
related to a respondent, Article 4.1 (i) of the Agreement, and the
implementing legislation in section 212(a) (2) of the Act, establish
a perverse burden of proof for a determination of industry support
for a petition. 285 Consider the following hypothetical.
Nippon Steel Corporation (NSC) has a U.S. subsidiary, Nippon
U.S.A., to which it exports steel. Nippon U.S.A. manufactures both
steel and steel-based products like tubing, ball bearings, and chainlinked fences. Nippon U.S.A. opposes the petition of Bethlehem
Steel, a U.S. producer, filed against NSC. In addition, the Savannah Steel Company (SSC), a U.S. company unrelated to NSC or
Nippon U.S.A., purchases steel and steel-based products from both
of these companies for use in its steel processing operations.
Should the DOC consider the opposition of Nippon U.S.A. and
sse when determining whether there is sufficient industry support
for the petition?
The DOC must exclude from its application of the 50% and 25%
tests an opposing domestic producer related to the exporter
because of Article 4.1(i). 286 The DOC can also exclude an unrelated importer of subject merchandise. A related producer or an
unrelated importer may only be included upon a showing that its
interests would be adversely affected by an antidumping order. No
such rule existed in the 1930 Act.
Plainly, the rule conditionally disenfranchises an affiliate of an
exporter, as well as an unaffiliated importer, creating an inherent
bias in favor of a petitioner. Nippon U.S.A., an affiliate of the
exporter NSC, must prove to the DOC that: (1) it uses steel from
NSC in the production of steel-based products; (2) it would be
harmed by an increase in the price of steel caused by an antidumping duty; and (3) there is no reliable domestic source of substitut285. See Act, supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 4846; SENATE REPORT, supra note
18, at 35-36.
286. Agreement, supra note 19, at 6 n.ll. The Senate report states that
a producer and an exporter or importer are related if the producer directly or
indirectly controls either the exporter or the importer; the exporter or the
importer directly or indirectly controls the producer; a third party directly or
indirectly controls the producer and exporter or importer; or the producer and
the exporter or importer directly or indirectly control a third party and there is
reason to believe that the relationship causes the producer to act differently than
an unrelated producer would act. ... [D]irect or indirect control is established if
a party is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction
over the other party.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 53.
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able steel or such source is prohibitively expensive. SSC, an
unaffiliated importer, must make the same showing. The rationale
for such disenfranchisement is unpersuasive: Section 212(a) of the
Act is
necessary to ensure that foreign producers, who would not normally be expected to support a petition, are not allowed to prevent investigations from going forward simply by directing or
encouraging (implicitly or explicitly) their affiliates in the
United States to oppose a petition .... Since it would normally
be expected that an order would benefit domestic producers at
the expense of foreign producers, when there is a relationship
between the two producers and the domestic producer opposes
an investigation, the Commerce Department needs to be satisfied that the opposition is based on the effect of an order on
domestic rather than foreign production interests. 287
This rationale has two flaws. First, it is unclear how a related
domestic producer that imports subject merchandise can meet the
burden of proof. Section 212(a) (2) states only that related domestic producers must "demonstrate that their interests as domestic
producers would be adversely affected by the imposition of an
antidumping duty order." 288 The legislative history is similarly
unhelpful:
The Committee does not intend that the Commerce Department establish a "bright-line" test for determining whether it is
appropriate to exclude importers who are also domestic producers. Rather, the Committee expects Commerce to look at the
relevant facts in each case, examining, for example, the volume
and value of the producer's imports, the percentage of that producer's production accounted for by imports, and other relevant factors. 289
Must Nippon U.S.A. demonstrate that it would have to close
down production because of the increased cost of imported materials resulting from an antidumping duty, or is a small drop in the
profits of Nippon U.S.A. a sufficient adverse effect? Because of this
ambiguity, Bethlehem Steel has ample room to argue that a duty
would have no adverse effect on Nippon U.S.A.
Second, Article 4.1 (i) of the Agreement, and section 212(a) (2)
of the Act, operate in a discriminatory manner by placing the burden of showing harm from an antidumping order on a related
287. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 35-36.
288. Act, supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at 4846 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673a(c) (4) (B) (i) (1994) ).
289. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 36 (emphasis added).
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domestic producer or an unrelated importer. 290 No burden, however, is placed on an unrelated domestic producer or, for that matter, a related importer. Suppose the Patriot Steel· Corporation
(PSC), a U.S. company unrelated to NSC, manufactures steel and
steel products. To register its opposition to Bethlehem Steel's petition with the DOC, PSC need not prove it would be injured by an
order. By placing the burden on Nippon U.S.A. but not PSC, the
Agreement and the Act assume that corporate affiliation alone
determines the position a company takes in an antidumping action
and essentially treat a foreign-owned company as guilty until
proven innocent. The unlikelihood that a U.S. subsidiary would
challenge its foreign parent may not justify this discrimination.
If the Agreement and the Act truly sought to minimize protectionist abuse, they would reverse the burden of proof. The presumption should be that both PSC and Nippon U.S.A. are
enfranchised. The petitioner ought to be required to prove to the
DOC that Nippon U.S.A. should be excluded on the ground that
the affiliate assesses its interests from the viewpoint of its Japanese
parent and not its U.S. operations. 291 Reversing the burden might
also force the DOC to consider the possible positive effects of steel
imports at allegedly dumped prices, rather than to focus on Bethlehem Steel's claims.

2.

Third-Country Petitions

Article 14 of the Agreement, 292 implemented by section 232 of
the Act, 293 expands the scope of protection afforded by antidumping law by authorizing third-country dumping petitions. The protected class now includes a third-country exporter competing in
the United States with a foreign exporter.294
Suppose Panasonic of Japan, the third-country exporter, and
GoldStar of Korea, the foreign exporter, each sell televisions in the
United States. Panasonic believes GoldStar is dumping televisions
in the United States but no U.S. company files a petition.
Panasonic can request the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to
290. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 6; Act, supra note 23, § 212(a)(2), 108 Stat. at
4846.
291. Circumstantial evidence presented by the petitioner should be accepted because
the petitioner may not have access to proprietary information about its competitor during
the early phase of a case.
292. Agreement, supra note 19, at 19-20.
293. Act, supra note 23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n ( 1994)).
294. Id.
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file a petition on its behalf. 295 In contrast to prior law, the Agreement and the Act obligate the USTR, the DOC, and the lTC to
respond to this third-country dumping petition. 296 Consequently,
any WTO member can seek protection in the United States, even if
no U.S. industry is complaining. Approval of the petition, however,
is not automatic. First, the petition must allege that an exporter
from another WTO member is dumping merchandise in the
United States and that such dumping injures an industry producing like merchandise in the country of the petitioning member.
Second, the USTR must consult with the DOC and the lTC, obtain
the approval of the WTO Council for Trade in Goods, and ensure
that the petitioning member affords U.S. exporters an equal
opportunity to initiate dumping actions. 2 9 7
The principal effect of this new provision will likely be an
increase in the number of antidumping cases brought in the
United States and other WTO members. The microeconomic
rationale for accepting a third-country dumping petition is weak,
however, because U.S. consumers benefit from competition among
foreign exporters, such as Japanese and Korean television
exporters.
The issuance of an antidumping order against GoldStar's televisions will generally result in a price increase equivalent to the
amount of the duty set by the order or a portion thereof. U.S. consumers are harmed because consumer surplus is reduced or perhaps eliminated. 298 Although Panasonic gains from protection in
this case, there is no offsetting benefit for a U.S. company. The
conventional argument in support of antidumping law-the protection of U.S. companies and workers from unfair foreign competition-is inapplicable. In light of global production, it may even
be obsolete. Of course, the conventional argument may be
deployed if a U.S. company is the third-country exporter, though
in such a case the company would already be eligible to seek protection based on the loss of its comparative advantage relative to a
foreign exporter. In any event, antidumping law is a tool for protecting domestic manufacturers, not boosting U.S. exports.

295. /d.
296. See Act, supra note 23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897.
297. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87.
298. Section 232 expressly requires the USTR to provide an opportunity for public
comment in determining whether to initiate a third-country investigation. Act, supra note
23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n(d) (1994)).
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Moreover, ambiguity surrounds the treatment of a third-country
dumping petition. Neither Article 14 nor section 232 indicate
whether the same substantive and procedural standards that apply
to a traditional petition also apply to a third-country petition. 299
The USTR has discretion to specify the standards the DOC and the
lTC must use in conducting a third-country investigation. 300
Assuming other WTO members also have such discretion, reciprocal manipulation of standards could occur. Suppose a WTO member lodges a third-country petition with the USTR and, at the same
time, a U.S. exporter seeks relief in that same member's market.
The U.S. exporter will urge the USTR to look favorably on the
third-country petition so that the WTO member will accommodate
the petition in which the exporter has an interest. Paradoxically,
the U.S. exporter would be arguing in favor of protection in the
United States and against protection overseas. The result might be
a "race to the bottom," as the USTR and other WTO members
relax their standards in response to pressure from companies in
their respective countries hoping to enhance the likelihood of a
satisfactory resolution of their own petitions.
B.

1.

The Dumping Margin Calculation

The Basic Formula and Problems of De Minimis Thresholds,
Averaging, and Comparability

Broadly speaking, Article 2 of the Agreement provides specific
rules on dumping margin calculations that substantially resemble
the rules in pre-Uruguay Round U.S. antidumping law. 301 A review
of those changes reveals that some are unlikely to have a substantive effect on prior law, others are likely to have a substantive effect,
and still others whose impact is uncertain. It is unclear whether
Article 2's revision of terminology, relating to the DOC's discretion
in calculating dumping margins, will have a practical effect.
Changes in basic antidumping nomenclature create less uncertainty because they merely clarify ambiguity under prior law. New
standards relating to the de minimis margin inquiry, the practice
299. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 19-20; Act, supra note 23, 108 Stat. at 4897 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n (1994)).
300. Act, supra note 23, § 232, 108 Stat. at 4897-98 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677n(c)
(1994)).
301. Compare Agreement, supra note 19, at 1-4 {stating new rules on determination of
dumping) with supra note 128 and accompanying text {stating pre-Uruguay Round U.S. law
on imposition of antidumping duties).

64

Geo. Wash. ]. Int'l L. & Econ.

[Vol. 29

of averaging, and questions of comparability are problematic and
are likely to have a felt impact.
Article 2 adopts the standard definition of dumping, based on
Article VI of the GAIT. A product is dumped if its "export price"
(EP) is less than "normal value" (NV).S02 The NV is the foreign
home market price of a "foreign like product" sold in the ordinary
course of trade (i.e., not to a related party or below cost) for consumption in the exporter's country. If home-market sales are
incomparable because such sales are few, nonexistent, or at belowcost prices, the DOC uses either the NV in a third country or a
constructed value (CV) in lieu of the NV. 303 The EP is the sale
price of the allegedly dumped product to an unaffiliated purchaser
in the importing country before the date of importation. 304 Where
the EP is unavailable or unreliable, a "constructed export price"
(CEP) is used. The EP may be unusable because the purchaser in
the importing country is affiliated with the exporter. The CEP is
based on the first sale to a purchaser unrelated to the exporter. 305
Article 2 requires a "fair comparison" between the NV and the EP
(or CEP). 306 The general formula for the calculation remains conceptually the same as under prior law:
302. Agreement, supra note 19, at 1.
303. Agreement, supra note 19, at 1; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 67-68.
304. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63.
305. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3.
306. Id.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 67; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 78, 82,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3850, 3854.
The DOC continues to attempt to calculate an individual dumping margin for all exporters subject to an antidumping investigation. Act, supra note 23, § 229, 108 Stat. at 4889
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 78.
As under prior law the DOC bases its determination on data provided by foreign exporters and U.S. producers in response to questionnaires issued by the DOC. If an exporter or
producer does not respond to a questionnaire or impedes an investigation, the DOC can
make a determination based on "facts available." See Act, supra note 23, § 231 (c), 108 Stat.
at 4896 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (1994)); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 869; HousE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 105, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3877. Under prior law the
DOC made determinations based on the "best information available" in such situations.
Whether the DOC's discretion is reduced because of this change in terminology remains
to be seen.
If a large number of exporters are named as respondents, the DOC may not have the
resources to calculate margins for each exporter. The DOC, in such cases, may limit its
calculation to respondents accounting for the largest volume of exports. Alternatively, it
may calculate the dumping margin based on a "statistically valid" sample of exporters.
Agreement, supra note 19, at 11; Act, supra note 23, § 229(a), 108 Stat. at 4890 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)(A) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79; HousE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 100, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3872. In both cases, an "all others" rate
is calculated for those exporters not included in the calculation. Generally, this rate is
based on a weighted average of individual dumping margins calculated for those exporters
that are individually investigated. Agreement, supra note 19, at 15; Act, supra note 23,
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= NV - EP (or CEP),

where NV is determined by home or third-country sales or a CV.
Sections 223 and 224 of the Act implement Article 2 by altering
the 1930 Act nomenclature to ensure consistency with new terminology.307 The term "NV'' replaces the term "FMV''; "EP" replaces
"PP"; "CEP" replaces "ESP"; and the term "USP" is abolished.3°8
Furthermore, the Agreement uses the term "like product" to refer
to both foreign and domestic merchandise and distinguishes
between the two by modifying the term with either "domestic" or
"foreign." 309 Under prior law "like product" referred to a domestic
(U.S.-produced) product, whereas "such or similar merchandise"
referred to a foreign like product (a foreign export subject to the
antidumping investigation).3 10 The Act clarifies the distinction and
eliminates this awkward terminology. Finally, the term "subject
merchandise" replaces the term "class or kind of merchandise subject to investigation." 311 These changes in terminology are not
intended to have any substantive legal ramifications. 312
§ 229(a), 108 Stat. at 4856-57 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c) (5) (1994)); MESSAGE, supra
note 69, at 872-73; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 42, 78-79; HousE REPORT, supra note
18, at 54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3826.
Under prior law the DOC used "generally recognized sampling techniques" to calculate
the dumping margin. See NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States, 997 F.2d 1453, 1457-58
(Fed. Cir. 1993). The new law contains a revised reference to a "statistically valid sample"
but does not imply any substantive change. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 872. Rather, the new
term simply conforms with the language in Article 6.10. Note, however, that the DOC is
not obligated to obtain the most representative sample. It is merely obligated to employ a
sampling methodology that yields representative results based on known facts. Id. at 873.
Note also that the DOC is directed to investigate each known producer in a nonsampling
situation. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1) (1994). It is unclear whether this requirement effectively supersedes the prior DOC regulation concerning 60% coverage, whereby the DOC
normally examined at least 60% of the dollar value or volume of merchandise sold 150
days before and 30 days after the first day of the month in which a petition was filed. 19
C.F.R. § 353.42 (b) ( 1995). If so, then the consequent increase in administrative burden is
certain to raise the number of instances in which the DOC uses sampling.
307. Act, supra note 23, §§ 223-224, 108 Stat. at 4876-86 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1677a, 1677b ( 1994)); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at
33, 63.
308. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 78-79,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3850-51; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820.
309. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820; see also 19
U.S.C. § 1677(10), (16) (1994) (defining "domestic like product" and "foreign like
product").
310. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820; see supra note
128 and accompanying text.
311. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33.
312. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 820. For a summary of changes to nomenclature, see
Pre- and Post-Uruguay Round Terminology and Abbreviations, infra at Appendix A.
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In contrast to the innocuous effects of the changes in terminology, Article 5 of the Agreement establishes a problematic two-part
de minimis margin inquiry. The first question is whether the volume of imports ·of the subject merchandise is so low that the
authorities should ignore the allegation. The second question is
whether the durpping margin is so slight that the authorities
should ignore it for purposes of dumping margin and injury determinations. Section 2 sets the threshold standards for answering
these questions at 3% for the de minimis volume test and at 2% for
the de minimis margin test. 313 These standards represent a substantial change from prior law. There was no analog in prior law to the
3% volume test and the standard for the de minimis margin threshold was 0.5%, not 2%.314
Under the de minimis volume test, the DOC does not initiate an
investigation if the volume of imports of subject merchandise from
the exporter's country is less than 3% of total imports of like merchandise from all countries. 315 The 3% test is subject to an exception for cases in which more than one country exports subject
merchandise. 316 If the total volume of exports from such countries
collectively exceeds 7%, an action may be brought even though no
one exporting country's share exceeds 3%. The second test means
that a dumping margin of 2% or less, ad valorem, is de minimis and,
therefore, no investigation ensues. 317 Obviously, no petitioner
would allege the existence of a de minimis margin or volume; thus,
the two-part inquiry may reduce the number of investigations that
313. Agreement, supra note 19, at 8.
314. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 38; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 49, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3821; see supra text accompanying notes 131-132. Section 213 of the
Act amends the 1930 Act to make it consistent with the Agreement. See Act, supra note 23,
§ 213, 108 Stat. at 4850 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1994)).
315. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 57; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 71,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3843. In other words, the volume of subject merchandise is
compared with the total imports from all sources of like merchandise. Section 222(d) of
the Act states that subject merchandise is negligible if it accounts for less than 3% of the
total volume of all like merchandise imported into the United States in the most recent
year preceding the filing of the antidumping petition. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(d), 108
Stat. at 4871-72 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(24)(A)(i) (1994)).
316. Act, supra note 23, § 222(d), 108 Stat. at 4871-72 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677 (24) (A) (i) ( 1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 57; HousE REPORT, supra note
18, at 71, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3843.
317. Interestingly, the 2% de minimis margin test applies only to antidumping investigations. The DOC retains its ability to use the 0.5% test in reviews. See HousE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 49, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3821; Memorandum from Powell, Goldstein,
Frazer & Murphy on Analysis and Summary of Antidumping Provisions in GAIT Legislation (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter Analysis and Summary] (on file with The George Washington
journal of International Law and Economics).

1995]

Rethinking Antidumping Law

67

end in antidumping orders, but it will not reduce the number of
investigations initiated.
Further, the established thresholds seem to be too low. The challenge is to dismiss marginal petitions by appropriately calibrating
the thresholds to eliminate protectionist abusers, not meritorious
petitioners. If larger dumping margins and import volumes are
required, fewer petitions will satisfy the de minimis threshold.
Given that almost all petitioners allege dumping margins far in
excess of 5%, 318 perhaps a volume test of 10% and a margin test of
10% might work. Although further empirical research is needed to
fine-tune the appropriate threshold levels, the 10% figures provide
a basis for further study.
Another unsatisfactory aspect of Article 2 of the Agreement is its
ambiguity with respect to averaging. 319 The basic rule is that the
DOC must use either average or individual transaction prices. 320
Authorities are not permitted to combine methods of comparison
in a particular case unless there is evidence of a "pattern" of export
prices that "differs significantly" among different purchasers,
regions, or time periods. The key terms "pattern" and "differs significantly" are undefined. Furthermore, section 229 of tlie Act,
which implements the averaging rule, preserves the ability of the
DOC to compare an average NV to an individual EP or CEP if the
average-to-average and individual-to-individual methodologies fail
to identify targeted dumping. 321 The persistent use of individual-toaverage price comparisons perpetuates the bias in favor of finding
a dumping margin by comparing an average FMV to an individual
USP-a situation created by prior law. 322 In addition, individual-to318. See Administration Voluntary Restraint Program Vzewed As Successful Only in Isolated
Cases, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 714 (May 28, 1986).
319. See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
320. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 98-99,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3870-71 (stating that "the Committee expects that [the
DOC] will use [the individual-to-individual} methodology far less frequently than averageto-average methodology"). The Statement of Administrative Action indicates that the DOC
does not like to make average-to-average comparisons. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 842.
321. Act, supra note 23, § 229, 108 Stat. at 4889-91 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1
(1994) ).
322. The most blatant distortion in the Commerce Department's administration
of the U.S. antidumping law is its refusal to average both U.S. and foreign prices
in computing dumping margins .... The Department typically ignores any U.S.
import prices above the foreign average and thus counts in its computation of the
dumping margin only those below the foreign average price.
The result is dumping margins even when foreign and U.S. pricing is identicaL
For example, a foreign producer who sells three items in its home market at $9,
$10 and $11 will be found to have dumped if the same sales are made at the same
prices in the U.S. market. The average foreign market value in this example would
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average price comparisons do not permit an exporter exercising
reasonable care and judgment to determine at the time it sets its
U.S. prices whether or not it is selling at LTFV. Suppose an
exporter makes its first U.S. sale in January. At that time, the
exporter cannot know what its weighted-average, home-market
prices for the next six months or year will be; thus, it cannot determine a priori what prices may lead to an accusation of dumping.
Interestingly, U.S. implementation of the basic rule that comparisons be made on the basis of either average or individual prices
may be inconsistent with at least two provisions of the Agreement.
Section 229(a) of the Act indicates that the basic rule is applicable
only in the investigatory phase of a case, not in a subsequent
annual administrative review, which is when antidumping duties
are assessed instead of merely estimated. 323
In drafting the implementing legislation on price comparison
methodology, the [Clinton] administration ignored the fair
comparison requirement of article 2.4 of the Agreement and
adopted for administrative reviews the current U.S. practice of
comparing individual U.S. sales to a monthly weighted-average
of sales in the foreign market. The administration also ignored
article 18.3 of the Agreement, which applies the agreed rules
equally to both investigations and reviews of existing measures.
It is quite likely that the United States will be challenged in the
WfO on the comparison methodology applied in reviews. This
potentiality for challenge follows not only from the express
wording of articles 2.4 and 18.3, but also from the practical consequences. That is, if the United States applies different price
comparison methodologies in investigations and reviews, it will
cause great uncertainty and unpredictability. Further, it will
impede the ability of foreign producers and exporters subject to
dumping orders to set prices in the United States at a level sufficient to be found selling at nondumped prices. 324
be $10 ($30/3), and would result in a $1 dumping margin when compared individually with the $9 U.S. sale.
PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 6-7. But see Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d
1159 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the DOC did not abuse "its discretion by refusing to
consider averaging U.S. prices").
323. Act, supra note 23, § 229(a), 108 Stat. at 4890 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f1 (d) (2) ( 1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79-80; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at
99, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871; Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 492. However, the
DOC must limit the averaging of NV to the month closest to the individual export sale with
which the average is compared. Thus, the DOC can no longer compare an individual sale
price to an average price calculated over a six- or twelve-month period. See HousE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 99, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3871; Analysis and Summary, supra note
317,at7.
324. Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 493 (foomotes omitted).
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There may be valid policy reasons for not using the averaging
methodology during the phase when antidumping duties are
assessed. For instance, averaging during that phase may result in a
windfall to buyers of dumped goods because some part of the
dumping duties that should be paid are charged to importers paying fair value. 325 However, because averaging is not used during an
administrative review, terminating an order may be as difficult as it
is easy to find that targeted dumping exists. 326 In sum, not only is
the price-averaging rule ambiguous, the limit on the use of averaging to the investigatory phase appears to be at variance with U.S.
international obligations.
Finally, the Agreement and the Act purport to guide the DOC in
deciding what sales are comparable for purposes of calculating
average NV. 327 Nonetheless, ambiguities persist. 328 Suppose a petitioner accuses an exporter of dumping televisions. While it may be
obvious that the NV of televisions with thirteen-inch screens should
not be averaged with those having twenty-one-inch screens, it is less
clear whether the NV of televisions with thirty-inch screens and
televisions with thirty-five-inch screens fall into distinct product categories.329 Nor is it clear that the exporter's sales in its home-country urban areas are comparable with those in rural areas. To limit
the effect of averaging, the petitioner will most likely argue for the
narrowest possible averaging categories. Undoubtedly, the petitioner will urge the DOC to accept an interpretation of comparability that maximizes the dumping margin. Similarly, with respect
to the individual-to-individual methodology, the DOC lacks adequate standards for determining whether merchandise sold overseas is comparable to merchandise sold in the United States. 330
Here, again, the Sesame Street game is played: Is a right-hand drive
Nissan Sentra sold in Tokyo comparable to a left-hand drive Sentra
sold in New York? If so, would differences in the model name,
stereo features, or trunk space vitiate comparability? In sum, the
problematic de minimis tests, coupled with the ambiguity with
325. ld. at 494.
326. But see Stein, sufrra note 278, at 882 (suggesting that the implementing legislation
creates standards for averaging that do not place an undue burden on petitioners).
327. Holmer et al., sufrra note 23, at 494.
328. See Agreement, sufrra note 19, at 3; Act, sufrra note 23, § 229, 108 Stat. at 4889-91
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (1994)).
329. When merchandise compared is not identical, a DIFMER adjustment is appropriate when there is a difference in the cost of manufacture, but not when there is a difference in market value that is not based on a difference in cost. See sufrra notes 186-187 and
accompanying text.
330. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
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respect to averaging and comparability, invite a protectionist
abuser to manipulate the dumping margin calculation.

2.

Concerns About Home-Market Viability

The Agreement alters the home-market viability test in an effort
to prevent the calculation of NV on the basis of home-market sales
that are too small in volume to present an accurate picture. The
new test, in at least one respect, makes calculation of the dumping
margin less susceptible to manipulation by petitioners. It provides,
however, no guidance on which alternative to home-country sales is
appropriate. The test is further flawed because it fails to detect the
occurrence of cross-border subsidization.
The home-market viability test determines whether the volume
of foreign home-market sales is too small to serve as a basis for
calculating the dumping margin. If the exporter's home-market
sales are less than 5% of its sales to the importing country, "normally" the home-market sales will be too small in quantity to
render the home market viable. 331 In such a case, export prices to a
third country may be used in lieu of the home-market price. The
formula, therefore, for market viability is:
MV

= (~/Q)

X

100

where MV is market viability, ~ is the quantity of sales by an
exporter in its home market, and Q is the quantity of sales by an
exporter in the importing country. If this ratio exceeds 5%, the
home market is viable.332
This formula represents a departure from prior law. Formerly,
the DOC's home-market viability test involved a comparison of the
volume of home-market sales to the volume of sales to countries
other than the United States, rather than to U.S. sales. 333 The new
test changes the denominator from the volume of sales to countries other than the United States, to the volume of sales to the
United States. 334 The purpose behind this change is to prevent the
use of NV on the basis of "thin" (low volume) home-market
331. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 1 n.2.
332. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878-79 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b)
(1994) ).
333. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
334. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(B)(ii)(II) (1994). See aLso SENATE REPORT, supra note 18,
at 68 (providing that viability will be measured by comparing home-market sales with sales
to the United States); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 83, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3855 (stating that home-market viability will depend upon the quantity of sales by the
home-market exporter compared with the quantity of sales by the exporter to the U.S.
market).
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sales. 335 If the DOC uses sales figures from countries other than the
United States in which the volume of sales is low, the size of the
denominator will be reduced. In turn, the probability of satisfying
the benchmark, and thus using a NV based on thin home-market
sales, increases. By preventing the use of sales figures from other
countries in the denominator, calculation of the dumping margin
is less susceptible to manipulation by other countries.
Nevertheless, the new home-market viability test raises at least
two concerns. First, the new test offers no guidance on whether
third-country sales or CV should be used as an alternative to homecountry sales when the home market is not viable. In contrast,
under prior DOC regulations, there was an express preference for
third-country sales. 336 Second, the new test suggests, without further elaboration, that a "particular market situation" may preclude
the use of foreign home-market sales. 337 Would a single sale in the
foreign home market that constitutes 5% of sales to the United
States be a "particular market situation" rendering the foreign market sale nonviable? If the exporter's government establishes prices
that cannot be considered competitively set, would foreign market
sales then be incomparable? 3 38 Would significant price changes
associated with holidays that occur at different times of the year in
the foreign and U.S. markets mean that prices in the foreign market are not suitable for comparison? These ambiguities are
unresolved.
Finally, the new test, while operationally straightforward, ignores
a salient microeconomic feature of dumping: it fails to detect
whether cross-border subsidization occurs. Dumping consists of
cross-border price discrimination as well as cross-border subsidization. A foreign exporter earns super-normal profits in its protected
home market where prices are high, thus offsetting below-normal
profits or losses incurred in the United States where it sells at
dumped prices. 339 Absent this subsidization, it seems difficult to
argue that the exporter is deliberately attempting to drive its U.S.
competitors out of business. Home-market sales cannot subsidize
U.S. sales unless one of two conditions exist. Either home-market
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 83, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3855.
19 C.F.R § 353.48(b} (1995).
See Agreement, supra note 19, at 1.
The Statement of Administrative Action suggests an affirmative answer. See
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 822.
339. Admittedly, an exporter has an incentive to maximize profits in its home market
by charging an optimum price in that market that is unrelated to the price it charges in the
importing country. See DAM, supra note 29, at 169.
335.
336.
337.
338.
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sales must be so significant in volume that the profits generated
plainly offset losses incurred in the United States340 or, where only
a small volume of home-market sales exists, each sale must generate an extraordinarily high profit margin so that losses incurred in
the United States are offset. The 5% bright-line test, while operationally straight forward, does not consider whether either condition is satisfied. Consequently, home-market sales can be used as a
basis for NV, even where a respondent is not cross-subsidizing U.S.
sales. The traffic-light system proposed in Part V avoids the issue of
home-market viability by eliminating the concept of NV.
3.

Wrongfully Excluding Below-Cost Sales

The treatment of below-cost sales in calculating NV is of enormous practical importance. Since 1980 roughly 60% of all
antidumping cases in the United States involved allegations of
below-cost sales. 341 Including these sales in the calculation of NV
significantly lowers the probability of a final affirmative dumping
determination. The NV is calculated on the basis of an average of
prices in the home market. It is a mathematical fact that the exclusion of below-cost sales raises the average and therefore increases
the likelihood of finding a dumping margin.
The fundamental microeconomic problem with Article 2.2 of
the Agreement, and section 222(h) of the Act which implements
this article, stems from the ambiguous phrase "ordinary course of
trade."342 The Agreement and the Act treat below-cost sales as
outside of the "ordinary course of trade" 343 and fail to differentiate
among total, variable, and fixed costs of production. 344 This helps
340. As one practitioner notes:
Obviously, if dumping is based on the assumption of cross subsidization of export
sales by home market sales, a company which sells 95% of its production in the
U.S. and 5% in the home market is not likely to be able to cross-subsidize from
the home market into the U.S. to a significant degree.
Horlick, supra note 13, at 131.
341. Id. at 136; see also Gilbert B. Kaplan eta!., Cost Analysis Under the Antidumping Law,
21 CEO. WASH.]. INT'L L. & EcoN. 358, 358(1988) (stating that "approximately two-thirds
of the antidumping investigations processed in calendar year 1987 involved cost of production or constructed value analyses").
342. 19 u.s.c. § 1677(15) (1994).
343. "(D]umping is measured by comparing the export price of a product with the
comparable price of the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, in the market of the
exporting country." SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 61; see HousE REPORT, supra note 18,
at 76, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3848. Interestingly, in a recent case arising under prior
law, the DOC decided that below-cost sales are in the ordinary course of trade. See Antifriction Bearings and Parts Thereof from France, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,900, 10,922-23 (1995). Of
course, final DOC and ITC determinations have no precedential effect.
344. See infra notes 584-594 and accompanying text.
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to perpetuate the bias created under prior law by ignoring the possibility that pricing behavior, which appears unfair or predatory,
may be economically justified. For instance, it may be economically
rational for a respondent to sell a foreign like product below its
average total cost of production, yet above its average variable cost
of production, 345 because the respondent may be facing either
depressed market conditions for foreign like merchandise or a
temporary excess inventory of such merchandise in its home country.346 By pricing the merchandise below its minimum average total
cost of production, but above its average variable cost of production, the respondent may only be trying to maintain market share.
At such a level, the respondent incurs short-run losses; although it
can cover all of its fixed costs, it can only cover a portion of its
variable costs. 347 The respondent expects to recoup these losses
when market conditions improve and prices rise to a level above its
average total cost of production or when it sells its excess
inventory. 348
Still other economic rationales may explain the respondent's
behavior. The respondent may be attempting to increase its market
share without driving competitors out of business or to "move
down its learning curve" by developing further knowledge and
experience in making the product in question. 349 In sum, it is
345. See infra notes 584-594 and accompanying text. Interestingly, one practitioner
points out that "[b]y the mid-1970s, there was a fair degree of consensus in the U.S. that
sales below fully allocated cost, but above some form of average variable cost, would not be
penalized as such under the U.S. antitrust laws." Horlick, supra note 13, at 134 (foomote
omitted). Horlick argues that the United States violates the national treatment clause of
Article III of GAIT 1947 because the cost-based pricing standard in antidumping law for
imported goods differs from the standard in antitrust laws for domestic goods. Id.; see also
Boltuck & Litan, supra note 56, at 15 (noting that foreigners are punished "for pricing
practices ... that are perfectly legal for U.S. firms to engage in when selling in the domestic market") (foomote omitted).
346. Under prior law Congress appears to have recognized this possibility. SeeS. REP.
No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 173-74 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7186, 7310.
347. See infra notes 584-594 and accompanying text.
348. See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 30-31. Note, however, that Deardorff presumes
that the exporter prices its product below average cost but not marginal cost. Id.; see also
BovARD, supra note 1, at 130-131 (explaining that "[t]he real question in cost of production cases should be not what total costs are, but what the variable costs are"); PoWELL ET
AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 6 (stating that the failure of antidumping law to distinguish
between truly anticompetitive conduct and legitimate pricing differences based on normal
business considerations "forces foreign sellers to keep their prices high to avoid dumping
allegations, even when market considerations might warrant reductions and their U.S.
competitors may in fact be lowering their own prices").
349. See generally Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 158-59 (explaining further economic rationales for dumping). For a debate on other causes of predation, see Janusz A
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a well-known conclusion of basic microeconomics [that] [e]ven
in perfectly competitive markets, profit-maximizing firms with
no significant market power may sometimes find it rational to
price below average cost. And the new trade theory contains
many examples of how such a pricing strategy can lead to efficient outcomes under imperfectly competitive conditions ....
In short, there is often nothing in such pricing behavior to suggest market power, unfair practices, or predatory malice.350
By ignoring this conclusion, the Agreement and the Act consequently maintain the same protectionist bias that existed under
prior law. 351 When a respondent's below-cost sales are excluded
from the calculation of NV, the respondent is, in effect, obligated
to price its merchandise at a higher level than the petitioner would
price its merchandise under similar circumstances. 352 This obligation is especially onerous for any respondent which incurs large
research, development, and start-up costs, yet has low variable
costs. 353
Aside from faulty microeconomic logic, problems of practical
application further ensure a continuation of protectionist bias.
Under prior law the DOC could launch a below-cost sales investigation if it had "reasonable grounds" to believe or suspect that sales
were being made at below-cost prices. 354 One practitioner, discussing shortcomings of the prior law, commented: " [ t] he threshold of
"reasonable grounds to believe or suspect' for cost investigations
frustrates many parties with its ambiguity. The standard is far from
self-defining, and can lend great uncertainty to the early stages of
investigation when cost and price issues must be identified." 355
Ordover et al., Predatory Systems Rivalry: A Reply, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1150 (1983);Joseph G.
Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1121 (1983).
350. LAuRA D'ANDREA TYSoN, INSTITUTE FOR INT'L EcoNOMICS, WHo's BASHING WHoM?
TRADE CoNFLicr IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INousrRIES 268 (1992).
351. See supra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
352. For a version of this point under prior law, see jACKSON, supra note 74, at 235.
353. High-technology companies are an example:
Especially for high-tech products, variable costs are usually far lower than fully
allocated costs. Assume a company's fully allocated cost for producing chips is
$1.40, and its variable cost is 70 cents. Is the company better off selling 5 million
chips at $1.50, or 100 million chips at $1 each? Selling 5 million chips at $1.50
provides a total revenue of $7.5 million; selling 100 million chips at $1 each provides $100 million. The greater the volume of sales that occur above variable cost
of production, the more irrelevant the fully allocated cost standard becomes.
[The DOC] 's method pressures foreign companies to sell a small number of
items above fully allocated costs rather than a great number of items above variable costs.
BovARD, supra note I, at 131.
354. 19 u.s.c. § l677b(b) (1994)
355. PATriSON, supra note 72 § 5.05[6]; see also AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United
States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 245, 250 (1983), aff'd, 745 F.2d 632 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (drawing on
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Article 2.4 of the Agreement and section 224 of the Act, which
implements this article, ensure that it remains relatively easy for a
petitioner to trigger a below-cost sales investigation, also called a
cost-of-production investigation. 356 As under pre-Uruguay Round
law, the DOC is required to merely have "reasonable grounds" to
believe or suspect that sales under consideration for the determination of NV have been made at below-cost prices.357 This minimum
standard is met if the petitioner provides information on costs and
prices (either observed or constructed) indicating that sales in the
foreign home market are at below-cost prices. However, contrary to
the law as applied by the DOC prior to the Act, the information
provided by the petitioner need not relate to a particular exporter
alleged to be engaged in dumping; the allegation may be countrywide, as opposed to company-specific.sss
Under prior law the DOC was required to have independent reasonable grounds for launching a below-cost price investigation.
The new regime merely requires the DOC to have information
"reasonably available to petitioners." Considering these changes, it
appears that the Agreement and the Act have lowered the standard
for initiating an investigation. 359 Worse yet, the Agreement and
the Act do not tighten the criteria for excluding below-cost sales,
thus replicating the opportunities for protectionist abuse inherent
in the 1930 Act. Below-cost sales may be disregarded if they are
made "in substantial quantities," "within an extended period of
time," and "at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all
costs within a reasonable period of time." 360 These criteria closely
resemble the ambiguous language in prior law.s6I
Consider the first condition. The Agreement establishes alternative tests for determining whether sales below cost of production
are substantial and, therefore, whether they may be excluded from
the law of criminal procedure relating to "reasonable suspicion" and holding that "absent a
specific and objective basis for suspecting that a particular foreign firm is engaged in home
market sales at prices below its cost of production, [the] threshold requirement of 'reasonable grounds to believe or suspect' has not been satisfied").
356. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4881 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1994)).
357. See supra note 152 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72;
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 90, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3862.
358. See Torrington Co. v. United States, 15 Ct. lnt'l Trade 456, 460 (1991); Al Tech
Specialty Steel Corp., 6 Ct. lnt'l Trade at 250; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 833.
359. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 833 (stating that " [ t] he changes ... are in tended to
permit [the DOC] to initiate below-cost inquiries at the outset of a case").
360. Agreement, supra note 19, at 1-2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878-81
(codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677b(b)(1) (1994)).
361. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72.
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the calculation of NV. 362 Such sales are substantial if they equai or
exceed 20% of the exporter's total sales in its home market. Alternatively, such sales are substantial if the weighted-average unit
price of the home-market sales is less than the weighted-average
unit cost of production for such sales. 363 The first test should
reduce the likelihood of a final affirmative dumping determination. Under pre-Uruguay Round law the DOC used a 10% threshold to determine whether to exclude below-cost sales. 3 64 By using
the second test and raising the threshold to 20%, it is more likely
that below-cost sales will be included in the computation of NV.
The amount assigned to NV, therefore, is likely to be lower and it
will be harder for the DOC to find a positive dumping margin.
Nothing in the Agreement or the Act indicates whether or when
the first or second test should be used. Clearly, a petitioner will
argue for whichever test leads to the exclusion of below-cost sales.
As two practitioners point out,
[s]ome U.S. steel industry lobbyists claim that the 20 percent
threshold will reduce the likelihood of a finding of dumping
and permit exporters to engage in significant sales below the
cost at home. This concern is misplaced, however, because the
Antidumping Agreement expressly provides that, if the
weighted-average sales price is below the weighted-average cost,
the administering authorities may disregard the below cost sales
even if they account for less than 20 percent of total home market sales. 365
In effect, the Agreement and the Act raise the threshold for exclusion but then provide a petitioner with a means of circumventing
the threshold.
The second condition differs from prior law in two seemingly
innocuous ways. Under prior law below-cost sales had to occur
"over" an extended period of time. Below-cost sales must now
occur "within" the period. 366 As a result of the change, it is no
longer necessary for the DOC to find that below-cost sales occur
throughout some minimum number of months. The word "over"
362. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4882 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(2)(C) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72.
363. It is unclear whether the second test corresponds to the pre-Uruguay Round rule
used by the DOC for highly perishable agricultural products. Compare MESSAGE, supra note
69, at 832 (suggesting consistency) with PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05 [6] (stating that the
DOC "has established a higher threshold for below cost sales in cases involving perishable
products").
364. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72;
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 89, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3861.
365. Horlick & Shea, supra note 20, at 26 (emphasis added).
366. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72.
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suggests that below-cost sales must occur for a sustained period,
such as in each month for a six-month period. "Within," however,
suggests that such sales occur at any point within the period, such
as during the second month in a six-month period. Also, under
prior law, the DOC interpreted "extended period of time" to mean
six or possibly three months, and thereby confined its below-cost
inquiry to a six-month period. 367 The Agreement and the Act
define "extended period of time" as one year but not less than six
months. 368 Consequently, the DOC can double the length of time
it surveys for below-cost sales. Obviously, the longer the period of
investigation, the greater the chance of finding below-cost sales to
exclude from NV.
With respect to the third condition-intended as a safe harbor-the Agreement and the Act provide a flawed mechanism for
identifying prices that allow for cost recovery within a reasonable
period of time. The definition dictates that if a price falls below
per-unit cost at the time of sale but remains above weighted-average per-unit cost for the period of investigation, the price allows
for cost recovery within a reasonable period of time. 369 This test
can be met only in rare circumstances, such as when costs fluctuate
during the period of investigation and all subject merchandise is
manufactured at a time of unusually high costs. The definition is
further flawed because it fails to distinguish among variable, fixed,
and total costs. These distinctions are important in understanding
the economic rationale behind an exporter's pricing behavior. 370
Finally, the definition is somewhat circular; it essentially states that
a price provides for cost recovery if it is above weighted-average
costs.
A petitioner can exploit these flaws to maximize NV and any
dumping margin. A petitioner, for example, can urge a measure of
cost recovery that is based on a speculative estimate of future production costs. Further, a petitioner can take advantage of events
that might complicate the weighted-average production cost calcu367. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 88, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3860.
368. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4882 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(2)(B) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 72; HousE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 88, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3860.
369. Stated differently, a price below cost at the time of sale provides for recovery of
costs within a reasonable period of time if it is above weighted-average cost of production
at the time of sale. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 1-2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat.
at 4882 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(2)(D) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 7172; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 88, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3860.
370. See supra notes 342-350 and accompanying text.
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lation. For instance, suppose there are temporary disruptions to
production because of maintenance work at the foreign factory
where the merchandise is made. As a direct result, production is
temporarily suspended or reduced and unit costs are artificially
inflated. Should these unit costs be excluded from the weightedaverage calculation? A petitioner seeking to exclude below-cost
sales in order to obtain the highest weighted-average production
cost possible will claim that the unit costs are not representative.
The petitioner will claim that it is appropriate to allocate the effect
of this work over time so that a proportional effect is realized. 371
However, a respondent, seeking the lowest possible weighted-average costs to satisfy the third condition for inclusion of below-cost
sales, will claim that the maintenance work is periodic and
foreseeable.
In sum, the three-part criteria engenders protectionist abuse. It
is wrong to exclude sales below the cost of production from the
calculation of NV sales. Below-cost sales may be rational and economically justified, yet their exclusion shows a blatant bias in favor
of a petitioner. This problem is eliminated under the proposed
traffic-light system, suggested in Part V, due to the elimination of
the NV concept.
4.

Maximizing the Dumping Margin by Adjusting NV

Article 2.4 of the Agreement, which is implemented in part by
section 224 of the Act, establishes a general obligation that the
comparison between EP and NV be "fair." 372 The comparison
would be more fair if LTFV sales were offset by non-LTFV sales.
However, like prior law, the Agreement does not contemplate offsets.373 Failure to offset inevitably increases the probability of a
final affirmative dumping determination, resulting in a clear and
systematic bias in favor of petitioners. Offsets are a logical means of
reducing the risk of protectionist abuse; thus, offsets are required
in the traffic-light system proposed in Part V.
More fundamentally, a key feature of Article 2.4 is its articulation
of adjustments to NV designed to ensure a fair comparison
between EP and NV. The Agreement mandates adjustments for dif371. The legislative history expresses a preference for the DOC to adopt the latter
approach. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 89, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3861;
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 832.
372. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (1994)).
373. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. Of course, it could be argued that
averaging is a type of offset system.
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ferences between foreign and U.S. markets that affect the comparability of the EP and NV. Such differences include trade levels, sales
conditions, quantities, physical characteristics, and taxation. 374 A
benign assessment of Article 2.4's scheme for making adjustments
is that its effect on a dumping margin determination is a priori
inconclusive. Several adjustments are deductions that will decrease
NV and, in turn, decrease the likelihood of a final affirmative
dumping determination. For example, as under prior law, the cost
of packing for shipment in the exporting country must be
deducted from NV. 375 Further, if the cost of transportationincluding warehousing expenses, incurred in bringing a foreign
like product to the place of delivery in the exporting country and
the amount of any rebated or uncollected indirect taxes imposed
on a foreign like product-were included in the calculation of NV,
they must be deducted. 376 Petitioners fought hard to exclude
deductions for freight and taxes from the Act. These deductions
are important victories over the forces of protectionism and overturn two pre-Uruguay Round court cases, Federal-Mogul Corp. v.
United States377 and Ad Hoc Committee v. United States. 378 The deduction from NV for transportation charges incurred in the exporting
country mirrors the deduction from EP for movement charges and
helps ensure that NV and EP are ex-factory prices. 379 The deduction for indirect taxes alters prior law; such taxes were previously
added to USP. The change is intended to ensure that dumping
margins will be tax neutral.3SO
At the same time, however, other adjustments may result in additions to NV that increase the probability of an affirmative dumping
determination. For example, NV is increased by the cost of containers and coverings associated with packing and readying the subject merchandise for shipment to the United States. 381 Because of
374. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 StaL at 4878 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1994)).
375. See supra note 182 and accompanying text; 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (6) (B) (i) (1994).
376. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 StaL at 4880 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (6)(B) (ii)-(iii) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 70;
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 84, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3856.
377. 17 Ct. lnt'l Trade 88, 92-100 (1993).
378. 13 F.3d 398, 401-03 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
379. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 84, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3856.
380. !d.; see also Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 5 (explaining that the adjustment for indirect taxes will guarantee a neutral effect on an antidumping margin
calculation).
381. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4880 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a) (6) (A) (1994) ).
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this prov1Slon and the deduction of home-market packing costs,
the Act ensures. that the exact same amount of packing costs are
incorporated into NV and EP. 382 However, it is unclear why all
packing costs are not removed from both prices in the same manner that freight and taxes are wholly excluded from NV and EP. As
another example, differences in the physical characteristics, conditions, and terms of sale between subject merchandise and a foreign
like product may necessitate a "circumstances of sale adjustment to
NV." 383 On balance, it is impossible to predict whether additions to
or deductions from NV will dominate the dumping margin
calculation.
A more critical assessment of adjustments to NV suggests that
adjustments spawn opportunities for protectionist abuse. It
remains true that" '[d]umping' often occurs as the result of American bureaucrats' manipulation of numbers, rather than actual foreign business practices." 384 Specifically, a petitioner can continue
to exploit the defects of the 1930 Act provisions on the COS and
LOT adjustments to FMV and the ESP cap-offset scheme and thus
maximize a dumping margin. 385 With respect to the COS adjustment, neither the Agreement nor the Act suggest a test for distinguishing "direct" from "indirect" sales expenses. Consequently, a
petitioner remains free to urge the DOC to increase NV by arguing
that an adjustment is inappropriate because it does not reflect a
direct sales expense. What one observer wrote about prior law
remains true: "[t]he question of whether a price is fair often
depends on whether a low-level Commerce bureaucrat ordains that
certain sales expenses are direct or indirect. "386
Important precautions, which are lacking in the Agreement, are
needed regarding a LOT adjustment. 387 Ideally, this adjustment
should be made only where a difference in the level of trade affects
382. See supra note 375.
383. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4880 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a)(6)(C)(ii) (1994)); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 85, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3857; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 828.
384. BovARD, supra note 1, at 115.
385. See supra notes 188-204 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at
70-71; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 828.
386. BovARD, supra note 1, at 123. While judicial review by the Court of International
Trade and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may force the "bureaucrat" to turn
square corners when exercising discretion, these courts invariably accord tremendous deference to agency determinations. Charlene Barshefsky & Michael J. Firth, International
Trade Decisions of the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit During the Year 198 7, 37
AM. U. L. REv. 1167, 1168 (1988).
387. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
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price comparability. There should be evidence of a pattern of price
differences between sales at different levels of trade in an
exporter's home-country market. If wholesale and retail prices in
the exporter's home-country market are not substantially different
over time, a LOT adjustment may be inappropriate. Mere reference to a company as a "wholesaler" should not automatically trigger the adjustment. What should matter is whether that company
actually performs the role of an intermediary between a producer
and exporter. Similarly, a sales subsidiary that is created merely to
perform the role of a de facto sales department should not trigger
a LOT adjustment. The Act provides little guidance and merely
states that an adjustment is necessary if differences in the level of
trade involve the "performance of different selling activities" and
affect price comparability "based on a pattern of consistent price
differences" between sales in the exporter's home market and the
United States. 388 What selling activities are "different?" What price
patterns are "consistent?" While neither the Agreement nor the Act
guarantees that the DOC will make a LOT adjustment, a petitioner
is free to attempt to exploit these ambiguities to maximize the
dumping margin.3s9
F;inally, controversy surrounding ESP caps and offsets-now
called CEP caps and offsets-persists. Under prior law petitioners
argued that the ESP offset should be eliminated because a respondent can manipulate the amount of indirect sales expense it incurs
in its home market to reduce FMV and thereby reduce any dumping margin. 390 Respondents countered that the ESP cap should be
eliminated, stating that opportunities for manipulation are exaggerated and that total indirect sales expenses should be deducted
from FMV. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in two
cases, upheld the ESP cap-offset scheme. 391
388. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(7) (A) (1994); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 829; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 70-71; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.CAN. 3859.
389. A respondent also could exploit the ambiguities by, for instance, attempting to
fool the DOC with a fake chain of sales.
390. Horlick, supra note 13, at 145.
391. In Smith-Carona Group v. United States, the court stated that "[w]ere it not for the
exporter's sales price offset, comparisons based on purchase price would be fair, yet comparisons based on exporter's sales price would be skewed in favor of a higher dumping
margin." 713 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984). In SCM
Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc., the court reversed a Court oflntemational Trade decision
in which the ESP cap was held invalid and a deduction from FMV for all indirect expenses
was allowed. 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court explained that "[f]oreign producers had claimed indirect expense deductions under the rubric of 'differences in circumstances of sale' to the point where price disparity routinely disappeared" and that
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Both the Agreement and the Act appear to favor petitioners by
placing conditions on when a CEP offset to NV for indirect sales
expenses may be made. First, the amount of this deduction is limited to the amount of the deduction from CEP for indirect sales
expenses-the ESP cap is reincarnated as the CEP cap. 392 Second,
the CEP offset may be made only if there is no home-market sale at
the same level of trade as the sale in the United States and the
DOC does not have adequate information to make a LOT adjustment.393 The rationale for this limitation provided in the legislative
history is opaque:
Only where different functions at different levels of trade are
established under section 773(a)(7) (A)(i), but the data available do not form an appropriate basis for determining a level of
trade adjustment ... will [the DOC] make a constructed export
price offset adjustment .... The adjustment will be "capped" by
the amount of indirect expenses deducted from constructed
export price .... In some circumstances, the data may not permit [the DOC] to determine the amount of the level of trade
adjustment. For example, there may be no, or very few sales of a
sufficiently similar product by a seller to independent customers
at different levels of trade. This could be the case where there is
only one foreign respondent and all sales are to affiliated purchasers. Also, there could be restrictive business practices which
result in too few appropriate sales to determine a price effect.
Similarly, the data could indicate a clearly contradictory result,
for example contradictory patterns during different periods. In
such situations, although an adjustment might have been warranted, [the DOC] may be unable to determine whether there is
an effect on price comparability. In such situations, although
there is a difference in levels of trade, [the DOC] may be unable
to quantify the adjustment. Where this occurs, [the DOC] will
make a capped "constructed export price offset" adjustment ...
in lieu of the level of trade adjustment that would be warranted . . . .
The constructed export price offset adjustment will be made
only where normal value is established at a level of trade more
remote from the factory than the level of trade of the constructed export price; i.e., where the [level of trade] adjustment

deducting all such expenses "could distort the computations in favor of foreign manufacturers." Id. at 1038-40.
392. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4881 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b
(a)(7)(B) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 71; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at
87, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3859.
393. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat at 4881 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a) (7)(B) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 71; HousE REPORT, supra note
18, at 87, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3859; Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 5.

1995]

Rethinking Antidumping Law

83

... , if it could have been quantified, would likely have resulted

in a reduction of the normal value.!l9 4
The highlighted language suggests that a CEP offset is a proxy for
the LOT adjustment, yet the two deductions serve entirely different
purposes. 395 The former is aimed at equalizing differences in NV
and CEP arising from indirect sales expenses, while the latter
ensures that these prices are based on either wholesale or retail
transactions. In other words, the highlighted language calls into
question whether the CEP offset continues to operate or is effectively replaced by LOT adjustments. The outcome depends on how
the DOC applies the statutory provision on LOT adjustments. 3 96
The DOC could theorize that a LOT adjustment is predicated on
an amalgamation of direct expenses, indirect expenses, and profit.
Further, it could find that direct expenses can be equalized
through a COS adjustment. 3 9 7 Accordingly, the key practical difference between a LOT adjustment and CEP offset may be that only
the former can equalize profit. Thus, the DOC might apply a CEP
offset only if it cannot determine how to make a LOT adjustment.
Undoubtedly, petitioners and respondents will argue about
whether data are "appropriate" to make a LOT adjustment.
An additional factor that makes it difficult to know how the DOC
will treat LOT adjustments concerns the CEP concept, which is
designed to be roughly equivalent to a stripped-down wholesale,
retail, or other price. Theoretically, the DOC is supposed to find
an actual sales price in the home market that is equivalent to the
CEP. Yet, in practice, this undertaking seems virtually impossible.
Overall, if the result of the conditions limiting the application of a
CEP offset is that it is generally unavailable to respondents and any
LOT adjustment is small, then dumping margins are certain to
increase. Overall, the Agreement and the Act preserve and possibly
extend opportunities for a protectionist abuser to manipulate the
dumping margin calculation by adjusting NV. In contrast, the proposed traffic-light system in Part V eliminates such opportunities by
abolishing the concept of NV.

394. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 87-88, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3859-60
(emphasis added); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 830-31.
395. See supra notes 189-191, 199-201, 392-394 and accompanying text.
396. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(7)(A) (1994).
397. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 828.
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Article 2.4 of the Agreement also addresses adjustments to EP
and CEP. 398 Such adjustments, covered in section 223 of the Act,
do little to minimize the risk that a protectionist abuser will maximize a dumping margin. 399 Shortcomings include an absence of
guidance on how to make allowances for costs and profits or how
to designate comparable levels of trade. Also, the final balance
between deductions and additions in calculation of EP or CEP is
unclear.
The basis for EP and CEP-the starting price-continues to be
the first sale made to an independent buyer in the United States. 400
The Agreement, however, indicates that CEP must include adjustments for costs-such as duties and taxes incurred between importation and resale, and for profits-and further specifies that the
NV to which the EP or CEP is compared must reflect the same level
of trade. 401 Exactly how should allowances for costs and profits be
made? \Vhat levels of trade are comparable? These questions are
unanswered. Further, large deductions from EP or CEP, which
increase the likelihood of a final affirmative dumping determination, are possible. The subtractions in prior law from PP and
ESP, 402 and the deductions specific to ESP, 403 are retained under
the new law with respect to EP or CEP404 •
A new deduction from CEP-an allowance "for profit allocable
to selling, distribution, and further manufacturing in the United
States"-is created. 405 The DOC must determine the percentage of
total profit allocable to U.S. sales on the basis of the ratio of U.S.
manufacturing and selling expenses to total manufacturing and
398. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3.
399. See Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat at 4876 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a
(1994) ).
400. See supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text.
40 I. Agreement, supra note 19, at 3.
402. See supra notes 167-176 and accompanying text; 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (2) (1994);
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63-64; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79-80, reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3851-52.
403. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text; 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1994); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 64-65; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79-80, reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3851-52.
404. Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat at 4876 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)-(d)
(1994) ).
405. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 824; Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat. at 4877 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(3) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 66; HousE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 80, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3852.
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selling expenses. 406 Total profit accrued in the United States and
home markets is multiplied by this ratio to yield profit allocable to
the United States. The theory behind the new deduction is that it
will ensure that CEP is "a price corresponding to an export price
between nonaffiliated exporters and importers." 407 The profit
deduction, however, creates a perverse incentive for a respondent:
A respondent is discouraged from engaging in direct investment in
the United States because such investment may lead to greater U.S.
profits and therefore higher dumping margins. Moreover, the
profit deduction is operationally ambiguous. How should total
profit be calculated? Some practitioners suggest that it should be
calculated by subtracting manufacturing and selling expenses from
total sales revenue. 408 Section 223 of the Act is silent on this point.
A petitioner may exploit this ambiguity in an effort· to maximize
any dumping margin. 409 Finally, there appears to be an inherent
propetitioner bias resulting from the profit deduction from CEP.
There is no compensating deduction from the NV. One practitioner argues that a LOT adjustment should be made to the NV
that is sufficient to compensate for the profit deduction from CEP:
The DOC
will be faced with the requirement to ensure that the level of
trade adjustment to the normal value yields a fair comparison
with the U.S. price after deductions of direct and indirect
expenses and an allocated portion of profit. The automatic
assumption that a comparison of sales at the same level of trade
406. Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat. at 4877-78 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(f)
( 1994)). Specifically, the numerator of the ratio consists of expenses incurred by the foreign exporter and affiliated U.S. seller with respect to the production and sale of subject
merchandise sold in the United States. The denominator of this ratio is the sum of all
expenses incurred by the foreign exporter and affiliated U.S. seller with respect to the
production and sale of the subject merchandise sold in the United States and the foreign
like product sold in the home market. /d.; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 66; HousE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 80, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3852; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at
824-25. For a formulaic presentation of the ratio, see Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 49495.
407. HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 80, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3852.
408. See, e.g., Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 3-4 (concluding that total actual
profit will be calculated as total sales revenue in the United States and home market minus
total manufacturing and general expenses in the United States and home market). The
legislative history of the Act indicates that losses (negative profits) will not be allocated. See
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 825.
409. Suppose the exporter and importer are affiliates but the product is not resold to
an independent buyer, or it is not resold in the same condition. What is the CEP in this
situation? Article 2.3 of the Agreement states that a "reasonable" basis may be used to
determine that price but provides no further guidance. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 3.
Thus, substantial discretion is left to domestic authorities. The consequent uncertainty
could benefit a petitioner.
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requires no adjustment is based on the fiction that sales to two
different parties at the same level of trade are identical in all
respects. Unless the [DOC] can establish, based on positive evidence, that the activities of the two parties at the same level of
trade are, in fact, identical (which is often unlikely for commercial entities in different countries), [the DOC] will not be able
to assume that such sales are identical. 410
Admittedly, the Agreement and the Act retain the pre-Uruguay
Round additions for costs and profits to PP and ESP, which lead to
a higher value for these prices, and, therefore, reduce the chance
of a final affirmative dumping determination. 411 At the same time,
however, it is uncertain whether the effect of such additions on
dumping margin calculations overwhelms or even balances the
effect of deductions. What is clear is that complicated arguments,
made under prior law, about adjusting PP and ESP will be raised
again with respect to EP and CEP respectively, and renewed complaints by practitioners of a bias against respondents are likely. 412
These arguments are not entirely resolved by the traffic-light system proposed in Part V, because the proposed system relies on the
concepts of EP and CEP in dumping margin determinations.
6.

Calculating CV

Calculating CV is a complicated exercise rife with opportunities
for protectionist abuse. Article 2.2 of the Agreement, implemented
by section 224 of the Act, calls for the inclusion of the costs of
manufacture, sales, general and administrative expenses, ( collectively referred to as "SG&A expenses" or "general expenses") and
profit in the CV calculation. 413 As under prior law these items are
added together to calculate CV. 414 However, the new law works a
dramatic change with regard to statutory minimum criteria. Profit
and general expense figures must be based on actual data pertain410. Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 498 n.58.
411. See Act, supra note 23, § 223, 108 Stat. at 4876 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)
(1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 79, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3851. There is one small change in the 1930 Act regarding additions.
Under pre-Uruguay Round law, an addition to the PP or ESP was made for taxes imposed
in the country of exportation on the exported merchandise which were rebated. Section
224 of the Act requires that such taxes be deducted from the NV. Act, supra note 23, § 224,
108 Stat. at 4880 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(6)(B)(iii) (1994)).
412. See, e.g., Horlick, supra note 13, at 146 (stating that while the DOC "shows no
perceptible bias in favor of or against those claiming adjustments[,] ... [c]ertain standard
[DOC] practices ... in effect 'tilt' against respondents").
413. See Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.2, at 1; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at
4884-85 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1994)).
414. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
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ing to the exporter's sales of the foreign like product in the ordinary course of trade, i.e., its above-cost sales. 415 Mandating the use
of actual data precludes reliance on fixed minimum percentages,
such as the 10% general expense and 8% profit amounts used by
the DOC under prior law. 416 This change is a welcome development. During a recessionary period in an exporter's home country,
adding a minimum 8% profit may inflate the "true" CV because
the exporter's profit margin may be only 1 or 2%. 417 CV, however,
is a concept that requires DOC administrators to decide cost questions that have no answers. Hence, any law relying on the concept
of CV is problematic.
In the post-Uruguay Round regime, three significant difficulties
are apparent. First, profits can be calculated on the basis of
selected sales instead of generally accepted accounting principles.418 A dumping margin, therefore, may be enlarged by carefully
selecting which sales to use and by excluding sales below the cost of
production on the ground that they are, by definition, not in the
ordinary course of trade. 41 9
Second, neither the Agreement nor the Act resolves the issue of
what time period to use to compute the elements of CV. 420 Should
the DOC consider data on cost of manufacturing, general
expenses, and profits for the week, month, quarter, year, or some
other period prior to the respondent's alleged dumping in the
United States? There is no doubt that a petitioner will argue in
favor of whatever period maximizes CV and the dumping margin.
Third, what if actual data concerning the sales of a foreign like
product are unavailable? Under the Agreement three alternatives
exist for calculating profit and general expense figures. Profit and
general expenses can be calculated using: (1) actual profits realized and general expenses incurred by the exporter in connection
with sales of the same general category of merchandise in the
exporter's home market; (2) weighted averages of actual profits
realized and actual general expenses incurred by other exporters
from home-market sales of the foreign like product in the ordinary
415. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 109 Stat. at 4884 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (2)(A) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 73.
416. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33, 74.
417. jACKSON, supra note 74, at 235.
418. Horlick & Shea, supra note 20, at 26.
419. See id.
420. This issue has remained unresolved since the decision in F.W. Meyers & Co. v.
United States, 12 Cust. Ct. 219, 239 (1974) (stating generally that a preexportation period
of far less than one year would be appropriate).
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course of business (profitable sales); or (3) any other reasonable
method, as long. as the amount calculated for profit does not
exceed the profit normally realized by other exporters or producers on home-market sales of the same general category of products.421 One weakness of the Agreement lies in its failure to
prescribe a hierarchy among these alternatives. 422 The DOC has
discretion to select among the three alternatives on a case-by-case
basis. 423 Petitioners will urge the DOC to select the alternative that
maximizes the dumping margin. Furthermore, these alternatives
for calculating profit and general expense figures are inherently
ambiguous. With respect to the first alternative, for example, what
does the term "general category of merchandise" mean? Arguably,
it encompasses more products than the term "foreign like product"
used in the second alternative, but again, there is no a priori rule.
With respect to the third alternative, when is it fair to say that profits are "normally realized?"424
Calculation of the CV is susceptible to protectionist abuse not
only because of the problem of manipulation of the CV, but also
because of difficulties relating to cost allocation. Cost of manufacturing must be allocated on the basis of records kept by the producer, provided they are kept "in accordance with the generally
accepted accounting principles ... and reasonably reflect the costs
associated with the production and sale of the product" in question.425 The DOC must consider all available evidence on the
421. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2-3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 73-74; HousE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 94, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3866; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at
840. The third alternative is known as the "profit cap" method. HousE REPORT, supra note
18, at 94, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3866; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 840.
422. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 74; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 94,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3866.
423. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 74.
424. Another example further illustrates the ambiguity that exists in this scheme. Consider a U.S. producer in an industry plagued by endemic dumping. Its profits are likely to
be low. On the one hand, the petitioner may argue that profits from the exporter's abovecost sales should be included in the calculation of CV. If such sales do not exist, the petitioner may argue for the use of profits from above-cost sales of different products exported
by the same exporter (alternative (1) ), or for the use of profits from above-cost sales of the
same product exported by a different exporter (alternative (2)). Ultimately, the petitioner
will choose the alternative that yields the highest profit figure in CV to maximize the
chance of a positive dumping margin. In contrast, the respondent will urge the use of the
U.S. producer's artificially low profit figure (alternative (3)) in an attempt to establish a
cap on what constitutes a reasonable profit. This use of alternative (3) will decrease CV,
thereby reducing the likelihood that dumping will be found. See Stein, supra note 278, at
883.
425. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 2; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(1)(A) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 74;
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 91, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3863.
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proper allocation of cost and adjust costs appropriately for nonrecurring items, such as research and development expenses that
benefit current or future production, or for circumstances in
which costs are affected by start-up operations.
For example, suppose an exporter spends one million dollars on
market testing and advertising over a five-year period before introducing a product into the U.S. market. The life cycle of this product in the United States is not determinable. Should the DOC
factor these costs into the cost of manufacturing when determining
the CV? If so, how should it allocate these costs-over one year,
five years, or ten years? Because the product's life cycle is uncertain, any a priori allocation seems arbitrary. Suppose a foreign
exporter uses the same factory or assembly line to make two products. The exporter can theoretically shift production costs from
one product to another through its internal cost-allocating procedures. While the exporter's allocation may be partly designed to
minimize the cost of manufacturing the allegedly dumped product, the allocation could also be grounded in economic reality and
may not be inconsistent with true production costs. What criteria
should the DOC use to determine whether the allocation is manipulative? Should the DOC insist on an on-site inspection of the
exporter's assembly line and examination of its books and records?
Should the DOC attempt to reallocate costs when determining the
cost of manufacturing? Without detailed information on the production processes for both products, any reallocation can only be
speculative.
Finally, suppose the exporter incurs one-time start-up costs for
research and development that lead to a new product based on the
design of existing merchandise. Should the DOC characterize this
as a start-up situation and therefore deduct start-up costs from the
cost of manufacturing? The Agreement provides no guidance. 426
Section 224 of the Act defines start-up situations narrowly. In order
for start-up costs to be deductible, the exporter must use a new
production facility or produce a new product that requires substantial additional investment and production levels must be limited by
technical factors associated with the initial phase of commercial
production. 427 What is the distinction between improvements to
existing merchandise or on-going improvements to present manu426. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 2.
427. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885-86 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(f) (1) (C) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 75; HousE REPORT, supra note
18, at 91-92, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3863-64.
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facturing facilities on the one hand, and new products and production facilities on the other? Should the DOC include only part of
the cost in the first instance to prevent a distortion in the cost of
manufacturing and the CV?42S
The legislative history of section 224 of the Act is sure to fuel
arguments between petitioners and respondents. A new product "is
one requiring substantial additional investment, including products which, though sold under an existing nameplate, involve the
complete revamping or redesign" of an existing product. 429 Thus,
the complete redesign of a model would result in a new product,
while a routine model-year change in merchandise would not. The
example in the legislative history illustrates the difficulty in understanding this distinction. It states that a sixteen-megabyte computer
chip is a new product if the previous version was a four-megabyte
chip, but not if the previous version was merely a physically larger
sixteen-megabyte chip. 430 Yet, there should be no reason a sixteenmegabyte chip should not be considered a new product, regardless
of the previous chip's byte capacity, if it is smaller, faster, more
accurate, or more durable than the previous version.
Once a decision is reached on whether a start-up situation exists,
the dispute shifts to the measurement of start-up costs. A key factor
is the determination of the duration of the start-up period. Again,
the Agreement provides no real guidance on this matter. Article
2.2.1.1 note 6 is of little help:
The issue addressed in article 2.2.1.1 n.6 of the Antidumping
Agreement on what, if any, adjustment should be made for startup was a compromise between countries who wanted to have the
ability to base decisions upon actual data within the context of
ongoing investigations and those who wanted to have the opportunity to provide estimates of future or life-cycle costs. The compromise reached indicated that "the adjustment made for start428. Under prior Jaw the DOC examined factors such as the nature of the expense, the
frequency of its occurrence, and its relationship to the product. See, e.g., Floral Trade
Council v. United States, 16 Ct. lnt'l Trade 1014 (1992) (explaining that to be considered
"extraordinary, the event must be unusual in nature and infrequent in occurance"); Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,154, 37,174 cmt. 42
(1993) (final determination) (considering the relationship of the expense to the product);
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from Belgium, 58 Fed. Reg. 37083, 37088
cmt. 6 (1993) (final determination) (examining frequency of occurence and the nature of
the expense); Steel Wire Rope from Korea, 58 Fed. Reg. 11,029, 11,035 cmt 12 (1993)
(final determination) (rejecting expense as "extraordinary" because it was neither unusual
in nature nor infrequent). However, there were no clear rules to resolve these issues.
429. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 836.
430. ld. The legislative history also indicates that a new production facility is one that
involves substantially complete retooling, i.e., replacement of nearly all production of a
facility or rebuilding of existing machinery. See id.
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up operations shall reflect the costs at the end of the start-up
period or if that period extends beyond the period of investigation, the most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into
account by the authorities during the investigation. 431

The Act seems to give the DOC discretion to resolve the issue on a
case-by-case basis. 432 Section 224 of the Act provides that the startup period ends at the time the level of commercial production
characteristic of the merchandise, producer, or industry is
achieved. 433 Section 224 does not, however, state how the DOC
should decide when this level is reached. The DOC will not give
weight to the exporter's own projections of future volume or use
the attainment of peak production levels as the standard because
the start-up period may end well before an exporter achieves optimum capacity utilization. 434 Instead, the DOC will examine the
actual production experience for the merchandise in question, historical data regarding the exporter's experience with similar products, seasonal changes in demand, and business cycles. 435 However,
if the product is new to the market, no such data will exist. In
effect, the Act lacks a clear test, requiring the DOC to engage in a
fact-intensive inquiry when some important facts are unavailable. 436
Obviously, a petitioner will urge the use of a short start-up period
to minimize the amount of start-up costs deducted from the cost of
manufacturing, thus maximizing the CV.
Once this dispute is settled, a methodology for making a start-up
adjustment must be selected. Precisely what costs should be
deducted from the cost of manufacturing? The larger the number
and size of items deemed indirectly related to the manufacture of a
new product-and, consequently, not deducted from the cost of
manufacturing-the larger the CV and, in turn, the larger the
dumping margin. 437 The Agreement is silent on this issue. The leg431. Holmer eta!., supra note 23, at 486 (footnotes omitted).
432. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 836-37.
433. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885-86 (codified at 19 U .S.C.
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(ii)-(iii) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 75; HousE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 92-94, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3864-66.
434. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 836-37.
435. See Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(ii) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 75-76; HousE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 92-93, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3864-65; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at
836-37.
436. See MEsSAGE, supra note 69, at 837.
437. Conversely, one practitioner observes that
[t]he Agreement does not provide a definition of what constitutes the end of a
start-up process, how broadly or narrowly the concept of start-up should be
viewed (for example, annual model changes vs. a new product) or what costs
should be adjusted (variable or fixed or both) .... [A]n overly broad construction
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islative history of the Act does state that "any adjustment for ...
start-up costs must be carefully limited to ensure that such an
adjustment is not transformed into a license to dump." 438 Further,
while Article 2.2.1.1 of the Agreement refers expressly to a deduction for start-up costs associated with "the production and sale of the
product under consideration," 439 section 224 of the Act restricts
the deduction to production costs. 44° Finally, the Act does not
restrict deductions to fixed costs; both fixed and variable start-up
costs may be subtracted from the cost of manufacturing.
The DOC will not deduct unit production costs incurred during
the start-up period from the cost of manufacturing. Rather, the
DOC deducts such costs at the end of the period. 441 But inclusions
in unit production costs are problematic. As defined by the DOC,
such costs include wages, depreciation of plant and equipment,
expenses for materials, overhead, insurance, rent, and leases. 442
Suppose an exporter hires new workers, buys extra raw materials,
and leases additional factory space to make a new product. Suppose further that these inputs are also used simultaneously to manufacture existing merchandise. When the start-up period ends, the
workers are retained and the exporter continues to order materials
and lease the space. Are all of the inputs directly related to the new
product and thereby deductible from the cost of manufacturing, or
should the DOC attempt to allocate only the relevant portion of
the input costs to the new product? 443
of start-up situations will permit unsustainable pricing practices, that is, prices
below cost over time, to be viewed as "fair pricing."
Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 487.
438. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 835.
439. Agreement, supra note 19, at 2 (emphasis added).
440. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885-86 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(ii)-(iii) (1994)).
441. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4885 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(f)(1)(C)(iii) (1994)); MESSAGE, supranote 19, at837.
442. MESSAGE, supra note 19, at 837.
443. The effects of section 222(i) of the Act, which harmonizes the definitions of "affiliated persons," are unclear. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(i), 108 Stat. at 4875-76 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1677(33) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 76. Suppose an exporter
purchases inputs from a related company. The exporter owns, directly or indirectly, less
than 50% of the supplier, or vice versa, and the inputs are sold by the affiliate to the
exporter at below market value. Under prior law, for purposes of deciding whether the
exporter sells merchandise in its home market at below the cost of production, the DOC
determined the exporter's cost of production by using generally accepted accounting principles and consolidating related companies. Consequently, the exporter and supplier were
treated as unrelated parties and the below-market input price was not adjusted. Thomas H.
Fine & Marie E. Parker, The Cost of Production and the Constructed Value-After GATT, in THE
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 775, 780-81, 791
(PU 1994).
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Similarly, exclusions from unit production costs raise difficulties.
The DOC plans to exclude sales and advertising expenses because
these expenses are not directly linked to the manufacture of a new
product. 444 However, direct or otherwise, the link exists. When
bringing a new product to market, expenditures for advertising
and marketing are often as crucial as those for traditional factor
inputs such as wages, materials, and land. Suppose the exporter in
the above example hires Michael jordan to endorse the new product through television and radio advertisements as well as an
around-the-world marketing tour. The exporter incurred these
expenses because forecasts indicated that without these efforts
sales of the product would be negligible and the manufacturing
operation would shut down. In this scenario it makes little sense to
exclude sales and advertising expenses; without these expenses
there would be no product.
In sum, calculating a CV is a highly subjective exercise in which
opportunities for protectionist abuse abound. The proposed traffic-light system in Part V may help reduce such opportunities by
clarifying the elements included in the cost of manufacturing.
7.

Changing the Presumption About Intermediate Country
Sales

The odds of obtaining a final affirmative dumping determination may increase if intermediate sales occur. The Agreement and
the Act make it easier for a petitioner to persuade the DOC to use
an intermediate-country sales price as the basis for the NV, 445
thereby increasing the dumping margin. They also spawn controHowever, for purposes of determining the cost of manufacturing when calculating CV,
the DOC relied on a different concept. It determined the cost of a major input sold to a
related party at below cost on the basis of the best evidence available. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(e) (2)-(3) (1994).
Section 222 (i) of the Act defines affiliated parties in the same way for purposes of both
the cost of production and CV calculations. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(i), 108 Stat. at
4875 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33) (1994)). "Affiliated persons" include cases where
one company owns the stock of another company, and where one company controls
another company even in the absence of an equity relationship. ld.
The ramification of this change on the outcome of the AD [antidumping] proceedings for each company will vary depending on their relationships with their
suppliers and the percentage, as well as the value, of inputs purchased from
related suppliers. The outcome for some industries and/or some countries could
significantly change.
Fine & Parker, supra, at 792.
444. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 837.
445. Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4879 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (3)
(1994) ).

Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.

94

[Vol. 29

versy about a respondent's knowledge of the subsequent disposition of its merchandise.
Suppose the Tata Steel Company of India (Tata) sells steel for
Indian consumption at $1100 per ton and sells steel to the Madras
Exporters Group (MEG), also an Indian company, for $1000 per
ton. MEG exports the steel to the United States through Indonesia.
It sells the steel to the Jakarta Trading Company GTC) for $1200
per ton. JTC resells some of that steel for Indonesian consumption
at $1300 per ton and exports the balance to Ford at $1100 per ton.
Bethlehem Steel files a petition alleging that Tata, MEG, and JTC
dump steel in the United States. Should the Indian domestic price
of $ll00 per ton or the Indonesian domestic price of $1300 per
ton be used as the basis for NV?
Bethlehem Steel will argue for the intermediate-country sales
price of $1300 per ton, and both the Agreement and the Act provide ample basis for Bethlehem Steel to do so. 446 Essentially, the
Agreement and the Act change the presumption in the 1930 Act
regarding intermediate-country sales. The 1930 Act presumes that
FMV is based on sales of such or similar merchandise in the country where the merchandise originated. 447 Under prior law the DOC
could base NV on sales in the intermediate country only if the producer did not know that the seller intended to export the merchandise and the merchandise was not substantially transformed in
the intermediate country. 44s The 1930 Act presumed that a foreign
producer was aware of the proposed disposition of its merchandise
after the first sale in the country of origin.
Under the old law if Tata knew the steel it sold to MEG was
intended for export to the United States, it would presumably discount its usual domestic consumption price of $ll00 per ton for
MEG to effect its dumping strategy of charging the highest feasible
price in India and the lowest such price in the United States. 449
Accordingly, under prior law, the intermediate-country price was
not used because it was considered tainted-it could have been a
dumped price. 450 Under prior law, therefore, the price in the
country of origin ($1100 per ton) was selected as the basis for NV.
Given a PP of$ll00 (the price Ford pays), to the chagrin of Bethlehem Steel, there is no dumping margin ($ll00- $1100).
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

See id.
See id.
SENATE REPORT,

Id.
Id.

supra note 18, at 69.
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In contrast, the Agreement and the Act reverse the presumption-sales in the intermediate country are now the basis for
NV. 451 To the delight of Bethlehem Steel, a dumping margin of
two hundred dollars ($1300 - $l100) exists. The new presumption
assumes a producer is unaware of the planned subsequent disposition of its merchandise. If Tata does not know the steel it sells to
MEG will be exported, it will not discount its usual domestic consumption price of $l100 per ton in the sale to MEG to effect crossborder price discrimination. In turn, the intermediate-country
price is not tainted. In general, this new presumption benefits petitioners because intermediate-country sales prices are usually
higher than country-of-origin prices. An exporter in the country of
origin will charge a mark-up to a trading company in the intermediate country, just as MEG charged JTC $1200 for the steel MEG
obtained for $1000.
The Agreement and the Act do specify four different scenarios
in which NV must be derived from sales prices in the country of
origin. 452 However, these scenarios are consistent with prior law
and appear unlikely to undermine the advantage petitioners will
obtain from the new presumption. 45 3 The first three scenarios are
straightforward. NV is to be derived from sales price in the country
of origin when: (1) the subject merchandise is merely transshipped
through the intermediate country; (2) a foreign like product is not
produced in the intermediate country; and (3) sales in the intermediate country do not satisfy the 5% market viability test (sales in
the intermediate country are less than 5% of sales to the United
States), or when a particular market situation in the intermediate
country does not permit a proper comparison. 454 In these three
scenarios Bethlehem Steel cannot claim that $1300 is the NV if
TATA uses Indonesia as a conduit for its steel andJTC either, does
not substantially transform the steel in Indonesia, or does not
make a significant number of sales in Indonesia. The fourth scenario provides that the NV is to be derived from the sales price in the
country of origin if the producer knew, at the time of the sale, that
the subject merchandise was destined for export because of the
possibility that the intermediate-country price was a dumped
451. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 4; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4878
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6869.
452. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 4; Act, supra note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4879
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(3) (1994)).
453. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68-69.
454. ld. at 69.
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price. 455 Thus, if Tata knows its steel is destined for export, the
India sales price of $1300 per ton is the basis for the NV.
The central problem with both the old and new presumptions is
their underlying assumptions about a producer's knowledge. Basing the source of NV on awareness, or lack thereof, of the subsequent disposition of merchandise creates ambiguity. The DOC is
instructed to examine all relevant evidence, 456 but in practice it
may be difficult for the DOC to ascertain what a producer, especially a large foreign one, did or did not know. Must the producer
have actual knowledge or is constructive knowledge sufficient?
What if it did not know, but should have known that its product
was destined for export? Suppose different officials have different
information. Which officials' knowledge should matter, or should
the knowledge of officials be aggregated? The petitioner has an
incentive to engage in results-oriented behavior and exploit these
ambiguities. The producer can check the prices in both the intermediate country and the country of origin and then make an argument about the respondent's knowledge based on which of the two
prices is highest.
In conclusion, intermediate sales transactions provide yet
another opportunity for a protectionist abuser to attempt to maximize a dumping margin. The extent to which this opportunity is
exploited will depend upon the frequency of intermediate-country
cases. These cases may arise largely with respect to China and
Hong Kong. Intermediate-country sales and a producer's knowledge about the subsequent disposition of its merchandise are irrelevant in the proposed traffic-light system in Part V because it
eliminates the concept of NV.
8.

Spikes, Sustained Movements, and Currency Conversion

To calculate NV, figures denominated in a foreign currency
must be converted into U.S. dollars. The dumping margin calculation should not, however, be distorted by the conversion. 457 Article
2.4.1 of the Agreement indicates that the currency conversion
should be made on the date of sale-the date when the material
terms of the sale are established. 458 If there is a sustained change in
the exchange rate during the period of investigation, a respondent
455.
456.
457.
458.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text.
Agreement, supra note 19, at 3.
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is expected to adjust its prices. 459 Section 225(a) of the Act purports to implement Article 2.4.1 by requiring conversion of foreign
currencies at the dollar exchange rate in effect on the date of
sale. 4 6° This requirement changes the DOC's existing practice of
using a quarterly rate "unless the daily rate varies by more than five
percent from the rate in effect on the first day of the quarter." 4 6 1
While in many cases application of the new rule will not generate
controversy, two questions remain. First, how ·should intra-day
"spikes" in exchange rates be treated? Reliance on an intra-day rate
is dangerous because exchange rates may move dramatically within
a single day. For example, suppose a Mexican exporter is accused
of dumping. The NV is 100 pesos and the EP is $23 dollars. Suppose further that the dollar-peso exchange rate is 3.65 pesos to the
dollar at 9:00 a.m. on the date of the sale of the subject merchandise, but at noon the Mexican finance minister announces an
immediate 20% devaluation in the peso, which is followed by selling of pesos against dollars. By 4:00 p.m., $1 dollar is worth 5 pesos.
If the 9:00 a.m. rate is used to convert the NV into dollars, the NV
is $27.40. The petitioner will argue in favor of the morning rate
because this rate results in a dumping margin of $4.40 ($27.40 $23.00). If the 4:00 p.m.· rate is used, the NV is $20 dollars. The
respondent will argue that the afternoon rate should be used since
it leads to a negative dumping margin of $3 dollars ($20.00 $23.00). 462 Absent a clear rule for spikes, a petitioner benefits if the
foreign currency appreciates relative to the dollar after the measurement time. If appreciation occurs, FMV denominated in dollars increases and a dumping margin is created or increases.
Conversely, a respondent benefits if the currency depreciates
after the measurement time. If depreciation occurs, FMV denominated in dollars falls and a dumping margin is reduced or eliminated. In cases where the period of investigation is short, whether a
459. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 3; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 810. Suppose an
exporter being paid in U.S. dollars for its merchandise sells the dollar forward against its
home-country currency to hedge against the risk that the dollar might depreciate relative
to its home currency before it is actually paid. The Agreement and Act, in this scenario,
call for use of the forward rate as the rate at which to convert the exporter's prices and
costs into dollars. For a discussion of foreign exchange hedging, see Bhala, supra note 165.
460. Act, supra note 23, § 225(a), 108 Stat. at 4886 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b-l (a)
(1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 76; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 96, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3868.
461. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 842; see supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
462. To be sure, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York certifies the unoon buying rate"
as "the" foreign exchange rate. 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1988). But, this certification is made to
the U.S. Customs Service for purposes of customs valuation.
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dumping margin exists or the ma~itude of such a margin will
depend substantially on the exchange rate selected. Neither the
Agreement nor the Act sets forth the needed rule. Article 2.4.1
states that "[f]luctuations in exchange rates shall be ignored." 463
This statement cannot be taken literally because every rate could
be viewed as a flu'ctuation and thus ignored.
Second, what accommodations should be made to allow an
exporter to respond to a long-term trend in an exchange rate? The
recent dramatic appreciation of the Japanese yen relative to the
U.S. dollar serves as an illustration. Because of competition in the
United States, many Japanese exporters cannot raise the price of
the goods they export to the United States quickly enough to compensate for this appreciation. However, U.S. antidumping law
assumes that rapid price adjustments are possible, except in cases
where a currency appreciation is an aberrational spike. By focusing
on the difference between pricing in the United States and home
markets, the law ignores the fact that a Japanese respondent may
already be charging a price that is the same as or more than its U.S.
competitors.
Article 2.4.1 says that the authorities shall allow exporters a minimum sixty-day "lag" time to adjust their export prices to compensate for sustained movements in exchange rates during the period
of investigation. 464 But, the key phrase "sustained movement" is
undefined. Is a sustained movement a change in one direction that
occurs over a week, sixty days, or six months? Further, suppose the
time period is one week. During that week the exporter's currency
appreciates relative to the dollar on Monday, Tuesday, and Friday,
but depreciates relative to the dollar on Wednesday and Thursday.
The net result is an appreciation. Is this uneven movement "sustained?" Because the lag rule is ambiguous, it is difficult for an
exporter to judge when a "sustained movement" is taking place.
Perhaps a consensus among Wall Street currency analysts about the
strength or weakness of the dollar relative to a foreign currency
may emerge after several months of study. Yet, by then it is too late
for an exporter that has not adjusted its prices-the exporter will
have run afoul of the lag rule. Of course, the exporter's customers
may not agree. A cautious exporter must assume almost every
change in an exchange rate will be sustained and consider changing its prices every day-and certainly within sixty days-to satisfy
the lag rule.
463.
464.

Agreement, supra note 19, at 3.
/d.
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The currency conversion provisions of the Agreement and the
Act are also hypocritical. Foreign companies exporting to the
United States must adjust their prices in response to exchange
rates; however, U.S. companies exporting to foreign countries are
encouraged to maintain their price levels when the dollar depreciates relative to a foreign currency. 465 When depreciation occurs,
for example, when the dollar fell from 150 yen per dollar in 1990
to ninety yen per dollar in 1995,466 U.S. exports become cheaper
for foreign buyers. Government officials and economists often urge
U.S. exporters to maintain their price levels to increase their share
in the foreign market instead of raising their prices to maximize
profits. One rationale for this recommendation is the hope that
maintenance of prices will help improve the U.S. bilateral merchandise trade balance with the foreign country. In theory, foreign
buyers will substitute cheaper U.S. products for more expensive
domestic and third-country products. However, if the lag rule is
enforced rigorously in the foreign country, U.S. exporters face the
dilemma of trying to maximize foreign market share while minimizing the risk of being accused of dumping in a foreign country.
A petitioner can exploit the ambiguities surrounding spikes and
sustained movements in a foreign currency by choosing an
exchange rate that maximizes the dumping margin. The conversion rules also lead to conflicting incentives for U.S. exporters. The
traffic-light proposal in Part V partly resolves these problems by
eliminating the concept of NV, although the same problems continue to plague the cost-of-production calculation.
C.

1.

The Injury Determination

Troublesome Material Injury Standards

The standards for a material injury determination, set forth in
the 1930 Act, remain unchanged by the Agreement. Article 3.1 of
the Agreement identifies three variables to be considered in making a material injury determination: ( 1) the volume of subject merchandise in the importing country; (2) the effect of such
merchandise on prices for a domestic like product; and (3) the
consequent impact of such merchandise on domestic producers of
the like product. 467 The continuity of pre- and post-Uruguay
Round material injury standards leaves three ambiguities
465. See id.
466. Bank Credit Analyst, supra note 166, at 57; Philip Gawith et al., Currency Tunnoil
Boosts D-Mark, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1.
467. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 4.
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unresolved and the ITC's investigation susceptible to protectionist
abuse. 468
First, the variables examined in connection with a material injury
determination do not expressly include the cost structure of either
the petitioner or the respondent. 4 6 9 Microeconomic theory indicates that differential cost structures are a principal source of comparative advantage. 470 These structures should be the primary
variable in the ITC's investigation. Next, the three injury variables
articulated in Article 3.1 of the Agreement are extraordinarily
broad. Consider the second variable: Article 3.2 of the Agreement
explains that the effect of such merchandise on prices for a domestic like product is measured through an assessment of whether
there has been significant price undercutting by the allegedly
dumped imports. 471 This is accomplished by comparing the price
of the allegedly dumped import with the price of the like product
in the importing country to determine whether the imports have
the effect of depressing prices significantly, or whether the imports
prevent price increases which otherwise would have occurred. 472
Any competition, whether from imported or domestic products,
will cause undercutting or price decreases or will inhibit price
increases. 473 The benefits return to consumers and outweigh losses
to producers; hence, such results should be encouraged. Finally,
consider the third variable: Article 3.4 of the Agreement provides a
nonexhaustive list of items used to gauge the impact of dumped
imports on the domestic industry. Factors to be considered
include: (1) all relevant economic factors that bear on the state of
the domestic industry, such as any actual or potential decline in
sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on invest468. The ITC bases its material injury determination on data provided by foreign
exporters and U.S. producers in response to questionnaires issued by the ITC. As under
prior law, if an exponer or producer does not respond to a questionnaire or impedes an
investigation, the ITC can issue a subpoena for the information or make a determination
based on "information available." See Agreement, supra note 19, at 11, 25-26; Act, supra
note 23, § 224, 108 Stat. at 4849 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 16736(a) (1) (1994)). While issuing a subpoena to a U.S. imponer is straightforward and, indeed, under prior law was
common, issuing one to a foreign producer could raise issues of jurisdiction and foreign
state compulsion.
469. Arguably, costs may be considered in the second stage of the ITC's analysis;
namely, causation. Yet, the lax causation standard set forth in Article 3.5 of the Agreement,
discussed below, is itself a problem.
470. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
471. Agreement, supra note 19, at 4.
472. See id.
473. See jACKSON, supra note 74, at 239. See generally SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at 457-88
(discussing perfect competition).
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ments, or utilization; (2) all factors affecting domestic prices; (3)
the magnitude of the dumping margin; and ( 4) the actual and
potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment,
wages, growth, and ability to raise capital or make investments. 474
Again, it seems certain that competition, whatever its source, will
have an impact on some, if not all, of these items and that a final
affirmative injury determination is virtually inevitable. Moreover,
no single variable is dispositive of an injury; therefore, the lTC is
invited to look at several factors to find injury.47s
It should be recognized, however, that the Agreement broadens
the ITC's discretion in one manner that could reduce the risk of
protectionist abuse. Under pre-Uruguay Round law the magnitude
of the dumping margin was not an explicitly listed factor, resulting
in confusion as to whether it should be considered. 476 Article 3.4 of
the Agreement, implemented by section 222(b) (1) (B) of the Act,
states that the magnitude of the dumping margin is a factor that
the lTC may consider in making its i~ury determination. 477 Thus,
the lTC can exercise its discretion to render negative injury determinations in cases where the dumping margin is small.
Finally, protectionist abuse may occur because of a failure to distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence of injury. A
decline in profits, wages, or the ability to raise capital is direct evidence.478 A large dumping margin or a decline in output, productivity, or capacity utilization is, at best, an indicator of injury or
causation. 479 The lTC is statutorily required to rely on both the
direct and the circumstantial evidence equally when rendering an
injury determination. 480 This requirement "can lead to a paradoxical situation in which the U.S. government determines that the
industry has been injured when the marketplace, in the form of
share prices, has judged its prospects to be improving by investing
more money in the industry and raising its stock prices." 481
The traffic-light system proposed in Part V attempts to resolve
these ambiguities in the material injury determination. The traffic474. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 5.
475. See id. at 4.
476. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
477. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 5; Act, supra note 23, § 222(b) (1) (B), 108 Stat. at
4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (C) (iii)(V) (1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at
54, 80; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 66-67, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3838-39.
478. Horlick, supra note 13, at 159.
479. !d.
480. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(iii)(l994).
481. Horlick, supra note 13, at 159 (foomote omitted).
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light system emphasizes cost differentials, eliminates the magnitude of a dumping margin as a basis for a final affirmative determination, and requires direct evidence of material injury. 4 s2
2.

A Lax Causation Standard

Article 3.5 of the Agreement retains, in substantial part, the lax
causation standard set out in the 1930 Act. 4 8 3 Interestingly, the
Federal Trade Commission reported in 1994 that "the vast mcyority
of domestic industries competing with dumped and subsidized
imports are not severely injured by unfair imports." 484 In light of
this finding, the fact that the causation standard in the Agreement
remains lax is a great boon to petitioners. 485 The causation standard, set forth in Article 3.5 of the Agreement, states that
demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped
imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based
on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other
than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring
the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other
factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors
which"may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption,
trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and
the export performance and productivity of the domestic
industry. 486

While this list is not exhaustive, the failure to mention costs is
remarkable. A theoretically sensible list would focus attention on
differential cost structures. 487
The lack of a precise definition for the term "causal relationship" leaves open the question of whether the United States is precluded from imposing antidumping duties when the imports are a
remote or partial cause of an industry's woes. Arguably, a negative
482. See supra notes 245-258 and accompanying text; Agreement, supra note 19, at 5;
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 67, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3839.
483. Agreement, supra note 19, at 5.
484. Morris E. Morkre & Kenneth H. Kelly, FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION, EFFEcrs OF
UNFAIR IMPORTS ON DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES: U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
CAsES, 1980 TO 1988, at 69 (1994) (emphasis added).
485. See generaUy Angelos Pangratis & Edwin Vermulst, Injury in Anti-Dumping Proceedings, 28]. WoRLD TRADE 61, 73-83 (1994) (proposing an analytical framework for resolving
causation issues, including strengthening the standard to eliminate de minimis injuries
from the dumping analysis).
486. Agreement, supra note 19, at 5.
487. See supra notes 469-470 and accompanying text.
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answer may be inferred from the fact that the lTC remains barred
from weighing causes. 48S This prohibition makes it easier for a protectionist abuser to obtain protection. It is necessary to require a
direct and substantial causal relationship to minimize abuse. The
traffic-light system proposed in Part V utilizes the "substantial" causation standard applied in escape clause actions under section 201
of the Trade Act of 1974.489
A problem related to the lax causation standard is the ITC's continued ability to cumulate imports. Article 3.3 of the Agreement
expressly condones the practice of cumulatively assessing the
impact on a domestic industry of imports that are the subject of
different antidumping petitions "if imports are simultaneously subject to investigation, the margins of dumping ... are greater than
de minimis, and a determination is made that cumulative assessment
is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between
the imported products and between the imported products and
the domestic like product." 490 Generally, this provision is consistent
with the 1930 Act; 491 thus, the ITC's cumulation practice has
become the international standard. Cumulation increases the
probability of a final affirmative injury determination because it
488. See supra notes 249-250 and accompanying text.
489. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201(b)(4), 88 Stat. 1978,2012 (repealed
1988).
490. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 58; Agreement, supra note 19, at 4-5.
491. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at
33, 40-41, 58. Under prior law cumulation was permitted for all imports that were simultaneously subject to investigation. Section 222(e) of the Act allows for cumulation of imports
that result from petitions filed on the same day. See Act, supra note 23, § 222(e) (G) (i) (I),
108 Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (G)(i)(I) (1994) ); HousE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 73, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3845. This welcome change should limit the
range of imports cumulated.
Minor necessary changes to the 1930 Act were implemented by § 222 (e) of the Act. Act,
supra note 23, § 222(e), 108 Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i)(l)
( 1994)). Article 3.3 of the Agreement, for example, establishes three prerequisites for the
use of cumulation. To implement the third prerequisite concerning competitive conditions, section 222(e) of the Act explains that the ITC may not cumulate imports for which
the DOC has made a preliminary negative dumping determination, unless the DOC subsequently reaches a final affirmative determination before the lTC renders its final determination. ld. § 222(e)(2)(G) (ii) (1), 108 Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C
§ 1677(7) (G) (ii) (I)); see MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 847-50. Section 222(e) of the Act also
preserves two important exceptions to the use of cumulation. Exports from beneficiary
countries under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act may be cumulated only with
exports from other beneficiary countries. Act, supra note 23, § 222(e) (2) (G) (i) (III), 108
Stat. at 4873 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (G) (i)(III) (1994)). Second, exports from
Israel may not be cumulated unless the ITC finds that Israeli exports cause or threaten to
cause material injury to a U.S. industry. Id. § 222(e)(2) (G) (ii)(IV) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(G)(ii)(IV) (1994)); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 59; HousE REPORT,
supra note 18, at 75, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3847; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 850.
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makes dumping a strict liability offense. The absence of an agreement or intent among exporters to drive U.S. rivals into bankruptcy is irrelevant. If a U.S. competitor is injured, the exporters
are presumed responsible. Moreover, cumulation penalizes a small
exporter by grouping it with large exporters. 492 Consequently, the
small exporter is subject to final affirmative dumping and i~ury
determinations based essentially on the practices of the large
exporters. 493 The result is particularly unfortunate in the case of
developing countries whose nascent industries are important to
their economic growth. They rely on a comparative advantage, visa-vis developed country producers, that is based on low costs. The
antidumping duty wipes out the advantage. Accordingly, cumulation is prohibited in the traffic-light system proposed in Part V.

3.

Troublesome Threat Standards

A petitioner unable to obtain a final affirmative material i~ury
determination is likely to argue that a threat of material injury
exists. Article 3. 7 of the Agreement sets forth standards, implemented by section 222(c) of the Act, concerning threat determinations.494 A change in circumstances that would create a situation in
which dumping would cause injury must be "clearly foreseen and
imminent." 495 The Agreement and the Act give the lTC a nonexclusive list of variables to consider, such as: (1) whether there is a
significant rate of increase in subject merchandise in the United
States, indicating that substantially increased importations are
likely; (2) whether the exporter has sufficient freely disposable
capacity, or whether it will imminently and substantially increase its
capacity, suggesting that a substantial increase in imports of subject
merchandise is likely; (3) whether the subject merchandise enters
the United States at prices that will have a significant depressing
effect on U.S. prices, which would likely increase demand for fur492. See jACKSON, supra note 74, at 240.
493. Id. For example, suppose the DOC finds that steel producers in japan, Korea, and
Britain dump steel in the United States. Suppose it also finds that steel exports from India
and Turkey, which are not negligible but amount to a far smaller volume than those from
the other three countries, are dumped. Because Indian and Turkish steel is imported in
small quantities, it could not possibly damage the U.S. steel industry. Nevertheless, the lTC
cumulates the steel exports from the five countries and renders a final affirmative determination of injury. Undoubtedly, the cause of injury to the U.S. steel industry is the dumping
of japanese, Korean, and British steel, yet an antidumping duty is imposed on Indian and
Turkish steel as well.
494. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 5-6; Act, supra note 23, § 222(c), 108 Stat. at
4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i) (1994)).
495. Agreement, supra note 19, at 5.
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ther imports; and (4) whether large inventories of subject merchandise exist. No single variable is dispositive. The totality of the
circumstances must be considered before determining that further
dumped imports are imminent and, absent protection, that these
imports will lead to material injury. 496 With the exception of the
last variable discussed below, Article 3.7 is generally consistent with
prior law. 497
As with the standards for a material injury determination, ambiguities surround the standards for a threat determination and
opportunities for protectionist abuse abound. Like the concept of
CV, the concept of threat may be intrinsically susceptible to abuse.
Still, the Agreement raises four serious concerns. First, the relative
cost structures of the petitioner and the respondent are not
express factors. Microeconomic logic suggests that whether a U.S.
industry is likely to be injured will depend upon the industry's ability to cut costs and thereby maintain or regain a comparative
advantage.
Second, under prior law, the lTC could consider only substantial
increases in inventories of the subject merchandise in the United
States. 498 Now, the lTC must consider inventories of subject merchandise wherever the inventory is located. Yet, it is a mistake to
infer an intent to dump in the United States from offshore inventory accumulation. Such increases may result from recessionary
conditions in offshore markets, seasonal changes in consumption
or production patterns, or consolidation of inventory facilities. The
critical issue, which may be difficult to resolve, is whether the
respondent intends to -dump its increased inventories in the
United States.
Third, the United States appears to have taken advantage of the
fact that the list of articulated variables in Article 3. 7 is not exhaustive. Section 222(c) of the Act indicates that the United States shall
retain its more extensive pre-Uruguay Round list of factors. 499
Items on that list include export subsidies; production shifting in
496. Id. at 5-6; Act, supra note 23, § 222(c), 108 Stat. at 4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7) (F) ( 1994) ); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; HousE REPORT, supra note 18,
at 70, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3842.
497. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; HousE REPoRT, supra note 18, at 70,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3842.
498. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 854.
499. Compare Agreement, supra note 19, at 5-6 (listing four factors the authorities
should consider in determining the threat of material injury) with Act, supra note 23,
§ 222(c) (i), 108 Stat. 4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (F) (i)(I)-(IX) (1994))
(explaining nine factors that the commission is to consider "among other relevant economic factors" when determining the existence of the threat of material injury).
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the foreign country; raw and processed agricultural products;
actual and potential negative effects on existing development and
production efforts; and any other demonstrable adverse trends. 500
By offering a more extensive list of variables than those set forth in
Article 3.7, the Act enhances a petitioner's ability to make a successful threat of an i~ury claim.
Finally, perhaps the greatest uncertainty surrounding threat
determinations is their predictive and speculative nature. Admittedly, Article 3.8 reminds VVTO members to take "special care"
when making threat determinations501 and the legislative history of
Section 222(c) implements this reminder, cautioning that "the
ITC's threat determinations must not be made on the basis of mere
conjecture or supposition." 5 02 Nonetheless, any threat determination requires the lTC to engage in prognostication. The lTC must
ask whether continued imports of subject merchandise will cause
i~ury, and if the lTC answers in the affirmative, whether such an
i~ury would occur in spite of the elimination of such imports. The
possibility that an antidumping duty may be imposed on the basis
of these inherently uncertain determinations invites protectionist
abuse. Thus, in the traffic-light system proposed in Part V, threat of
injury is not a basis for an injury determination.
4.

Dealing with Captive Production

Ambiguities surrounding the new rules on captive production
create opportunities for petitioners who have lost their comparative advantage to an exporter to argue that they are being injured
by imports. The rules, set forth in section 222(b) (2) of the Act, go
beyond the provisions in the Agreement. 503 Captive production
"refers to production of the domestic like product that is not sold
in the merchant market and that is processed into a higher-valued
downstream article by the same producer." 504 A sale in the
"merchant market" is a sale made to an unrelated customer, and a
"downstream article" is an article that is distinct from a domestic
500. Act, supra note 23, § 222(c)(i), 108 Stat. 4870-71 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(F)(i)(I)-(IX) (1994))
501. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 6.
502. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 70,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3842.
503. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7) (C) (iv) (1994)).
504. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840.
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like product but is produced from that product. 505 Captive production typically occurs when a company is vertically integrated and
internally transfers a significant portion of its production volume
for further internal processing into a distinct downstream article
(captive production), 506 while at the same time selling some of its
domestic production to unrelated U.S. customers (the merchant
market). 507 The problem the lTC encounters is whether it should
focus exclusively on the merchant market, or whether it should
also consider captive production when making an injury
determination.
Whether the lTC renders a final affirmative injury determination
may depend on the resolution of this issue. First, the ITC's focus
will affect its determination of the market share of imports in the
domestic industry. A petitioner generally seeks to define the relevant market narrowly to exacerbate purported injury to its industry
by showing a higher import-penetration ratio. 508 Accordingly, the
petitioner will then urge the lTC to consider only merchant-market sales. Second, the manner in which the lTC resolves the issue
also influences its evaluation of the financial performance of U.S.
producers. Here again, the narrower the definition of the affected
market, the easier it is for a petitioner to claim it has been injured
by the subject merchandise. Adverse financial performance in one
market niche is not offset by positive financial performance in a
different niche because the latter is excluded from consideration.
The ITC's pre-Uruguay Round practice was to ignore this distinction and examine domestic production regardless of the destination of the merchandise. 509 The Agreement is silent on captive
production. Through section 222(b)(2) of the Act, the United
States unilaterally amended the 1930 Act to deal with the problem.510 As one practitioner points out, this amendment raises an
immediate concern:
There is no basis in the Antidumping Agreement for singling
out captive production for special treatment for purposes of
material injury analysis. The Agreement requires that the effects
505. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55.
506. ld. at 54; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840.
507. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 54; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840; see also MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 852; Analysis and Summary,
supra note 317, at 9 (defining captive production as production of a product that is primarily consumed internally in the manufacture of a finished article).
508. See PoWELL ET AL., supra note 4, tab A, at 4-5.
509. See Analysis and Summary, supra note 317, at 9-10.
510. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(c)(iv) (1994)).
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of the dumped imports be assessed in relation to the domestic
production of the like product. In addition, with two limited exceptions, neither of which relates to captive production, the
Agreement defines the domestic industry to be the domestic
producers "as a whole" of the like product. Thus, injury analysis
that is premised upon the exclusion of captive production is likely to be
challenged as inconsistent with the Agreement.

Still writhing from defeat in the 1993 hot-rolled steel cases,
the U.S. integrated steel mills actively lobbied for the inclusion
of the captive production provision in the implementing legislation .... The [Clinton] administration eventually caved to political pressure ... and the captive production provision made its
way into the implementing legislation.sii
In other words, as a threshold matter, any distinction made by the
ITC between the merchant market and captive production, pursuant to section 222(b) (2) of the Act, may be invalid under the
Agreement and subject to challenge in the WTO.
Section 222(b) (2) of the Act authorizes the ITC to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether to consider only merchant-market sales
when examining market share and financial performance. 512 The
rationale for distinguishing between the merchant and the captive
market is clear. In a captive production situation, imports compete
primarily with sales of a domestic like product in the merchant
market, not with inventory internally transferred for processing
into separate downstream articles. 513 Hence, the ITC should
include imports that are captively consumed for processing into
downstream articles in its analysis only if the imports compete with
merchant-market sales of the domestic like product. 514
511. Holmer et aL, supra note 23, at 490-91 (emphasis added) (foomotes omitted).
512. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(C)(iv) (1994)); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 852.
513. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3840; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 852.
514. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 853. The legislative history states:
Imports which are sold in the merchant market shall be included in the import
penetration ratio for the merchant market. Imports which are captively consumed by the related-party importer for processing into a downstream article
should be included in the import penetration ratio for the merchant market only
if the imports compete with sales of the domestic like product. If such imports do
not compete with sales of the domestic upstream like product in the merchant
market, the ITC shall include such imports in the total import share of the industry's total production, but not in the import penetration ratio for the merchant
market or in any other calculation in which captive domestic production is
excluded.
Id.; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55-56; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 69,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3041. Note that the ITC can calculate the market share of
imports in the merchant market and include allegedly dumped products in the
calculation.
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The challenge is to develop a practical, bright-line test to determine whether an analysis of market share and financial performance focused on the merchant market is needed. Section
222(b) (2) utterly fails in this regard. Section 222(b) (2) directs the
lTC to pursue four inquiries: (1) whether the volume of merchant
sales and internal captive production transfers is "significant"; (2)
whether the production of the domestic like product that is transferred internally for further processing into a separate downstream
article enters the merchant market for the upstream like product;
(3) whether the domestic like product is the "predominant" material input used in the production of the separate downstream article; and (4) whether the domestic like product sold in the
merchant market is "generally used" in the production of the
downstream article. 515 The lack of clear definitions renders these
inquiries inherently ambiguous and enables a petitioner to argue
for exclusion of captive production by simply demonstrating
greater import penetration in the allegedly injured domestic
industry.
Consider the first inquiry. There is no standard for determining
what volume of production is "significant." The legislative history
provides little guidance; it merely states that " [c] aptive production
and merchant sales are significant if they are of such magnitude
that a more focused analysis of market share and financial performance is needed for the lTC to obtain a complete picture of the
competitive impact of imports on the domestic industry." 516
With respect to the third inquiry, there is no definition of "predominance." Again, the legislative history is little help; it indicates
that the domestic like product is considered "predominant" only if
it is the "primary" material used in the production of the downstream article. 517 Is this a 50% test, where the domestic like product is the "predominant" or "primary" input if it exceeds 50% of
the total value of the product, or is a super-majority threshold
amount required?
Finally, with respect to the fourth inquiry, the petitioner and
respondent are certain to disagree over whether a domestic like
product is "generally used" in the production of the downstream
515. Act, supra note 23, § 222(b)(2), 108 Stat. at 4870 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(7)(C) (iv) (1994) ); HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68-69, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.CAN. 3840-41.
516. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3840 (explaining significant captive production).
517. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 68, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 853.
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article. Yet again, the legislative history does not help; it defines
"general use" in terms of significance. If a "significant" portion of
the production of the domestic like product that enters the
merchant market is actually processed into the same downstream
article as that produced from the internally transferred captive production, the domestic like product is "generally used" in downstream production. 518 Worse yet, the legislative history increases
the opportunity for protectionist abuse by stating that whether a
domestic like product sold in the merchant market is physically
capable of being processed into a downstream article is irrelevant.519 The legislative history states that the only question for consideration is whether the domestic like product is actually used in
downstream production. 52° Conceivably, a petitioner could deliberately abstain from using a domestic like product to create the
impression that the merchant and captive production markets
should be distinguished.
It is unclear how these four inquiries relate to one another and
how they should be applied to particular situations. Several questions and examples will help to illustrate this point. First, what priority should be given to the inquiries? Suppose the volumes of
merchant and captive production sales are significant (the first
inquiry), and the domestic like product is not used in the downstream article (the third inquiry). These two factors, considered in
isolation, suggest that the merchant and captive production markets should be treated separately. But, suppose also that the second
and fourth inquiries yield an affirmative answer, suggesting that
the markets are not distinct; what should the lTC do? Second,
which producers are relevant to the fourth inquiry? Suppose one
auto producer files an antidumping petition against exporters of
certain japanese auto parts. Two other auto producers, but not the
first, use a domestic like product from the merchant market in
their downstream production of cars. Should the lTC only
examine data from the first producer? Finally, does the second
inquiry create a per se rule? Does any sale of the domestic like
product in the merchant market constitute "entry" into that market? Suppose a domestic producer sells its "over-run" production in
518. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 69, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841; MESSAGE, sufrra note 69, at 853.
519. SENATE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 69, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841.
520. SENATE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 55; HousE REPORT, sufrra note 18, at 69, reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3841.
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the merchant market to unrelated businesses. Has the steel
entered the merchant market?
In sum, a petitioner can exploit the ambiguous terms and nature
of the four inquiries to encourage the lTC to artificially narrow its
investigation. If the petitioner is successful in this endeavor, the
result is an exaggeration of the market share of imports and injury
to the financial condition of the affected domestic industry. The
traffic-light system proposed in Part V returns to the rule of the
earlier law, under which the lTC ignored the distinction between
the merchant and captive markets.
D.

Anticircumvention and the Expansion of Protection

Ambiguous post-Uruguay Round anticircumvention rules allow
for the scope of an antidumping order to be expanded to include
imported parts. As a result, a U.S. parts manufacturer can obtain
undeserved protection from imported parts. In tum, by raising the
cost of these parts by the amount of the antidumping duty, such
protection unjustly harms U.S. companies that rely on such parts.
Suppose RCA produces portable pagers in the U.S. from components imported from Malaysia. 521 Suppose also that RCA files an
antidumping petition against Sony, who produces pagers in Japan
and exports them to the United States. Suppose finally that the
DOC issues an antidumping order against Sony covering the
pagers. Consider two possible scenarios that could arise after the
order: (1) Sony exports pager components to its U.S. subsidiary,
Sony-U.S.A., which makes pagers from the components; or (2)
Sony exports pager components to a related company in Seoul,
Sony-Korea. Sony-U.S.A. then imports pager components from
Sony-Korea, as well as from Sony, for use in the production of
pagers.
A threshold question in both cases is whether RCA should be
entitled to petition the DOC to expand the scope of the original
order to cover components even though RCA is not a domestic
producer of the components. Both pre- and post-Uruguay Round
law both provide an affirmative answer to this question. 522 A party
521. This hypothetical is adapted from an antidumping investigation and determination of sales at LTFV. Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan, 48
Fed. Reg. 36,349 (Dep't Comm. 1983); High-Capacity Pagers from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg.
28,682 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination); High-Capacity Pagers from Japan, 47
Fed. Reg. 40,679 (Dep't Comm. 1982) (initiation).
522. With respect to pre-Uruguay Round law, see Horlick, supra note 13, at 156. The
Act did not change the prior law on this matter.
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with standing to file a petition regarding a finished product but
not components, can seek to extend the order to components. To
reduce protectionist abuse, the law should be revised to deny
standing to RCA and bar it from seeking this result.
The substantive questions raised in both cases further highlight
the risk of protectionist abuse. In the first case is Sony circumventing the order by exporting components to the United States
for assembly into finished merchandise? In the second case is Sony
circumventing the order by causing its U.S. subsidiary to use parts
from a third country? The DOC cannot answer either question
unless it identifies a minor assembly operation in the United States
that permits an exporter to continue dumping finished merchandise by substituting exports of finished merchandise, which are
subject to an antidumping order with exports of parts, which are
not covered by the order. Put differently, the DOC must distinguish between a minor assembly operation and an instance of a
bona fide direct foreign investment made by an exporter in a U.S.based manufacturing operation that contributes substantial added
value to imported parts resulting in finished merchandise.
Prior law was helpful in resolving only the first case. As discussed
above, to expand an antidumping order prior law required that a
"small" difference exist between the value of parts imported into
the United States from a country subject to an antidumping order
and the finished product made from those parts. 523 Thus, with
respect to the first scenario, the key inquiry would be whether a
"small" difference in value exists between the pager components
exported by Sony to Sony-U.S.A. and the pagers produced by SonyU.S.A. Prior law, however, failed to prevent the sort of circumvention suggested in the second case, i.e., the "third-country parts"
problem that is encountered when an exporter circumvents an
antidumping order by establishing a "screwdriver," or minor assembly operation in the United States that purchases as many parts as
possible from a third country. 524 In determining whether the difference in value between parts imported from the country subject
to the order and the finished product was "small," the DOC could
not consider these third-country parts. 525
523.
524.

See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
supra note 18, at 102, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3874;
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 893.
525. Smith-Corona Corp. v. United States, 17 Ct. lnt'l Trade 47, 49-51 (1993) (holding
that an antidumping order applicable to Japanese portable electronic typewriters (PETs)
dumped in the U.S. was not circumvented and that the DOC acted correctly in excluding
from its investigation third-country components of the PETs).
HousE REPORT,
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Section 230 of the Act now provides help in the second scenario.526 Section 230 addresses the third-country parts problem by
requiring the DOC to focus its anticircumvention investigation on
two "mandatory factors." 527 First, the DOC must determine
whether a "minor or insignificant" assembly is occurring in the
United States or a third country. 528 Second, the DOC must determine the value of parts imported from the country, subject to the
order into the United States, or whether a third country is a "significant" portion of the total value of the finished product. 529 In brief,
section 230 "shift[s] the focus of the anticircumvention inquiry
away from a test of the difference in value between the subject merchandise and the imported parts or components, towards nature of
the process performed in the United States or a third country."530
Despite this improvement in the prior law, there are two difficulties with this section. First, section 230 is inconsistent with the
Agreement. The Agreement is silent on anticircumvention.53I As
two practitioners point out, "there is no provision permitting anticircumvention measures or the imposition of antidumping duties
on products which have not been fully investigated and found to
be dumped and causing injury." 532 Indeed, Article 18.1 of the
Agreement forbids a WTO member from taking action against
526. Act, supra note 23, § 230, 108 Stat. at 4891 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677j(b)(l)(C)-(D) (1994)).
527. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 893.
528. /d.
529. /d. Section 230 of the Act retains the requirement that before expanding the
scope of an antidumping order to include imponed parts, the DOC must consider
whether: (1) there are changes in the pattern of trade regarding the sourcing of parts to
produce the finished product; (2) the producer of the finished product subject to the
order is related to the U.S. or third-country assembler; and (3) imports of parts from the
country subject to the order into the United States or a third country have increased after
the investigation that led to the original order. See id. at 894; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18,
at 82; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 101, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 3873.
530. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 81-82.
531. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 80. The Uruguay Round Ministerial Decision
(Decision) recognizes the "problem" of circumvention and the desirability of having uniform rules on anticircumvention as soon as possible. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 819. This
decision does not provide a foundation for section 230. The Decision is reprinted in
MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 1694. The December 20, 1991, Dunkel Draft of the Agreement
contained provisions that the United States regarded as weak. The United States successfully persuaded other contracting parties to delete these provisions from the final Agreement. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 819. For a critique of the Dunkel Draft, see Gary N.
Horlick, How the GATT Became Protectionist, 27 J. WoRLD TRADE 5 (1993).
532. Horlick & Shea, supra note 20, at 28; see also Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 499500 (noting the inconsistency of the U.S. government's interpretation of the Decision and
its obligations under Article VI of the 1947 GATT and the Agreement).
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dumping except in accordance with the Agreement. 5 33 Furthermore, Article VI of the 1947 GATT provides that antidumping
duties cannot be imposed without a finding of dumping and injury
with respect to a like product from the country subject to investigation.534 Thus, section 230 is a unilateral modification, without
foundation in the Agreement, of U.S. anticircumvention rules.
Second, the statutory language utilizes but does not define critical terms. What assembly operation is "minor or insignificant?"
What value of imported parts is "significant?" For example, with
respect to the first mandatory factor, section 230 lists a number of
variables the DOC may consider in deciding whether an assembly
operation is "minor or insignificant. "535 These variables include the
levels of investment, research, and development; the nature of the
production process; the extent of production facilities; and
whether the value of the processing performed in the United
States is a "small" proportion of the value of finished merchandise
sold in the United States. 536 No hierarchy among or weighing system for these variables is suggested; the DOC must proceed on a
case-by-case basis.
As another example, with respect to the second mandatory factor, the legislative history of section 230 indicates Congress did not
"intend to replace one problematic test-the "small' value testwith another." 5 37 Ironically, this result is not avoided because it is
no easier to define "significant" than "small." No quantitative test is
established to determine when the value of import parts is a "significant" portion of the total value of finished merchandise. While a
bright-line test was rejected in order to preserve the DOC's flexibility, the result is that it is now necessary for an uncertain case-bycase adjudication. 538 What is clear, however, is the legislature's goal
of enhancing the ability of a petitioner to expand an antidumping
order. The legislative history indicates that Congress "expects and
intends that the new standard will be less difficult to meet, thereby
improving our ability to prevent circumvention." 539
533. Agreement, supra note 19, at 22.
534. GATT, supra note 2, art. VI, 61 Stat. at A3, A23, 55 U.N.T.S. at 188, 212.
535. Act, supra note 23, § 230, 108 Stat. at 4891 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (1994)).
536. Id. § 230, 108 Stat. at 4892; .see also MESSAGE, .supra note 69, at 893; SENATE REPORT,
.supra note 18, at 82; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 101, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN.
3873.
537. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 82.
538. Id.; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 101, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3873.
539. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 82.
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In sum, the Act may have gone beyond the bounds of the Agreement. In any event, the Act's mandatory factors do not qualify as
rigorous tests for deciding when to expand the scope of an
antidumping order or protection to cover imported parts or merchandise. One solution would be to use quantitative tests for defining "minor or insignificant" assembly operations and "significant"
added value to provide greater discipline. An alternative solution,
suggested in the proposed traffic-light system, is to treat the suggestion of expanding any extant order as a new case and require new
dumping margin and injury determinations.

E.
1.

Reviewing an Order

The Irony of Sunset Reviews

Traditionally, the United States has revoked only a small number
of outstanding antidumping orders and has done so only after they
have been in effect for a long period of time. 540 As two practitioners point out,
[b]etweenjanuary 1, 1980 [sic] and july 31, 1994, a total of 533
antidumping and countervailing duty orders had been, at some
time, placed into effect. During this same period of time, 162
orders (30.39%) were revoked. The average period of time a
revoked duty order remained in effect was 8.28 years. 541
Another observer's results were even more startling: "Over ninety
percent of all companies convicted of dumping since 1980 are still
restricted by dumping orders." 54 2 Reviewing and revoking an order
raises two competing concerns:
On the one hand, the purpose of an antidumping order is to
provide relief from imported goods that are unfairly competing
in one's domestic market. Once domestic industry has proven
its case-that the goods are being dumped and the dumping
injures or threatens injury to a U.S. industry-the order and
resulting duty should remain in effect during the existence of
that conduct. It is an expensive and time-consuming exercise to
go from allegation to order, both for the parties and for the
administrative agencies charged with determining whether the
allegations are true. This first view reflects the concern that
once the domestic industry has proven that it is, in fact, injured
by dumping or subsidies, it should not be asked to reprove its
case.
540.

See Barbara R. Stafford & Linda S. Chang, The Sunset Pr(J!Jisions, Mortality and the

Uruguary Round, in
541.
542.

THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND

1994, 721, 727 n.12 (PU 1994).
Id. (emphasis added).
BovARD, supra note l, at 140.
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On the other hand, an order and the ensuing duty should not
remain in place for any longer than necessary. It is blatantly
unfair to keep an order in effect, whether by design or inertia,
when it is no longer needed. As with many of he issues
addressed in the Uruguay Round, the approach to the sunset
issue preferred by individual GATT member states was based on
whether their principal concerns were anxiety over placing an
undue burden on injured domestic parties, or vexation with an
unnecessary and, therefore, unfair encumbrance on
exporters. 543

Article 11.3 of the Agreement purports to balance these competing
concerns by mandating, pursuant to a provision known as the "sunset" rule, 544 the termination of an order no later than five years
from the date of its imposition. 545 The sole exception to the sunset
543. Stafford & Chang, supra note 540, at 729-30.
544. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at 4859 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(a)-(3)(A) (1994)).
545. The sunset review, as well as the "new shipper" review discussed in the next section, should not be confused with a "normal" administrative review or a "changed circumstances" review.
Under pre-Uruguay Round law almost all antidumping orders were subject to a normal
administrative review within one year from the date they were issued. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)
(1988). Upon request of an interested party, the DOC calculated final liability for an
antidumping duty on an entry of merchandise subject to an order. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 43. The amount calculated during the investigation phase was thereby regarded
as an estimate. The DOC revoked the order if it concluded that: ( 1) one or more producers subject to the order had not sold merchandise at LTFV for three consecutive years; (2)
it is unlikely that they will sell their merchandise at LTFV in the future; and (3) they agree
to reinstatement of the order should they resume LFIV sales. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (1988);
19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a) (1995). See, e.g., Antifriction Bearings (other than Tapered Roller
Bearings) and Parts Thereof from France, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,900 (1995) (notice of final
administrative review).
Article 9.3.1 of the Agreement establishes deadlines for an administrative review; normally 12 months and in no case more than 18 months. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 1466.
Section 220(a) of the Act implements these deadlines. Act, supra, note 23, § 220(a), 108
Stat. at 4859 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(A) (1994)).
With respect to a "changed circumstances" review, under pre-Uruguay Round law, an
interested party not only had to request the review but also show there were "changed
circumstances sufficient to warrant a review." 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1) (1988). A decision by
the DOC as to whether this standard is met was not subject to judicial review. AOC Int'l
Proton Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, No. 93-06-00341, 1993 Ct. Inti. Trade LEXIS 238,
at *9-12 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 22, 1993). If an interested party made the requisite showing,
the DOC recalculated FMV, USP, and the dumping margin. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (2)
(1988). A changed circumstances review of a final determination by the DOC and ITC
could not be made within two years of the date of the determination. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(b)(4) (1988); see also OvERVIEW, supra note 30, at 70 (stating that no review may
occur within 24 months of notice of final determination without good cause).
In connection with a changed circumstances review, Article 11.2 of the Agreement
requires the appropriate authority to determine whether dumping and injury would be
likely to continue or recur if the antidumping order were revoked. Agreement, supra note
19, at 17. Section 220(a) implements this requirement. Agreement, supra note 19, at 17;
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rule occurs when the appropriate authority-the DOC-as a result
of a review it initiates or a review initiated by an interested party,
concludes that termination "would be likely" to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. This ambiguous exception brings to the fore the failure of Article 11.3 to successfully
balance the competing concerns raised in the above-quoted passage. Ironically, a sunset review is unlikely to lead to revocation.
The irony of the ineffectiveness of Article 11.3 is suggested by
two subtleties in sections 220(a) and 221 (a) of the Act, which
implement Article 11.3. 546 First, an antidumping duty may remain
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 44-45; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 55-56, reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3827-28; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 878.
Under pre- and post-Uruguay Round law, revocation of an antidumping order may also
result from a review initiated by the DOC without the request of any party. If the DOC
determines that an order is no longer of interest to any party or that other changed circumstances warrant revocation, it will initiate a review. 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d) (1995). Lack
of interest is demonstrated by an affirmative statement of a petitioner or the absence of a
request for a review for four years (which, in essence, means that five annual review periods have transpired). In practice, any unsupported statement of interest would prevent
revocation.
Neither the Agreement nor the Act correct three key problems with administrative and
changed circumstances reviews-their cost, scope, and attendant burdens of proof. These
problems are inherent biases against commencing a review and lifting an order. First,
because these reviews are triggered only upon request of an interested party, the mechanism "uses the transaction cost of participation in a proceeding as the criterion for deciding whether a review will be conducted." Horlick, supra note 13, at 128. Theoretically, the
DOC could initiate an administrative review, but it rarely does so. !d. at 129. The price tag
for revocation can exceed $100,000. !d.
Second, "[i]n practice a respondent can only request review of the order to the extent it
itself is covered," whereas "[a] domestic petitioner can request a review of all companies
specifically named in the order, as well as any new entrants or other companies specifically
named." !d. at 128-29. A petitioner could cause an antidumping duty on several companies
to be raised, whereas a respondent could cause only the duty it owes to decrease. Arguably,
a respondent should be able to trigger a review of all respondents-even though some may
be its competitors-that are covered by an order.
Third, the burden of persuasion rests on the party seeking revocation of an order. For
example, a petitioner need not show that dumping and injury persist; rather, a respondent
must prove that there are changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a review. This burden reflects a "guilty until proven innocent" approach.
546. Act, supra note 23, §§ 220(a), 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4857, 4865 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1675(a), 1675a (1994)). In one sense, the sunset rule is consistent with prior law. Under
pre-Uruguay Round DOC regulations, the DOC could revoke an order if there had been
no request for review of that order for four years. 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d) (4) (1995); see supra
note 544. However, in two respects, the sunset rule is inconsistent with prior law.
First, there was no such rule in the 1930 Act. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 33; HousE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 56, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3828; see also Horlick, supra
note 13, at 129 (explaining that the United States previously did not have a sunset rule for
dumping). Under prior law antidumping duties were imposed as long as dumping or
injury continued. Indeed, the failure of the United States to review antidumping orders
was a source of concern throughout the GATT negotiations. See 2 THE GATT URUGUAY
RouND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 1424-25 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
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in force pending the outcome of a sunset review, which may take
one year. 547 Interestingly, under pre-Uruguay Round law, time limUnder an Executive Order issued pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, authority
for calculating dumping margins and issuing orders was transferred in 1980 from the
Department of the Treasury to the DOC. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, §§ 2(a),
5(a) (1) (C), 3 C.F.R. §§ 513-515 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1590 (1994); Exec.
Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131, 135 (1980). The Treasury regulations called for modification or revocation of an order, either upon request of a party or on the initiative of the
secretary of the Treasury, if there was a change in circumstances. See 19 C.F.R. § 153.41 (a)(b) ( 1975). Section 751 (a) of the 1979 Act called for the DOC to undertake annual reviews
of all antidumping orders. This requirement imposed an unnecessarily heavy burden on
the DOC that was alleviated by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. As a result of the 1984
Act, reviews were conditioned upon request: See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (1984); see also
HousE SuscoMM. oN TRADE, HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 98TH CoNG., 2o SESS.,
REPORT ON H.R. 4784 TRADE REMEDIES REFoRM Acr OF 1984 16 (Comm. Print 1984) (stating purpose of conditional reviews).
Second, under prior law the ITC could notify the DOC of its determination that circumstances in the affected market or industry had changed so significantly that injury was
unlikely to recur if an order were revoked. 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.45(a), (c) (1995). In tum, the
DOC could revoke the order. The burden of proof rested on an exponer engaged in
dumping to show that injury would not recur and, therefore, revocation was justified. The
Agreement shifts that burden from the respondent to the DOC. This shift has caused one
practitioner to suggest that the sunset rule weakens U.S. antidumping law because it is
easier than under prior law for the respondent to obtain revocation. See Stein, supra note
278, at 890-91. This suggestion is disputed above.
547. Ankle 11.4 specifies that a sunset review normally should be completed within
one year of its commencement. Agreement, supra note 19, at 17. Normally, the DOC will
complete its review within 240 days and the lTC will complete its review within 360 days. 19
U.S.C. § 1675(c)(5) (1994); SENATE REPoRT, supra note 18, at 46; HousE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 57, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3829; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 881. Depending on the amount of interest in a sunset review, measured by submissions from companies
in the relevant domestic industry, exponers, and the exponers' government, the DOC and
the lTC may decide not to conduct a full-fledged sunset review. Indeed, if there is no
interest, no review is conducted and the order is revoked automatically. See MESSAGE, supra
note 69, at 879-81. In addition, if an antidumping order was not revoked after a previous
sunset or changed circumstances review, a sunset review must be conducted within five
years of that prior order. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 58, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.CAN. 3830.
When the Act took effect on january 1, 1995, there were approximately 400 orders eligible for review on the ground that they had been in effect for at least five years. See id. The
Agreement contains a "procrastination" provision to deal with these transition cases. Article 18.3.2 allows WTO Members to treat all orders in effect on the date the Agreement
enters into force as if they had been issued on the date of entry into force. Agreement,
supra note 19, at 22. Thus, there will be no sunset review revocation for five years from the
date of enactment. To ensure timely completion of reviews of a backlog of over 400 transition cases, the DOC and the ITC will stan the reviews 18 months before this date and
complete them within 18 months after this date. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 47;
HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 58, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 3830; MESSAGE, supra
note 69, at 882; Stafford & Chang, supra note 540, at 742. In addition, section 220(a) of the
Act indicates that sunset reviews may take up to 18 months. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a),
108 Stat. at 4863 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(6) (1994)). In summary, with respect to
transition cases, the United States took advantage of the flexible language in Ankle 11.4,
which provides that a sunset review "normally" should be completed within 12 months of
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its for annual reviews were hortatory, not mandatory. 548 Some
"annual" reviews have dragged on for ten years, in part because of
the backlog of reviews that the DOC inherited from the Department of the Treasury. 549 Courts have adopted this approach to sunset reviews, thereby stretching out the review process. Second,
section 220(a) and its legislative history state that the DOC and the
lTC must conduct a sunset review "after" five years from the imposition of an order. 550 Article 11.3, however, uses the phrase "not
later than five years from" the imposition of an order. While postUruguay Round U.S. law is not inconsistent with Article 11.3, it
does take advantage of the outermost permissible limit. 551
The substantive standard for sunset reviews allows the DOC and
the lTC to render likelihood determinations that are susceptible to
protectionist abuse. The DOC must determine whether the revocation of an outstanding antidumping order "would be likely" to lead
to a continuation or recurrence of dumping within a reasonably
foreseeable time. 552 Similarly, the lTC must decide whether revocation of the order "would be likely" to result in continued or recurring material injury within a reasonably foreseeable time. 553 It is
impossible to determine with precision what will happen if an
order is revoked. Applying the "likelihood" standard entails making a predictive determination which is speculative and plagued
with ambiguity. 554
the date of its initiation. The United States viewed its situation as abnormal because of the
large volume of transition cases. For non transition cases, sunset reviews will begin 30 days
before the expiration of the five-year period and will be completed within one year. Stafford & Chang, supra note 540, at 745.
548. See supra note 547.
549. For example, in one case concerning import entries of tapered roller bearings
from japan during 1974-1979, the DOC did not issue the final results of its annual review
until June 1990. Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1160, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
550. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at 4861 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (1)
(1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 45.
551. See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 56, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3828. There
may be a third subtlety to sections 220(a) and 221 (a) of the Act. Because it may be simple
and inexpensive to request a sunset review, a petitioner is likely to do so.
552. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883, 889-91.
553. /d. at 883; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 48; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at
59-60, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3831-32. This standard must be distinguished from
that applied by the lTC in material injury and threat determinations. In the former situation the lTC looks for current material injury by reason of dumped imports. In the latter
situation the lTC looks for imminent material injury. !d. at 60.
554. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883; HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 59, reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3831; see also, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927,
933 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that a likelihood determination in a changed circumstances
review is "inherently predictive").
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Consider the DOC's "likelihood" determination. The Agreement
offers no guidance on calculating the likelihood of future dumping; thus, the matter is left to each WTO member. One solution
might be to calculate a future margin based on estimated future
prices in the exporting and importing countries' markets. The
DOC rejected this formula and decided to rely on its original
dumping calculation, "as that would be indicative· of respondents'
behavior without the discipline of an order." 555 But this decision
presumes past actions are a reliable indicator of future behavior
and ignores the possibility that supervening events may cause an
exporter to dramatically alter its behavior.
For instance, the factors the DOC examines in making its likelihood determination under section 221 (a) of the Act are
the relationship between dumping margins, or the absence of
margins, and the volume of imports of the subject merchandise,
comparing the periods before and after the issuance of an order
.... For example, declining import volumes accompanied by the continued existence of dumping margins after the issuance of an order may
provide a strong indication that, absent an order, dumping would be
likely to continue, because the evidence would indicate that the

exporter needs to dump to sell at pre-order volumes. In contrast, declining (or no) dumping margins accompanied by
steady or increasing imports may indicate that foreign companies do not have to dump to maintain market share in the
United States and that dumping is less likely to continue or
recur if the order were revoked. 556
Declining import volumes or the existence of dumping margins
after an order may not be probative of the likelihood of continued
or recurred dumping. Declines could result from cyclical economic
factors in the United States, such as a recession; from changes particular to the exporter, such as a shift in export strategy (a decision
to export a lower volume of goods to the United States and a
higher volume of goods to another importing country); or from a
change in costs, such as an increase in wages, leading to lay-offs
A related avenue for protectionist abuse may exist when the DOC deems a response to
its notice of initiation of a sunset review "inadequate." Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108
Stat. at 4862 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(3)(B) (1994)). In such a case the DOC may
make a determination on the basis of facts available. This determination is subject only to a
relaxed standard of review by the Court of International Trade. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b) (1)(B)(ii) (1994).
555. Stafford & Chang, supra note 540, at 747; see also MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 890
(stating that a company that dumps despite an order would likely continue to dump if the
order were removed).
556. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 889-90 (emphasis added); 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c) (1994);
SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 52; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 63, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.CAN. 3835.
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and the closure of a production facility. Similarly, the persistence
of a dumping margin after an order has been issued could result
from changes in conditions in the exporter's home market, such as
an increase in prices caused by inflation which would result in an
increase in NV; a change in exchange rates, such as an appreciation of the exporter's home currency relative to the U.S. dollar
which would result in an increase in NV; or a change in the U.S.
market, such as increased market competition resulting in a lower
export price. 557 Nevertheless, there is a built-in bias against an
exporter based on its preorder behavior. 558 The onus is put
squarely on the exporter to prove that declining import volumes
and dumping margins are not indicative of the likelihood of a continuation or recurrence of dumping. The exporter remains guilty
until it proves its innocence. 559 Not surprisingly, some practitioners
"expect that in practice the [DOC] will be very likely to find that
dumping is likely to continue or recur in almost every sunset
review." 560
Furthermore, the ITC's likelihood analysis makes a change in
the status quo unlikely. While section 221 (a) of the Act articulates
specific factors that the lTC must consider, 561 the ITC's likelihood
determination remains "inherently speculative" and calls for "predictive inquiries [which] may suggest a number of possible outcomes."562 Like the DOC, the lTC assumes the role of a soothsayer
557. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 890.
558. See id. at 889-90.
559. Still another example of this conclusion is a provision in section 221 (a) on the
magnitude of the dumping margin. The size of the dumping margin calculated by the
DOC in the original investigation may be used by the lTC to decide whether there is a
likelihood of material i11iury. See Act, supra note 23, § 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4868 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1675a(c)(3) (1994)). Hence, the exporter is encumbered by its past behavior
with respect to both the DOC and lTC likelihood determinations. To be sure, section
221 (a) allows the DOC to consider other information like price, cost, market, or economic
factors that the DOC deems relevant. However, it will do so only" [i]f good cause is shown."
/d.

560. POWELL, GOLDSTEIN, FRAZER & MURPHY, UPDATE OF ANALYSIS OF HOUSE WAYS AND
MEANs CoMMITTEE REPORT 1 (Oct. 1994) (on file with The George Washington journal of International Law and Economics).
561. Act, supra note 23, § 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4865-67 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)
(1994)).
562. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 47-48. The likelihood of material injury standard
is applicable and the same factors are considered, regardless of whether the ITC's initial
affirmative determination concerned material injury, threat of material injury, or material
retardation of an industry. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at
48. In addition to the factors discussed below, section 221 (a) calls for the lTC to consider
duty absorption (i.e., whether an importer affiliated with an exporter of dumped merchandise pays the antidumping duty after imposition of an order, rather than eliminating the
dumping in order to insulate the first unrelated buyer in the United States from the effects
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when it considers the question of how an exporter might respond
if the order to which it has been subject is lifted. Specifically, the
lTC evaluates whether removal of an order would be likely to result
in a significant increase of the following: (1) in the volume of
imports; (2) in price underselling and consequent price suppression or depression with respect to a domestic like product; and (3)
in impact on the domestic industry. 563 Some of the evaluative factors, which are set forth in section 221 (a) of the Act, plainly discourage the lTC from revoking an order. 564
For example, the lTC considers whether the state of the relevant
domestic industry has improved during the pendency of the
order. 565 This factor should cause the lTC to determine whether
the industry has taken measures, such as reducing costs and investing in new technology, to meet foreign competition. Instead, the
legislative history urges the lTC to maintain an order to protect a
U.S. industry.
[T] he lTC [is required] to consider whether any improvement
in the state of the industry is related to the existence of the
order .... The Committee believes that this is an important
inquiry. An antidumping ... order ... is expected to have a
beneficial effect on the domestic industry. The Committee does
not, therefore, believe that the lTC should find that there is no
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of material injury simply because the industry has improved after an order was
imposed .... Moreover, an improvement in the condition of the
industry after an order is imposed . . . may indicate that the industry is
likely to deteriorate if the order is revoked . . . .566

The legislative history also suggests that the lTC may make an
affirmative likelihood determination without data showing that the
current state of the relevant domestic industry is likely to deteriorate if the order is lifted. 567 This factor invites the lTC to confuse
correlation and causation. The lTC may conclude that if the
domestic industry improves during the order period, then "termiof the order) and the magnitude of the dumping margin. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at
49, 51.
563. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 50-51; see also HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at
60, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3842 (comparing the continuing material injury standard
and current material injury standard).
564. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 50.
565. See id. at 48.
566. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
567. The legislative history states that the lTC may make an affirmative likelihood
determination "notwithstanding the lack of any likely further deterioration of the current
condition of the domestic industry if revocation of the order ... would be likely to lead to
the continuation or recurrence of material injury." See HousE REPORT, supra note 18, at 60,
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.AN. 3832 (emphasis added); MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 884.
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nation of the order would result in continuing or recurring
injury." 568 Such a conclusion may be erroneous because the
improvement may be attributable to factors other than the order,
such as a change in market conditions during the order period.
Vulnerability of the U.S. industry is another factor that discourages revocation. The indicia of "vulnerability" are not set forth in
the Act, but generally the term connotes susceptibility to material
injury. 569 It does not matter if the industry is vulnerable because of
past dumping or poor management, mere vulnerability is sufficient.570 Thus, the ITC can renew an order where the cause of the
weakening of a domestic industry is not principally attributable to
imports. 571 Equally irrelevant is the. fact that causes other than
future imports may contribute to future injury. 572 Consequently,
the ITC may renew an order if the likely causes of future injury to a
vulnerable industry are economic recession and technological
change.
Finally, the DOC and the IT9 likelihood determinations share
common ambiguities. For instance, how far into the future should
568. Stafford & Chang, suf!ra note 540, at 749. The legislative history states that
[t]he ITC's prior injury determination] is an important consideration since this is
the most recent period in which imports of the merchandise under review competed in the U.S. market free of the discipline of an order ... [and that] if the
ITC finds that the conditions that led to the initial finding of material injury,
threat, or material retardation are likely to recur, it would be reasonable for the
ITC to conclude ... that there is a likelihood of continuation or recurrence of
material injury.
SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 48.
569. SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 49; MESSAGE, suf!ra note 69, at 885.
570. The legislative history states that
the concept of "vulnerability" is derived from existing standards for material
injury and threat of material injury. In material injury determinations, the ITC
considers other factors .... These other factors may account for the injury, but
they may also demonstrate that an industry is facing difficulties from a number of
sources and is vulnerable to dumped ... imports.
SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 49.
571. Stafford & Chang, suf!ra note 540, at 750.
572. MESSAGE, suf!ra note 69, at 885. Another factor arises in a sunset review of a case
involving an order affecting a regional U.S. industry. Section 221 (a) gives the ITC discretion to base its sunset review on its original injury determination for a particular regional
industry. If the original determination is no longer valid, the lTC may redefine the region
or examine the United States as a whole. Act, suf!ra note 23, § 221 (a), 108 Stat. at 4865
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(8) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 51. This
flexibility allows the ITC to account for the potential effects on marketing and distribution
of a dumped good after imposition of an order. SENATE REPORT, suf!ra note 18, at 51. This
discretion, however, allows the ITC to switch petitioners and thereby reincarnate an obsolete order. This discretion is potentially incongruous with the fundamental purpose of
sunset reviews. For instance, if an original determination applicable to producers in Virginia becomes obsolete, the lTC should not be able to reincarnate the order by considering Alabama producers.
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the DOC and the lTC look in an attempt to assess the likelihood of
a continuation or recurrence of dumping? The unsatisfactory
answer found in the legislative history to section 221 (a) is for "the
reasonably foreseeable future." 573 What if there are several "likely"
outcomes upon revocation? The legislative history of section
221 (a) of the Act lacks a relative weighing system for different outcomes. Section 221 (a) merely indicates that a decision to retain an
order is not erroneous where there are several "likely" outcomes, as
long as the likelihood determination is "reasonable in light of the
facts of the case."s74
In conclusion, the sunset review process resembles the midnight
sun. The DOC and the lTC likelihood determinations associated
with the sunset review process are, ironically, unlikely to lead to an
improvement in the United States's record of revoking orders,
since more orders may be renewed than revoked on their fifth
anniversary. To prevent the entrenchment of orders, the proposed
traffic-light system in Part V requires automatic termination of an
order after one year.
2.

The Presumption of New Shipper Guilt

Unfortunately, during the Uruguay Round negotiations the
United States rejected as unreasonable a proposal that exempted
new shippers. 575 The proposal required a new investigation before
imposing an antidumping duty on a new shipper. 576 The United
States, however, agreed to a proposal, embodied in Article 9.5 of
the Agreement577 and implemented by section 220(a) of the Act,
that provides a new shipper with an expedited review to establish
an individual dumping margin on the basis of that shipper's own
sales. 578
573. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 883. With respect to the ITC's likelihood determination, this period normally exceeds an "imminent" time frame which it uses in its initial
threat of material injury analysis. Id. at 887.
574. !d. at 883.
575. Section 220(a) of the Act defines a "new shipper" as an exporter who did not
export the merchandise in question to the United States during the original period of the
antidumping investigation and is not affiliated with any exporter who did export the merchandise to the United States during that period. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at
4866 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994)).
576. MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 875.
577. Agreement, supra note 19, at 15.
578. Act, supra note 23, § 220(a), 108 Stat. at 4858-59 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(a)(2)(B) (1994)); SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 43-44; HousE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3827.
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The new shipper review rule suffers from a conceptual weakness.
Automatically covering a new shipper in an antidumping order
results in an order which is overly broad in scope; a new shipper is
initially presumed guilty of dumping and a petitioner is initially
presumed worthy of protection from that new shipper. The rule
also suffers from practical defects. A new shipper review may
impose significant monetary and time costs on a new shipper. Article 9.5 states that antidumping duties cannot be imposed on a new
shipper's products during the period of review. 579 Under the 1930
Act a new shipper paid estimated antidumping duty deposits. 580
The legislative history of the current Act indicates that cash deposits, bonds, or other security can be posted, at the importer's
option, until the review is completed. 581 Undoubtedly, posting a
bond is less costly than depositing cash; however, a new shipper
still incurs the cost of a lost opportunity when required to purchase
a bond. Further, it is unclear how long an "accelerated" review will
take. A reasonable estimate, based on the DOC's past performance
and the fact that there is no mandatory date for completion, is at
least one year. The effect of the rule may be to discourage new
shippers facing an antidumping duty from exporting to the United
States, thereby making the industry less competitive and making
consumers worse off. To avoid these defects, the traffic-light system
proposed in Part V eliminates the automatic extension of an order
to a new shipper and requires a new investigation before an order
can be imposed on that shipper.
V.

TowARD A TRAFFIC-LIGHT SYSTEM

Both in the United States and elsewhere, antidumping laws go
beyond preventing anti-competitive practices-which should be
their rationale-and often have the effect of protecting domestic industries from foreign competition. 582

A.

System Overview

Part IV argued that ambiguities in the Agreement and the Act,
coupled with a neglect of fundamental microeconomic principles,
facilitate protectionist abuse. What should the Uruguay Round
negotiators have done? First, the negotiators should have placed
579. Agreement, supra note 19, at 15.
580. 19 C.F.R §§ 353.14, 353.15 (1995). The deposit amounts are based on "all others"
rates.
581. SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 44.
582. EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 239 (Feb. 1994).
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greater emphasis on certainty and predictability; they should have
made greater use of bright-line rules and clearly defined terms and
phrases to curtail opportunities for protectionist abuse. Second,
the negotiators should have paid more attention to the underlying
microeconomic rationales for cross-border price discrimination,
rather than focusing on the mere act of such discrimination. The
negotiators should have attempted to classify the behavior of an
exporter according to its cost structure and based on this classification, they should have narrowed the range of actionable dumping
situations.
These prescriptions suggest parameters for a new antidumping
scheme that would be less susceptible to protectionist abuse. A proposal for such a scheme-the "traffic-light" system-is offered
below. The system is akin to .that established for countervailing
duty law in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. 583 It outlaws only predatory dumping
that is a substantial cause of material injury; it limits the duration of
an antidumping order; and it eliminates anticircumvention rules.
The system, therefore, is simpler and less susceptible to abuse than
the system set out under the Agreement and the Act.
B.

System Theory

The microeconomic theory underlying the traffic-light system is
the cost structure of a firm. The theory is graphically represented
at Appendix B. 5 s4 The total cost ofproduction a firm incurs rises as
the quantity of output produced by that firm increases. 585 Total
cost is defined as the sum of fixed and variable costs. 586 Fixed costs
arise from short-run contractual commitments, such as wages and
salaries, rental and lease payments, interest on outstanding debt,
583. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, Hein's
No. KAV 3778; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 1533. The traffic-light proposal might also result
in a closer alignment between antidumping law and antitrust law on predatory pricing.
Interestingly, in 1923, Viner proposed a tripartite system. He distinguished among three
different kinds of dumping: sporadic, short-run, and long-run dumping. Viner argued that
firms can adapt to sporadic dumping and long-run dumping leads to gains for consumers
that outweigh losses to producers in the importing country. However, short-run dumping
was predatory-the exporter might intentionally undercut producers of the like product
in the importing country to drive them out of business, establish a monopoly, recoup its
losses from dumping, and earn monopoly rents. Thus, short-run dumping should be
actionable in order to protect consumers in the importing country. See Hoekman & Leidy,
supra note 28, at 160 n.13 and accompanying text.
584. The discussion below is drawn in part from SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at 427-32,
439-46.
585. Id. at 439-40.
586. Id. at 440-42.
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and depreciation. 587 Even if a firm halts production, it must continue to meet these obligations. Fixed costs, therefore, are
expenses incurred even with zero output. 58B As output rises, average fixed costs fall. 589 Variable costs consist of that portion of total
costs other than fixed costs. Variable costs equal zero when no output is produced and increase as the level of output increases. Average variable costs decrease as output increases because of
economies of scale in production and the pattern of marginal
costs. Later, when these economies of scale are exhausted, average
variable costs will rise as output increases. 590 Average total costs
consist of the sum of averaged fixed and average variable costs.
Average total costs initially fall but later rise as output increases
because of the pattern of average variable costs. 5 9 1
Finally, the marginal cost of the firm's output is the increment of
total cost that results from producing one additional unit of output. As the firm begins to produce, its marginal costs decline to a
minimum positive number because of increasing economies of
scale that result from using some or all factors of production. Each
additional unit of a variable factor of production yields more than
one additional unit of output. 5 92 When marginal costs fall, each
incremental unit of output pulls down average variable and average total costs. Eventually, however, marginal costs will begin to
rise. This increase, known as the law of diminishing returns, operates to reduce the extra output that results from an incremental
variable factor. 593 In turn, average variable and average total costs
begin to rise with incremental units of output. Accordingly, the
marginal cost curve, depicted in the graph, must intersect the minimum points of the average cost and average variable cost curves.
When marginal costs fall, average total and average variable costs
are, by definition, falling. Conversely, when marginal costs rise,
587. /d. at 440-41.
588. /d.
589. Average fixed cost (AFC) at a given quantity of output (Q) is calculated by dividing fixed costs (FC) at that quantity by that quantity, i.e., AFC = FC/Q. The numerator is
constant at all levels of output. Hence, average fixed cost falls as the denominator rises. /d.
at 441, Fig. 24-1.
590. The average variable cost (AVC) at a given quantity of output (Q) is calculated by
dividing the variable cost (VC) for that quantity of output by that level, i.e., AVC = VC/Q.
591. Average total cost (ATC) is calculated by summing AFC and AVC and dividing the
result by Q. As Q increases, ATC is "pulled up" by AVC.
592. Variable factors of production are those factors that can be altered in the shan
run, such as labor. In contrast, in the shan run, a firm cannot alter the amount of a fixed
factor, such as land used in the production process.
593. SAMUELSON, supra note 53, at 428.
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average total and average variable costs also must rise; any average
curve is pulled down when marginal costs are falling and pushed
up when they are rising.s94
This cost structure reveals a firm's break-even and shut-down
points. The break-even point is the point where the price for the
firm's output equals its minimum average total cost, which, by definition, is where the marginal and average total cost curves
intersect:
Price= Marginal Cost= Minimum Average Cost.
At the break-even point, the firm earns no excess profits in the
long run. Yet, it is economically rational for the firm to continue
producing because it covers both its fixed and variable costs. Below
this point, the firm cannot cover its total costs-it covers its fixed
costs, but not all of its variable costs. Nevertheless, it still may be
rational for the firm to continue to produce and sell merchandise
at a price below the break-even point, as long as the price remains
above the shut-down point.
The shut-down point is the point where the price for the firm's
output is at or below its minimum average variable cost. By definition, the shut-down point occurs where the marginal and average
variable costs curves intersect:
Price= Marginal Cost= Minimum Average Variable Cost.
At or below the shut-down point, the firm cannot cover any of its
variable costs. When the price for its output is so low that it receives
less revenue than the variable cost incurred from producing the
output, it is economically rational for the firm to cease production.
C.

1.

System operation

Red-light Dumping

The traffic-light system eliminates the comparison between
prices in the home and importing countries. As one observer
noted, granting protection on the basis of price in a foreign market
is "irrational."595 There is no need to calculate NV; the concept is
abolished. Thus, opportunities for protectionist manipulation associated with adjustments-the 5% home-market viability test, thirdcountry sales, below-cost sales, intermediate country sales, and currency conversion-are eliminated. Instead, dumping is defined in
terms of the cost structure of the respondent. The DOC compares
594.
595.

!d. at 441, 443, fig. 24-1 (b).
PHIUP SLAYTON, THE ANTI-DUMPING TRIBUNAL

65 (1979).
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the respondent's cost of production, focusing on its break-even
and shut--down points for the subject merchandise, and the EP or
CEP of the subject merchandise. 596 The dumping margin formula
is:
Dumping Margin = Cost of Production - EP (or CEP).
Cost of production consists of the sum of the cost of factor inputs;
principally, labor, land and physical capital, and general expenses,
with no allowance for profits. 597 Cost of production should include
the cost of transporting the subject merchandise to and selling it in
the United States. The issue should be whether it is rational to sell
the merchandise in the United States, not whether it is rational to
sell in general. Additionally, if cost of production incorporates all
items that are also included in the EP or CEP, then the need to
make adjustments and the risk of manipulation is reduced.
This cost of production calculation is not unwieldy for three reasons. First, it is similar in manner to the way in which the DOC
calculates NV for nonmarket economies, except that the DOC
"borrows" the cost factors from comparable market economies.
Hence, the DOC already has experience in using this methodology. Second, the DOC examines the actual data from the respondent's audited financial information that most closely corresponds
to the period in which red-light dumping is alleged. 598 This examination is based on information provided by the exporter in
response to the DOC's antidumping questionnaire. The DOC may
request verification of this information from the exporter if the
DOC believes such verification is necessary. Third, the DOC's questionnaire, which is currently being revised, is extensive. 599 Because
section D of the draft revised questionnaire concerns cost of pro596. Readers familiar with antitrust Jaw will recognize an analogy between this proposal
and the Areeda-Tumer test for predatory pricing. Under that test a price lower than reasonably anticipated short-run marginal cost is predatory because a profit-maximizing producer in a competitive market should supply a quantity of output at which price equals
marginal cost. However, because of practical difficulties in measuring marginal cost, average variable cost is used as a proxy for marginal cost. Thus, the test states that a price lower
than average variable cost-which is referred to here as the shut-down point-is illegal. See
HoVENKAMP, supra note 61, at 300. The Areeda-Tumer test has been widely debated in the
antitrust literature. See supra note 61.
597. More specifically, cost of production is calculated in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles (GMP). See PATTISON, supra note 72, § 5.05[6].
598. In the absence of actual data, threshold amounts could be ascribed for the cost of
factor inputs and general expenses.
599. See Notice, Request for Public CommentS on Revised Antidumping Questionnaire,
60 Fed. Reg. 26,026 (1995); U.S. Dep't of Comm. Import Admin. Office of Antidumping
Investigations, Request for Information (May 10, 1995) (on file with The George Washington
Journal of International Law and Economics).
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duction, there should be little difficulty in obtaining information
relevant to the cost of production calculation. In effect, the burden
is on respondents to maintain and provide this information.
The DOC's goal, when comparing items one and two above, is to
identify the respondent's break-even and shut-down points. Based
on its identification of break-even and shut-down points, the DOC
categorizes the respondent's activity as red-light, yellow-light, or
green-light dumping. A bright-line legal presumption is associated
with each category which, in turn, allows the DOC to filter out
those petitions that simply seek protection from a respondent that
is more efficient. ·
Admittedly, values assigned to the break-even and shut-down
points are likely to vary with the measurement period. A measurement period that is too short must be avoided because in the short
run virtually all costs are fixed. Conversely, it is necessary to avoid
using a measurement period that is too long because in the long
run a respondent can vary all of its inputs in the production process and adjust all of its contractual commitments. A measurement
period that is too long, therefore, provides a respondent with an
opportunity to react to market trends, such as changes in tastes and
technological developments. Over time, an exporter can substitute
fixed for variable costs, and thereby manipulate its shut-down
point. 600 By deliberately increasing fixed costs in relation to variable costs to lower the shut-down point, the respondent reduces the
likelihood of a red-light dumping determination. There are two
advantages to linking the measurement period to the period of
alleged red-light dumping. First, linking the measurement period
to the alleged dumping period creates an unambiguous standard
and, therefore, forecloses arguments that the period is too short or
too long. Second, it is fair.
With respect to red-light dumping, the threshold question is
whether an exporter is engaged in predatory dumping if it sells its
product in the importing country below its shut-down point-at a
price below its minimum average variable cost. Under these circumstances it is reasonable to conclude that predatory dumping is
occurring. The exporter is behaving aggressively, perhaps ruthlessly; it is sustaining losses which, if it were a profit-maximizing
enterprise, would cause it to shut down. At this point, it is fair to
infer that the exporter seeks to drive its competitors in the importing country out of business, establish a monopoly position, and
600.

PosNER,

supra note 56,

at 308-09.
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reap monopoly rents. Although it can still be argued that the
exporter is behaving in an economically rational manner, the
exporter is sacrificing short-run for long-run profits in favor of
market share, 601 and the net welfare effect of such behavior on the
importing country will surely be negative because competition will
be lessened. Red-light dumping, therefore, creates an irrebuttable
presumption against the respondent that it is engaging in predatory pricing and a rebuttable presumption that such pricing has
injurious effects.
These presumptions shift the battleground to the lTC. No final
antidumping duty is imposed and no estimated deposit is required
until the lTC renders a final affirmative determination that the
red-light dumping is the substantial cause of material injury. Its
method of injury determination has, consequentially, been
reformed in four ways. First, the lTC must focus on cost differentials. The lTC cannot use the magnitude of a dumping margin as a
basis for a final affirmative determination; it must obtain direct evidence of material injury. An interesting case arises when a petitioner has shown that a respondent's EP is below the respondent's
shut-down point and also proves that either this EP is below the
petitioner's shut-down point, or that this EP is below the average
shut-down point for the relevant U.S. industry. Arguably, it may be
inferred that the petitioner is of "typical" efficiency; at least as efficient as the respondent but cannot compete with the EP. Alternatively, it may be justified to infer that red-light dumping, not the
petitioner's inefficiency, is the substantial cause of material injury.
Second, the dumping of the subject merchandise must be the
"substantial" cause of injury. "Substantial" causation is defined in
the same way as it is for escape clause actions under section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974: Substantial causation is "important and not
less than any other cause. "602 Dumping must be isolated as a causal
factor and other possibilities must be excluded. The respondent
can rebut the presumption of injurious effects by introducing evidence of additional or more substantial causes of iftiury, most notably that the petitioner's cost structure indicates it is an inefficient
producer.
Third, the inherently speculative bases for an iftiury determination of threat and material retardation are eliminated. Only actual
material iftiury suffices. Although eliminating these bases means
the lTC cannot take preventive action against dumped merchan601.
602.

See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 151-54.
19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(B) (1994).
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dise, waiting until actual injury occurs not only lessens the chance
of an inefficient petitioner obtaining undeserved protection,· but
also compels the inefficient petitioner to adjust and respond to foreign competitive pressures. This represents a legal policy choice
that only actual, not prospective, harm should be redressed.
Finally, the lTC must ignore any distinction between merchant and
captive markets. Accordingly, a petitioner is unable to artificially
narrow the defined market under investigation.
The ITC's determination could also be reformed to include an
examination of the extent to which injury occurs to competition in
the relevant industry and to consumer interests. First, the lTC
could question whether there are barriers to entry in the relevant
U.S. industry. For example, consider a hypothetical case where a
respondent engaged in red-light dumping forces a U.S. company,
Firm A, out of business. If there are significant barriers, no U.S. or
foreign company can challenge the respondent in the industry.
Not only is Firm A injured, but industry competition and consumer
interests are also injured. Alternatively, if there are no barriers to
entry into the industry, another U.S. company, Firm B, can commence operations and compete with the respondent. The respondent may then again engage in red-light dumping and force Firm B
into insolvency. Yet again, another domestic rival, Firm C, may rise
to take the place of Firm Band compete with the respondent. This
process causes a hemorrhage of the respondent's profits because it
has to continue to lower its price to eliminate the challenge of each
new domestic competitor. Thus, as one antitrust scholar explains,
[t]he rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses
today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The
monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if new
entrants appear soon after the successful predator attempts to
raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market
contains significant barriers to new entry. The relevant barriers are
Bainian, not Stiglerian: that is, one must ask whether post-predation monopoly profits will be disciplined by new entry. 603
Accordingly, in the above example, because of low barriers to
entry, the respondent cannot reap the benefits of predation by
charging monopoly prices after a competitor has been dispatched.
Second, the lTC should consider the respondent's share of the
market for the subject merchandise. Again, consider the example
of the respondent engaged in red-light dumping that drives Firm A
out of business. Suppose the respondent has 5% of the aggregate
603.

HOVENKAMP,

supra note 61, at 310 (emphasis added).
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market share for the subject merchandise. Surely this case should
be treated differently from one in which the respondent's market
share is 90%. As one antitrust scholar puts it: "A market with two
competitors, one of which is very large, is far more conducive to
predatory pricing than a market with several relatively small competitors. Predatory pricing is simply implausible in competitive
markets. "604
In sum, to determine whether the respondent has rebutted the
presumption that pricing associated with red-light dumping has
injurious effects, the lTC should undertake two further examinations. First, the lTC should attempt to determine whether there are
significant barriers to entry in the relevant industry. Next, the lTC
should determine whether the respondent has a significant share
of the market for the subject merchandise. As intimated above,
these inquiries overlap with antitrust analysis. More research may
be needed to determine whether these inquiries are appropriate in
the antidumping context and whether other factors, such as the
existence of excess capacity in the respondent's firm or the disposition of productive assets of a petitioner that has gone bankrupt, 605
are relevant. However, one advantage to the application of antitrust analysis is readily apparent; if the absence of barriers to entry
and a large market share rebut the presumption that red-light
dumping is injurious, a petitioner's likelihood of success is
reduced. In tum, the risk of protectionist abuse may be lessened.
Under the red-light dumping scheme outlined above, if the lTC
finds injury, the DOC issues an antidumping order. The duty
equals the difference between the EP or CEP and the respondent's
shut-down point. The order terminates automatically in two years
from the date of issuance, during which time the petitioner is
expected to implement changes to respond to foreign competition.606 Under the red-light dumping scheme, therefore, sunset
reviews are unnecessary because the order cannot be extended607
and the petitioner cannot petition for a new order within two years
of the date of expiration of the initial order. At any point during
the duration of an order, the respondent may request an administrative review for the purpose of proving that it no longer engages
604. /d. at 309.
605. See id. at 311-13.
606. In contrast, under the escape clause-section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended-the period of relief, including any provisional relief, is four years. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2253(e) (1) (A) (1994).
607. In contrast, under the escape clause, extensions are permissible but the aggregate
period of relief cannot exceed eight years. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(e) (1)(B) (ii) (1994).
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in red-light dumping or to adjust the margin of dumping and
amount of duty imposed. Upon such proof, the DOC would be
required to lift or amend the order.
To further avoid protectionist abuse, the presumption regarding
new shippers is reversed. A new shipper is automatically exempt
from an antidumping order. Only a new petition filed against a
new shipper could lead to an order against it. Likewise, allegations
of circumvention are treated not by expanding an existing order,
but rather by initiating a new case. Admittedly, it may be necessary
to allow for an exception to the automatic exemption for new shippers. In an industry in which production facilities are easily mobile,
a dumper could move to a new country and establish itself as a new '
shipper. Arguably, this dumper is not a bona fide new shipper and
should not receive the automatic exemption.
What if some, but not all, of the exporter's sales in the importing
country occur at or below its shut-down point? The issue is whether
the exporter's yellow-light and green-light sales608 should offset its
red-light sales. Under the traffic-light system, the propetitioner bias
in favor of finding large dumping margins by barring offsets is
eliminated; offsets are permitted.
Economists may object to making red-light dumping actionable
because, as an empirical matter, predatory pricing does not occur
very often. 609 For example, "[r]ather than being predatory in motivation, the low price in the importing country may be merely an
attempt to meet the competition of local firms in the importing
country ... [or] competition in the local market of some thirdcountry exporter." 610 This objection misunderstands the proposed
traffic-light system: The whole point of the system is to narrow the
scope of antidumping law. In practice, foreign companies are often
accused of predatory pricing. Typically, a foreign company is puz608. See discussion infra pan V.2-.3.
609. See, e.g., DAM, supra note 29, at 169 (stating that "[a] review of cases in which
dumping duties have been imposed will uncover few cases in which domestic firms have in
fact been driven out of business" (foomote omitted)); Deardorff, supra note 29, at 35-36
(noting that "economists have routinely dismissed predatory dumping as so unlikely that it
should not be used to justify anti-dumping duties"); Hockman & Leidy, supra note 28, at
161 (finding that "in practice cases of successful predatory dumping remain undocumented" (foomote omitted)); PosNER, supra note 56, at 305 (noting that in the antitrust
context "[c]onfirmed instances of predatory price discrimination were rare even before
the practice was illegal"); see also Brenda S. Levine, Predatory Pricing Conspiracies After Matsushita Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.: Can an Antitrust Plaintiff Survive the Supreme
Court's Skepticism?, 22 INT'L LAw. 529, 537 (1988) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court,
throughout its discussion of Matsushita, "expressed skepticism that a predatory pricing conspiracy could ever arise" (foomote omitted)).
610. DAM, supra note 29, at 168.
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zled by such an accusation, asking how it can be accused of dumping when its U.S. prices are the same as or higher than the prices of
its U.S. competitors. Interestingly, one economist explains that
"[t]he truth of the matter is that predatory dumping by foreigners
in the U.S. market is much less of a problem than predatory protectionists who use alleged dumping by foreigners as an excuse to
obtain protection in the domestic market."6 11
In addition, the phenomenon of multiple-benefit predation is
sometimes observed in the antitrust context. Multiple-benefit predation "occurs when the predator predates in one situation, but
stands to benefit in several." 612 This phenomenon could occur in
the antidumping context. For example, a foreign company might
predatorially dump a product in only one market in which it competes. In the other markets, the foreign company intends to intimidate rivals into maintaining, not cutting, their prices. Thus,
multiple-benefit pricing is a signal emanating from the one market
in which dumping occurs but is directed at competitors in other
markets. The signal is designed to impose price discipline in those
other markets. Finally, and more generally, even if undesirable
behavior rarely occurs or leads to adverse results, it does not follow
that a law against that behavior is unjustified. Infrequent violations
may be a testament to the success of the law in deterring the
behavior.
A second objection that can be raised against making red-light
dumping actionable is that even when predatory dumping does
occur, the exporter may have to keep its price fairly low to discourage potential competitors from reentering the market. 613 The
exporter, in this scenario, would not necessarily reap monopoly
rents; therefore, imposing an antidumping duty on it may not be
justified. The defect in this objection is that it emphasizes price as a
barrier to entry, where in fact many nonprice factors are potential
barriers to entry. It is difficult to forecast the criteria by which
potential competitors will make entry decisions.
611. KRAuss, supra note 29, at 70-71.
612. HoVENKAMP, supra note 61, at 306.
613. See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 36 (noting that in order for predatory pricing to
be successful, the predator must prevent reentry and that this is most easily done "by keeping price fairly low"); Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 161 (noting that "even if all
competitors worldwide were driven from the market, to be able successfully to exploit market power over time, barriers to entry in the postpredatory phase must be present" (footnote omitted)); PoSNER, supra note 56, at 305 (discussing the costs of predation to the
predator in the antitrust context).
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A third objection posits that even if predatory dumping drives
competitors out of the importing country, it may not eliminate
other exporters from the market. 614 An exporter engaged in predatory dumping will not necessarily become a monopolist; rather, it
may face fierce competition from other exporters (assuming all
exporters do not collude). Again, however, this approach lacks predictive power. Whether other exporters will remain standing after a
sustained onslaught of dumping by one exporter cannot be known
until after the battle. Moreover, this objection implicitly, and reasonably, assumes that what should matter is competition, not the
national identities of the competitors. But no country likes to see a
domestic industry wiped out and supplanted by foreigner
companies.
Fourth, and finally, proving predation is difficult, particularly if
the law demands evidence of intent.
[G] iven that the principal theoretical rationale for [antidumping] is the predation argument, one could argue that use of
[antidumping] should be limited to such cases. Of course, it will
be quite difficult to establish the .intent of the dumping firm. However,
one could require that certain necessary conditions be met that
are expected to be positively correlated with the possibility of
predation. Market share and concentration ratios are obvious
possibilities in this connection. For example, it could be
required that firms that are dumping have x% of the global market, and that there exist [sic] at least a concentration ratio for
the global industry of y% . . . . [I]n practice market shares of
countries facing [antidumping] investigations are often
negligible. 615

To be sure, requiring direct evidence of intent is likely to be too
difficult a standard for petitioners to meet. Indeed, there has been
no prosecution under the Antidumping Act of 1916, which contains an intent test. 616 One possible solution would be to admit circumstantial evidence of the exporter's motivation. Such evidence
could pertain to objectively quantifiable factors, such as those suggested in the above-quoted passage. The traffic-light system, however, dispenses with the problem of intent by making red-light
614. See Deardorff, supra note 29, at 150.
615. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 28, at 177-78 (emphasis added) (foomote omitted).
616. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F.
Supp. 1190, 1243 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that "despite its venerable age (64 years), [the
1916 Act] is virtually a statute of first impression"); Kermit W. Almstedt, International Price
Discriminatian and the 1916 Antidumping Act-Are Amendments in Order?, 13 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 747, 756-57 (1981); Roy L. Prosterman, Witholding of Appraisement Under the
United States Anti-Dumping Act: Protectionism Or Unfair Competition Law?, 41 WASH. L. REv.
315, 316 n.4 (1966).
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dumping a strict liability offense. This resolution helps minimize
uncertainty and narrows the scope of disagreement between a petitioner and respondent.
2.

Yellow-light Dumping

Is an exporter dumping if it sells its product in the importing
country at a price somewhere in between its break-even and shutdown points-at a price below its minimum average total cost but
above its average variable cost? The answer is not clear. As discussed above, there are strong justifications for believing that, at
least in the short-run, such yellow-light pricing is rational, not predatory, and has no net adverse welfare effect. 617 However, a counterargument can be made that if the exporter continues to price its
product between the two critical points over a long period, it may
be engaging in predation. If competitors are eliminated and the
market becomes oligopolistic or monopolistic, the net welfare
effect of yellow-light pricing would be negative.
Because there are plausible competing explanations, a presumption of predatory intent against the respondent is unjustified.
Thus, in the event of yellow-light dumping, the DOC should issue a
cautionary statement to the respondent, informing it that its pricing strategy for the subject merchandise is nearing the point of redlight dumping which, in turn, will trigger certain presumptions
against the respondent. However, no lTC injury determination is
made, no antidumping duties are imposed, and no deposits
required. The investigation is terminated and the caution has no
precedential value in a subsequent action.
Suppose a respondent receives more than one caution within a
short period of time; for example, within three years. In this case
tougher action against the respondent is merited. One option is to
require the respondent to submit cost and price information to the
DOC so that it can closely monitor the respondent's pricing behavior. A second option is to presume that the respondent is engaged
in red-light dumping.
It may be argued that this proposal will encourage petitioners to
file yellow-light dumping cases in order to inject price uncertainty
into the respondent's calculus. If the proposed yellow-light scheme
does lead to bad-faith yellow-light petitions, the system could be
tightened, perhaps by presuming that the first microeconomic
617.

See supra notes 342-350 and accompanying text.
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explanation discussed above is correct-that there is no predation.
In turn, only red-light petitions would be accepted.
"
3.

Green-light Dumping

Finally, is an exporter dumping when it sells in the importing
country at or above its break-even point-at a price equal to or
above its minimum average total cost? Clearly, the answer to this
question must be negative; hence, this case is one of green-light
dumping. Regardless of the relationship between the price of the
subject merchandise and the price of the foreign like product, the
respondent is acting in an economically rational manner. The
respondent not only covers its ·total costs, but may also earn a
profit. The only recourse for a producer in the importing country
claiming harm from green-light dumping is to reduce its own cost
structure to match that of the respondent. 618 If the DOC renders a
green-light dumping determination, the entire investigation is
automatically terminated without an lTC injury determination.
Thus, as in yellow-light dumping, a green-light dumping case is a
one-step matter. As with the yellow-light case, no antidumping
duties are imposed and no deposits are required.
D.

System Appraisal

The central purpose of the traffic-light system is to limit the risk
of protectionist abuse. By restricting the scope of actionable dumping behavior, the traffic-light system makes antidumping law a less
attractive, more difficult remedy to obtain. By classifying dumping
behavior and attaching definite legal consequences to each category, the law is simpler and less ambiguous than under the Agreement or the Act.
Of course, the traffic-light system does not solve every problem
identified in Part IV. Important issues about the dumping margin
calculation must be considered. For example, problems of cost
allocation and start-up operations need to be resolved. Likewise,
the adjustment and currency conversion, problems discussed in
Part IV.B.8. supra, need to be addressed. Nor does the traffic-light
system suggest possible improvements to procedural aspects of preliminary and final determinations. Accordingly, the system is only a
618. See PosNER, supra note 56, at 309-10 ("It can be argued that if U.S. industry is hurt
when the Japanese firm is selling at a price equal to its marginal cost, it is a self-inflicted
hurt, a hurt due to the failure of the U.S. firms either to minimize their costs or to compete." (footnote omitted)).
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partially complete first draft that attempts to distinguish the protectionist abuser from the meritorious petitioner.
Three issues are of particular significance. 619 First, if red-light
dumping is found, should there be an exception to the imposition
of an antidumping duty if the dumped product is not made or is in
short supply in the United States? A "no or short supply" exception
would consider the interests of consumers in the dumped products. If the dumped product does not exist in the United States, or
is in insufficiently short supply to meet domestic consumption
needs, then
the application of dumping duties to imports of that product
only serves to punish U.S. industrial users, without providing any
counterbalancing benefit to domestic producers. In this situation, there are only two true beneficiaries of the dumping
duties: foreign suppliers, who can raise their prices in the U.S.
market and earn windfall profits at the expense of U.S. industrial users; and the downstream foreign competitors of the U.S.
industrial users, who gladly find their American counterparts
hamstrung by higher costs. The higher costs from antidumping
duties have a serious adverse impact on the ability of U.S. industrial users to compete in world markets and may ultimately
translate into a loss of U.S. jobs.62°
It is noteworthy that Canada and the European Union have a "no
or short supply" exception in their antidumping laws. Their exceptions take the form of either a public interest test, whereby
antidumping duties are not imposed if such imposition would be
against the public interest, or a lesser duty rule, whereby the
amount of the duty imposed is less than the dumping margin. 621
Alternatively, there may be a valid economic reason for not instituting a "no or short supply" exception. The point of imposing a
duty is to level the competitive playing field and give the petitioner
"breathing room" to reinvigorate its operations.
[C]laims that the injured domestic industry should not be concerned when it is unable to supply all or any of a particular item
ignore the commercial reality of why companies stop producing
or never start producing a particular item-expected inadequate return on investment. Without the correction of the price
discrimination, domestic producers will not be able to make
market-driven decisions about expanding production, reentering products where prior dumped pricing signals dictated market exit. There is no realistic way to provide the market signals
619.
ing law,
620.
621.

For a discussion of these issues in the context of post-Uruguay Round antidumpsee Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 503-11.
Holmer et al., supra note 23, at 503.
Id.
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where products are exempted from payment of duty. Such a system also would have the perverse effect of rewarding the most
successful dumpers-those that have eliminated all domestic
production of an item or prevented U.S. companies from ever
commencing production. 622
Put simply, an antidumping duty does not eliminate supply from
the U.S. market, but rather confers upon U.S. companies the
opportunity to compete with fairly priced imports. A "no or short
supply" exception would eliminate this opportunity.
Second, if red-light antidumping duties are imposed on a
respondent, should such duties be treated as a cost of doing business in the United States and deducted from the EP when calculating the dumping margin? Consider a case where a U.S. importer of
a dumped product is unrelated to the foreign producer or
exporter of that product. If an antidumping duty is imposed on the
unrelated importer, the importer has two choices. First, it may
attempt to pass on all or a portion of the duty to its U.S. customer.
Second, it may absorb all or a portion of the duty, essentially treating the duty as a cost of doing business.
If the importer selects the first option, it loses some of its competitive advantage over U.S. producers of the like product because
the price of its product rises by the amount of the duty not
absorbed. If the importer selects the second option, again, it loses
some of its competitive advantage over U.S. competitors because its
costs rise by the amount of the duty absorbed. This situation is to
be contrasted with one in which the U.S. importer and its foreign
supplier are related. If the importer chooses to absorb all or some
of the antidumping duty, then relief for the U.S. producers of the
like product is "artificially curtailed." 623 "This result is due to the
twin facts that the prices to the importer's customers have not been
raised, or not raised sufficiently, and the importer is not a potential
customer for the domestic producers. "624 In effect, the cost of the
duty is allocated among two related companies on a nonarmslength basis, and the price of the dumped product charged to U.S.
customers does not rise to reflect payment of the duty.
Interestingly, since 1986 the European Union has treated
antidumping duties as a cost and deducted them from the EP. 625
The result is, of course, a larger dumping margin. The United
622.
623.
624.
625.

!d.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

505.
506.
506-07.
508.
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States has consistently rejected this approach. 626 Instead, under the
Act, during the second and fourth administrative reviews, the DOC
will, upon request, consider whether a foreign producer or
exporter sells a product through an affiliated importer in the
United States that absorbs antidumping duties instead of eliminating the dumping. 627 If the DOC makes an affirmative finding of
duty absorption, it must inform the ITC, which may consider the
finding in its sunset review to determine whether injury is likely to
continue or recur. 628 The dumping margin, however, is not
affected by an affirmative finding.629
Third, when red-light antidumping duties are collected, should
the proceeds be given to the petitioner to enable it to invest in
production improvements and worker training so that it can
become more competitive? The emotional appeal of distributing
the proceeds to those injured by dumping is powerful. Moreover,
the economic reasons may be compelling. First, those injured by
dumping are in the best position to utilize the proceeds for investment in physical capital, human capital, and other productive
inputs. Second, potential respondents may feel additional pressure
not to dump when they realize that duties imposed on them are
transferred directly to their competitors.
However, one problem with a scheme to channel the proceeds
from antidumping duties to petitioners is that it may violate Article
18.1 of the Agreement. 630 That article states that antidumping
duties are to be the exclusive remedy for dumping. 631 Would the
transfer of proceeds amount to a different remedy or merely a
derivative of the imposition of duties? A second concern, and possibly a more serious problem, is that the scheme may give rise to a
countervailing domestic subsidy under Article VI of GATT 194 7
and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.632

626. See, e.g., MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 885 (stating that the Act is not to be interpreted to treat antidumping duties as a cost).
627. See Act, supra note 23, § 221, 108 Stat. at 4865 (codfied at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) ( 4)
(1994)}; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 885.
628. See Act, supra note 23, § 221, 108 Stat. at 4865-66 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1675(a)(4), 1675a(a}(1)(D) (1994)}; MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 886.
629. See MESSAGE, supra note 69, at 885.
630. Holmer et a!., supra note 23, at 511.
631. See Agreement, supra note 19, at 22.
632. Holmer et a!., supra note 23, at 511.
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CONCLUSION

Rethinking antidumping law was a responsibility of the Uruguay
Round negotiators. They failed. They perpetuated a law filled with
ambiguities surrounding the filing of dumping petitions, dumping
margin calculations, injury determinations, anticircumvention, and
reviews. They perpetuated a law incongruous with fundamental
microeconomic precepts. The post-Uruguay Round regime, therefore, is at least as susceptible to protectionist abuse as its predecessor. Sadly, antidumping law remains a major potential nontariff
barrier to trade. The proposed traffic-light system is an effort at
pragmatic reform. Its aim is to reduce ambiguity in the law, and
infuse it with microeconomic logic.
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PRE- AND PosT-URUGUAY RouND TERMINOLOGY
AND ABBREVIATIONS

Pre-Uruguay Round Term and
Abbreviation

Post-Uruguay Round Term and
Abbreviation

Class or kind of merchandise
subject to investigation
Constructed Value (CV)
Exporter's Sales Price (ESP)
Department of Commerce (DOC)
Foreign Market Value (FMV)
International Trade Commission
(lTC)
Less Than Fair Value (LTFV)
Like product
Purchaser's Price (PP)
Such or similar merchandise
United States Price (USP)
United States Trade
Representative (USTR)

Subject merchandise
Constructed Value (CV)
Constructed Export Price ( CEP)
Department of Commerce (DOC)
Normal Value (NV)
International Trade Commission
(lTC)
Less Than Fair Value (LTFV)
Domestic like product
Export Price (EP)
Foreign like product
No comparable term
United States Trade
Representative (USTR)
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GRAPHS
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ATC

Qa

SHUT .. DOWN POINT

BREAK-EVEN POINT

Quantity of Merchandise Sold
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B.
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TC
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Costs
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Costs
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